

5 Oct 60

WEEKLY COMINT ECONOMIC BRIEFING

1. INDICATIONS OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA

Soviet shipping and [redacted] messages of 23 September indicate that the cargo ship Atkarsk had arrived that day in Port Nikolaev (the primary Soviet Black Sea port for loading arms for export) to load 2,454 tons of "Yastrebov's" cargo and was scheduled to arrive in Cuba between 21 and 31 October. (Yastrebov, a Soviet trade official, has been associated with the export of Soviet military cargo from Port Nikolaev since 1956.) These messages also reveal that the cargo ship Nikolaj Burdenko, (which loaded 3,234 tons of unknown cargo in Nikolaev from 9 to 16 September), would arrive in Cuba between 10 and 20 October.

Communications intelligence also indicates that the Soviet ship Kirov is probably now en route to Cuba, possibly carrying arms; and that another ship (Leninogorsk) is now loading cargo at Nikolaev for Cuba.

(Two Soviet ships are known to have delivered military equipment to Cuba; the Ilya Mechnikov on 8 September and the Solnechnogorsk on 23 September.)

[redacted]

3
A
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5
Oct
60

DECLASSIFIED BY [redacted] ON [redacted]
 by Director, NSA, [redacted]
 [redacted] DATE 2 Oct 98

8. PRESENCE IN CUBA OF SOVIET ARMS EXPORT CHIEF

Information has become available that during the first week of August the Embassy in Havana received visa requests from two officials of the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate (CED) of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, the Soviet organization responsible for export of military equipment. The two officials--Deputy Chairman of the CED

-3-

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

DECLASSIFIED per GPO 24 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, OSS

BAW date 2 Oct 98

13
07/07
28
28
150
3
150

DECLASSIFIED per GPO 24 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA, Date, 053
Fell 2002 2 Oct 98

10. PLANNED CUBAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS

In an 18 May plain-text message, the Head of the Soviet Commercial Mission in Havana informed the Soviet All-Union Association for Motor Vehicle Export that a contract for helicopters was to be signed with Cuba in two days, and he requested that the planes be shipped urgently since a letter of credit was being opened. (On 3 April the Soviet Commercial Mission in Havana had requested information on passenger and freight helicopters, including agricultural versions.)

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

M. A. Sergsychik and Yastrebov, an individual who has been associated since 1956 with the loading of arms cargo for Indonesia and the Middle East--applied for visas to pass through the ~~enroute~~ enroute to Moscow from Havana. This is the first indication that CED officials have been to Cuba. However, the head of the Czech arms export organization is known to have been in Cuba in early June.

[REDACTED]

-4-

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

3
August
60

~~██████████~~
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
1 Feb 61
DIST: O/D

SPANISH-SPEAKING PILOT NOTED IN CZECHOSLOVAK AIR ACTIVITY
AT TRENČIN, 17 JANUARY

Czechoslovak air-ground communications observed on 17 January 1961 on a frequency of 114.25 mcs (combined bomber training/tactical frequency allocated to the 46th Bomber Division/S341, Prerov) show that a Spanish-speaking pilot was probably undergoing flight training of an unidentified type at Trenčín airfield (48-52N 18-01E).

At approximately 0840Z, an unidentified Spanish-speaking pilot was in contact with the Trenčín airfield tower control (callword TENOR-1). The transmission was subsequently blocked by a Czech transmission and only six numbers (217213), given in Spanish, were heard. Two other pilots, speaking Czech and utilizing pilot suffixes 181 and 175 (unidentified), were also noted in contact with the Trenčín controller, but there was no indication that these pilots were working together or with the Spanish-speaking pilot.

COMMENT: This is the first known VHF activity at Trenčín by a Spanish-speaking pilot. Use of the S341 frequency suggests that this pilot was possibly in a bomber or bomber trainer; however, activity at Trenčín noted in previous COMINT has not been identifiable as bomber activity.

Spanish-speaking pilots were noted previously communicating on HF with the Trenčín airfield controller on 11 October 1960, and were believed to be training in ground attack aircraft (see ~~██████████~~, 13 Oct 60). Subsequent Trenčín-controlled activity in October, also on HF, included references to the YAK-11, a piston engine trainer (~~██████████~~)
(DIST: OSCAR/DELTA; PLUS GCU FONTAINEBLEAU.)

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

[REDACTED] 2573
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
10 Apr 61
DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] 2573

SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP NIKOLAJ BURDENKO DELIVERS MILITARY CARGO TO CUBA

1. The Soviet passenger cargo ship NIKOLAJ BURDENKO (UPVY, 5840GT) possibly arrived at a Cuban port late evening 7 April or early morning 8 April with an unspecified amount of YaSTREBOV's^a cargo.

2. The NIKOLAJ BURDENKO was in port Nikolaev 15 March and was scheduled to load YaSTREBOV's cargo. The ship probably departed from Nikolaev on 21 March and passed Istanbul on the 22nd. At 251500Z the ship was at 37-26N 06-03E. Since then the ship's position has not been revealed in her daily reports. On 7 April limited D/F placed the BURDENKO near the Windward Passage.

3. This is the third noted instance of a Soviet ship loading cargo specifically described as "YaSTREBOV's" for Cuba.

a. An official of the Chief Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations involved in the export of Soviet military equipment from Nikolaev.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

13 Apr 61
Correction No. 1 to:
[REDACTED]) 17
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
10 Apr 61
DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CORRECTION NO. 1 to

SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP NIKOLAJ BURDENKO DELIVERS
MILITARY CARGO TO CUBA

In paragraph 3 change "third" to "fourth."

(DIST: [REDACTED])

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ONE PAGE

~~SECRET REPOSITORY RECORD COPY~~

[REDACTED]

P

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

OPERATORS' CHATTER REVEALS CUBAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL TO LEARN RUSSIAN

[CHATTER BETWEEN]

San Antonio de los Baños: -- 23 May 61
[and] --
[C% Rancho Boyeros] --

[1]^a Do you know who I talked with yesterday? Czechoslovakia.

[2]^b Oh yes, did you talk with them?

[1] I talked with OLIN Y CINCO^c.

[2] What does OLIN Y CINCO have to say?

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

- [1] He was very hard to understand. We have to speak using code words.
- [2] You do?
- [1] Yes. The language is kind of hard. Say [XG], how did you find out about the [XM] pilot? They are going to open the Badilla^d.
- [2] What's happening there?
- [1] Badilla^d is like opening a hatch. Do you understand? [XM]
Say airplane [XM]
- [2] But you told me that only 2 or 3 were coming.
- [1] Are you crazy?
- [2] 2 or 3?

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

You told me that 2 or 3 were coming at first for training.

[1] 2 or 3? Do you know how many [XG]? Over 1,000. Now everybody wants to take the mechanics examination.

[2] And what do you want?

[1] Do you think they will send us those planes?

[2] [XM]

[1] Do you think that those planes will be assembled at [XM]

[2] [XM] Yes.

[1] Say, did you know that one of those planes does not have equipment [XM]

[2] [XM]

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[1] Do you understand? Do you think Radar will be sent over here and [XM]?

[2] Yes.

[1] Say, that is what we have been needing here.

[XM]

[1] The Russian course [XM]

[2] Yes.

[1] Two months. I had been listening to it over here. Did you know that I've [pause]. Oh we have to learn Russian.

[2] Who?

[1] Everybody here.

~~SECRET~~ PAGE 4 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 4 of 5 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

- [2] Everybody?
- [1] Yes, they have sent a [XM] from there with [XG] words. [XM] one of those leaflets.
- [2] Are they limited?
- [1] [XM] What is that for?
- [2] Yes, for our use.
- [1] How is it going to be arranged for the people to use the language there?
- [2] [XM] According to [XM]
[XM]

~~SECRET~~

- a. San Antonio de los Baños.
- b. Rancho Boyeros.
- c. As transcribed, not identified, possibly a code word.
- d. Meaning unknown.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET SABRE~~

[REDACTED]
P

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

RADAR BEING INSTALLED; POSSIBLY FOR USE WITH ARTILLERY UNITS

[OPERATOR CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO UNKNOWN STATIONS:]

18 Jun 61

--
--

[U] How are things there?

[U] Good. Let me tell you that things are hot here. We now have radar here and all that so that no [XM] us.

[U] How is that?

[U] We now have radar here.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 of 4 PAGE(s)

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

[Signature] date 2 Oct 98

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

[U] Where is it?

[U] Here beside the station; under some mango trees which are near by.

[U] Beside the (B% howitzers)?

[U] But outside in the open air.

[U] Well, who will operate it?

[U] I don't know. I haven't been there yet. I passed by and saw the (B% directional antennas) [XM] there but returned yesterday. You understand what the course is about now. He is learning about radar [and] these matters.

[U] Huh?

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 of 4 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 2 of 4 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

- [U] You already know.
- [U] The [XM] are already up.
- [U] They are already up; at least they are here.
- [U] Tell me, is it on a truck or is it a separate apparatus?
- [U] No, there are two trucks there and the apparatus are separate. They are huge towers which look like television antennas; like the television tower there.
- [U] Do they rotate?
- [U] Well, I don't thnik that they are working yet. However, they are up and they resemble the television antennas there.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

[U] That is good.

[U] Is that what you understood?

[U] Yes, because this one has to be rotated.

[U] Yes, to work. I saw it while they were testing yesterday or the day before and the large apparatus was rotating but it has not been installed on the base yet.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 of 4 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 4 of 4 PAGE(s)

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
19 Jun 61
DIST: [REDACTED]

SPANISH-SPEAKING PILOTS TRAINING AT TRENCIN AIRFIELD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
ON 31 MAY 1961

Training of at least four Spanish-speaking pilots at Trencin airfield (48-52N 18-01E) was noted in Czechoslovak air-ground communications (VHF voice) on 31 May 1961. The nationality of the pilots has not been determined; study continues, however.

Between 1631Z and 1730Z these pilots were in continual contact with the Trencin airfield tower control (callword TENOR-1) on a frequency allocated to the 46th Bomber Division/S341, Prerov (49-26N 17-25E); the pilots used suffixes (714, 787, 794, and 796) from a block probably allocated to the unidentified ground attack unit at Trencin, which is believed to be subordinate to S341.

It is noteworthy that during this activity the Spanish-speaking trainees apparently engaged in air-to-air communication, as evidenced by the following transmission:

<u>Time</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Text</u>
1727Z	TENOR-1	796	794 [is at] altitude 3000 meters [in the] zone; permission to carry out maneuver....

This is the first time that air-to-air communication between Spanish-speaking trainees has been noted.

Two pilots speaking Czech and using pilot suffixes (B val 798) and 91 (presumably 791) were also active during the same period. Although they made reference to zones "A" and "D," suggesting tactical activity, there was no indication that they were working together or with the Spanish-speaking pilots. However, a study of voice characteristics discloses that Spanish may not be the native tongue of one of the pilots who used that language, suggesting that he may have been a Czech using Spanish to facilitate training commands.

For information on previously observed activity by Spanish-speaking pilots at Trencin, recipients of [REDACTED] 1 Feb 61, should refer. (DIST: [REDACTED])

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

██████████
ELECTRONIC RELEASE
19 Jun 61
DIST: O/D

SPANISH-SPEAKING PILOTS TRAINING AT TRENČIN AIRFIELD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
ON 31 MAY 1961

Training of at least four Spanish-speaking pilots at Trenčín airfield (45-52N 18-51E) was noted in Czechoslovak air-ground communications (VHF voice) on 31 May 1961. The nationality of the pilots has not been determined; study continues, however.

Between 1631Z and 1736Z these pilots were in continual contact with the Trenčín airfield tower control (callword TENOR-1) on a frequency allocated to the 46th Bomber Division/S341, Prerov (49-26N 17-25E); the pilots used suffixes (714, 787, 794, and 790) from a block probably allocated to the unidentified ground attack unit at Trenčín, which is believed to be subordinate to S341.

It is noteworthy that during this activity the Spanish-speaking trainees apparently engaged in air-to-air communication, as evidenced by the following transmission:

<u>Time</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Text</u>
1727Z	TENOR-1	790	794 [is at] altitude 3000 meters [in the] zone; permission to carry out maneuver....

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For information on previously observed activity by Spanish-speaking pilots at Trenčín, recipients of ██████████ 1 Feb 61, should refer. (DIST: OSCAR/DELTA; PLUS GCU FONTAINEBLEAU.)

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
30 Jun 61
DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SOVIET FREIGHTERS SCHEDULED TO CALL CUBA IN JULY 1961

1. The following Soviet freighters have been scheduled for loading sugar in Cuba during July 1961:

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Loading Period</u>
BALTIJSK /	10 - 20 Jul
LESOZAVODSK /	10 - 20 Jul
DEPUTAT LUTSKIJ /	15 - 25 Jul
AL'MEI'EVSK /	15 - 25 Jul
KURA /	20 - 30 Jul
ALAPAEVSK /	20 - 30 Jul
MICHURINSK /	20 - 30 Jul
KUBAN' /	25 Jul - 5 Aug
IZHEVSK /	25 Jul - 5 Aug

2. On 27 June 3954 tons of cargo for Cuba had been loaded aboard the DEPUTAT LUTSKIJ in Leningrad. Included in the cargo were 24 cases weighing a total of 34,295 kilograms described as AN-2 aircraft, and 17 cases weighing a total of 2,345 kilograms described only as aircraft.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

Basic National Security Policy

F Y Classified Doc. relating to: June 1962

183 p. paper outlining BNSP - this paper makes no clear reference to the use of COMINT etc, however, it would be useful in dealing with this area in by giving the policies of our National Security and thus putting the stage for COMINT in gaining/realizing these goals

Sec. 2

contains BNSP - short version - and papers relating to -

Sec. 3

Critical Planning Tasks

11 April 1962

Funnel Messages :

Military and/or technical advisers
were believed to be in Cuba (msgs.
dated 11 April 62 and 17 Aug 62).
See 23 July 62
and

Note: One Igorij Moiseyevich
Perchyn and wife arrived in

Processing - Cuban Crisis '62

AGO 10234

30224Z Oct 62

Blake to Klocker

States that NSA's first priority requirement - is reaction reporting in connection w. high and low level reconnaissance flights.

Physical facilities at enables only very limited processing there.

Includes proposal to establish at a facility capable of intercept processing and reporting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban air defense communications.

(green notebook)

30 Oct 1962

SIGINT Intercept units:

COMINT-derived advisory warnings. will originate

* TS Navy Department Msg - AB1 54337
From CNO → CINCLANFLT, 30 2324Z
Oct 62.

In-Flight ADVISORY Warning Plan

30 October 1962

In a DIRNSA message to COMUSAFSS (Klocko), Lt. General Blake, USAF, advised the following course :

1.

2. Colonel [redacted] of your staff has just completed a briefing for members of my staff in which he outlined the requirements of CINCONAD and CINCAFLANT for COMINT support to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities. Although we have received no formal statement of requirement as outlined by Colonel

[redacted] there is no question about the validity of the requirement to keep CONAD and CINCAFLANT currently advised of the Cuban Air situation. I feel, however, that our first priority requirement is reaction reporting in connection with high and low level reconnaissance flights. Our problem is that limitations in physical facilities at [redacted] enables us to do only ^{very} limited processing there. The processing capability presently on board enables us to meet in a barely adequate fashion the requirement for reaction reporting, in order to perform the analysis necessary to meet the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT, we would have to double our present analytic effort at

3. We can however, provide a very limited response to these requirements by adding a small number of Air Force personnel familiar with these requirements to the complement at [redacted] operating under the control of OIC, [redacted] and permitting these individuals to pick off as a by-product of our limited processing in support of the reaction reporting that information which would also satisfy CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible. When the processing is not engaged in supporting reaction reporting, we will direct the OIC, [redacted] to satisfy the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible.

4. It is our understanding that the information produced as a result of the arrangements outlined above would be passed over a communications circuit to MacDill AFB where it would be relayed to the other Air Force

consumers. Pertinent information could also be passed by appropriate secure means to CONAD Control Center

5. I have been advised that we have received the authority to move in to
Therefore,
as a longer term solution to our problem, I would propose to task the [Army with
establishing ?] a facility capable of intercept processing and re-
porting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban Air Defense Communications. Based on our
preliminary information it would appear that, in addition to the personnel required
to perform the mission outlined above, there may be space to intercept and process
some portion of the Cuban Military Problem. If so, I might further propose a co-
located Army-Air Force facility

[Note: General Kloc^o's comments on the interim and longer term solution
we^o solicited by Gen. Blake in this message.*

*
(TSC) DIRNSM Msg to COMUSAFSS, DTG 302241Z, 10234/30.

27. Cuban Crisis

- a. During the Cuban crisis, D3 personnel were assigned to JCS J-3 Battle Staff at the Pentagon to ~~keep~~ keep NSA, Ft. Meade, apprised and up to date on all significant collateral data relating to the Cuban crisis. Present planning is for D3 personnel to return to Battle Staff for duty if the group is reconstituted.
- b. Arrangement was made with JCS J-3 to provide for automatic inclusion of NSA representation when future crises dictate revising the Joint Battle Staff. Project Officers names were exchanged (for JCS) and the individuals have been in contact. for NSA,
- c. D3 maintained a constant watch over all SIGINT support plans and implementing actions during the Cuban crisis, as well as the up-dating of CINCLANT and corresponding Component plans.

(2)

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR

7

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	INFO PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	SPECIAL HANDLING COMINT CHANNELS
-------------------------------	-----------------------------	--

FROM	USAFSS	DATE	06 NOV 62	INFO		DISTRIBUTION
TO	AFSSO USAF AFSSO CONAD AFSSO SAC AFSSO TAO	STRIKECOM AFSSO CCC CINCLANT				A B B1 B11 C C1 C11 DRF D31 D32 P04 NSACP D3EXEC AFSS ADNSG B1101-1 B1401-1
INFO	JCS (JRC) DIRNSA NAVSECGRU ASA	AFSCC 6940TTW DIRNAVSECGRULANT				5-1-62

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

OOD 6-11-66.

AFSCC EMERGENCY REACTION UNIT NR 1) BECOMES OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE
070500Z NOV. UNIT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND
REPORTING COMINT AND ELINT INFORMATION ON THE CUBAN AIR PROBLEM.
COMMUNICATIONS ROUTING INDICATOR ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT,
BECOMES EFFECTIVE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AS SONAS CIRCUIT TO NSA
BECOMES OPERATIONAL. PENDING THIS, SHOULD BE UTILIZED.
REQUEST BE ADDED AS RECIPIENT OF REPORTS DEALING WITH
IMPENDING RECONNAISSANCE OPERATORS IN ORDER THAT RECON REACTION
REPORTING WILL BE MEANINGFUL TO CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES. REACTION
REPORTING WILL BE DISSEMINATED ON AS NEAR REAL-TIME BASIS AS
POSSIBLE. COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY WILL BE COMMENSURATE WITH
PRE-FLIGHT AND POST-FLIGHT SUPPORT INFORMATION WHICH IS PROVIDED

DRAFTER	WRD/GPN	6-1-69	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
DOCUMENT MARKING				PAGE 1 OF 2

AGI NR	55036
AGO NR	

REFERS TO MESSAGE	AGG	AGI	DTG	SUSPENSE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	BYC
					HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY	062030Z
					SECRET	

in Havana in
Service passport
4 May '62).

Dec 1961 on a
(collateral source

NSA FORM 7200 REV JUN 61
(Supersedes 7200 REV APR 58
to be used until exhausted)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY NR. *11/148*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 13 APRIL 1962

TO: CUSASA

~~CONFIDENTIAL COMINT CHANNELS~~

D32/ 494/62

MY 192244Z JAN AND YOUR 262126Z JAN RELATIVE TO:

INTEGRATED ANALYST

OVERSEAS TOUR EXTENDED TO

AUGUST 63.

DISTRIBUTION

D32	1 - 4
IRF	5 - 6
D302	7 - 8
B	9 - 10
B2	11-16
PO1	17-22
PO2	23-24
M351	25-27
ASALNGP (FM)	28-29
M611.2	30-31

RS-113

DRAFTER

/D322/3781-S

/ACTING CHIEF/D3/

RELEASED BY (ZULU)

132113

PAGE PAGES

1 OF 1

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

04280/13

DYS

132330Z

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CBS

MAW date 20 Oct 95

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGO 01226/195W

AGI 04091

DTG 192244Z JAN 62 262126Z JAN

SUSPENSE NONE NONE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 April 1962

D32/ 494/62

M/R: Previous correspondence to GUSASA, Serial N 2516, dated 20 Nov 61 questioned need for replacing _____ upon expiration his tour in August 1962. ASA reply dated 4 January 1962 stated need for replacement. Referenced message proposed that _____ be extended for one year during which time ASA would supply a W9 or senior NCO to be trained at NSA as _____ replacement. Subsequent messages acquired _____ agreement to one year extension. This message informs ASA of _____ extension. Coordinated with ASALNUP _____ This message constitutes final reply to M6 RS #113.

~~7D322/4031-S/13 April 1962/bg~~

cc. M6142



~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

[REDACTED]
18 APRIL 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

0/11370-62

REFERENCE TO RADAR TRACKING ON RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

Between 13 and 17 April 1962 radar tracking activities were mentioned in Cuban internal plaintext communications. These were accompanied by references to equipment designators which, in the past, have equated to known Russian radar sets. This is the first occurrence noted of references to either radar tracking or to Russian radar equipment in Cuban internal traffic.

On 13 April 1962 a schedule was published that mentioned P-20 and P-8 "sets" [REDACTED]. Initial analysis suggested these were radio sets. Subsequent research revealed that P-20 and P-8 are Russian-made non-communication emitters, and that the schedule was a radar search schedule for them. P-20 and P-8 have been given the US nicknames TOKEN and KNIFEREST A.

2 May 62

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

2 May 62

DRY CARGO SHIPMENTS TO AND FROM CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS
1 January - 31 March 1962

1. During the first quarter of 1962, 43 Soviet dry cargo ships made 43 voyages to Cuba delivering at least 228,000 metric tons of cargo excluding military cargo.^a These ships also transported approximately 370,000 metric tons of Cuban sugar and 2,238 tons of nickel concentrate to the USSR. Although the number of voyages during the quarter remained on a par with the first quarter of 1961, the tonnage delivered in 1962 represented an approximate increase of 50 percent over the known tonnage for that same period in 1961. It also represents the largest number of known tons of cargo shipped to Cuba in Soviet ships for any quarter since shipments began. The following table shows the number of shipments and minimum amounts to Cuba monthly.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Tons Delivered</u>
January	13	66,689
February	17	85,484
March	13	76,005
Totals	43	228,258

2. The cargo ship SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE] was noted departing the Baltic on 25 December 1961 with an unknown cargo and arriving in Havana on 26 January 1962. However, it is estimated it arrived at an unknown Cuban port, possibly Mariel, on or about 14 January and departed on or about 25 January. This ship may be one of two ships reported unloading military equipment including armored tanks at Mariel 12-15 January and may also have unloaded four motor torpedo boats at Havana on 26 or 27 January (these four MPB's are not reflected under military cargo in the table in paragraph 6).

3. In addition to the above-mentioned cargo ships the Soviet expeditionary ship VLADIMIR OBRUCHEV [UDOK] arrived at Havana on 18 January after leaving Odessa on 20 December 1961 where it loaded diving suits before departing. Before arriving in Cuba it declared for Nicaro with a cargo of fuel oil; however, it proceeded directly to Havana. This ship remains in Cuba engaged in undetermined operations as of the writing of this report.

4. Of special significance is the arrival in Cuba during the first quarter of 1962 of at least eight motor torpedo boats and five KRONDSHTADT-class patrol vessels all of which departed from Murmansk. The TBILISI [UOUL] and the KOLKHOZNIK [UPLF] each carried four MTB's on deck and towed a patrol vessel. The BALTJSK [UVHY], BRATSK [UIAC], and L'GOV [UQMW] each towed a patrol vessel in addition to carrying other cargo.^b

- a. See paragraph 6 for known military cargo delivered.
b. See paragraph 6 for further details.

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5. The Soviet tanker SLAVGOROD [UCDR], which departed Feodosiya 5 January and arrived at Havana 23 January, carried six motorized cranes on deck in addition to hauling a cargo of gas oil. (The cranes are included in the cargo list under paragraph 6. See [redacted] for additional details on POL shipments).

6. The following table shows known tonnages and types of cargo delivered.

<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Item Count</u>	<u>Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
Asbestos		700
Automotives:		
buses	33	--
buses-PAZ652	2	--
cars	35	--
cars	3	5
dump trucks-MAZ205	73	508
tractor trucks-KRAZ221	24	202
trailer	1	6
trucks-GAZ63	47	147
trucks-KRAZ219	9	100
trucks-MAZ200(with trailers)	42	294
trucks-MAZ200	29	180
trucks-MAZ200B	16	48
trucks-ZIL164	22	920
truck(approx. a 10-ton truck)	1	--
spare for PAZ642 buses	29 cases	--
spare (unspecified)	151 cases	11
vehicles	30	240
vehicles	126	--
vehicles	---	3000
vehicles-GAZ69	28	66
Books (composition)	500,000	--
Brick		188
Cement (white)		4342
Chain		11
Chemicals:		
ammonium nitrate		11,698
ammonium sulfate		7,968
borax		20
caffeine		4
caustic potash		10
chemicals (unspecified)		525
citric acid		5
dinitrotoluene		10
hexametaphosphate		23
isopropyl		8
methanol		31
potassium bichromate		11
potassium nitrate		956
reagents		6
soda		1,000
sodium chloride		5

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<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Item Count</u>	<u>Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
sulphur		5,226
super phosphates		14,221
urea		1,737
trinitrotoluene		163
Coal		20
Condensed milk		232
Cotton		1,170
Dye (blue)		4
Dynamite		74
Dynamite fuze (fire fuze)	50,000 meters	--
Equipment:		
bulldozers	58	927
cranes	5	106
cranes (automatic)	18	--
diesels with spares	4	--
drilling equipment		4
excavators	4	--
graders	2	29
moulds		41
moulding machines	15	90
moulding machines (model 703M)	10	34
technical equipment		1,462
tractors-MFZAT5M	6	--
unspecified equipment		369
Geodesy radio equipment		3
Grain (including barley, corn, flour, maize, oats, and wheat)		65,800
Grease tanks	50	4
Gum resin		171
Industrial oil		250
Metals:		
cast iron ingots		266
construction metal		2,570
lead ingots		206
metal		1,136
rolled iron		800
steel		2,837
tinplate		1,455
titanium tubes (length-5400 millimeters) 50		--
wire		34
Medicines:		
medical equipment		4
pharmaceutical products		8
Military cargo:		
AV-50 propellers	12	--
crates (possibly ammunition)	4	--
motor torpedo boats	8	--
patrol vessels-KRONDSHEADT class	5	--

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<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Item Count</u>	<u>Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
portable radar van and five ton truck	1 each	--
T-34 tanks	2	--
tracked artillery vehicles	2	--
Paper:		
kraft sack paper		259
newsprint paper		99
Power cables		65
Rubber		250
Sunflower seed		1,448
Unspecified cargo (may include some or all of unlisted tonnages of above cargo except military cargo)		58,279
Wood:		
lumber	5,209 standards	17,983
railway ties	61,918 ties	3,870
woodpulp		11,224
	Total	228,258

7. The following chart provides details of Soviet dry cargo ships calling at Cuban ports during the first quarter of 1962. (Dates, ports, and tonnages appearing in parentheses are estimated.)

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CHART
DRY CARGO SHIPMENTS TO AND FROM CUBA IN SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS
1 January - 31 March 1962

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
LADINSK [UJNR, 6650GT]	Odessa 13 Dec	9377 tons cargo consisting of 5359 tons wheat, 3852 tons flour, 5 cranes-196 tons, 61 tons equipment	Havana Cobanas Nuevitas	4 Jan 15 Jan 24 Jan	16 Jan 23 Jan 15 Feb	13396	Unloaded sugar at Helsinki, Finland.
BOLISEVICH SUKHANOV [UJTR, 6650GT]	Leningrad (17 Dec)	1469 tons sulphate, 1800 tons soda, 251 tons rubber, 300 tons equipment, 868 tons rolled iron, 41 bulldozers (656 tons), and 129 motor vehicles, 282 tons condensed milk	Havana Isabella de Sagua Nuevitas	7 Jan 29 Jan 26 Jan	19 Jan 25 Jan 13 Feb	13521	To unload sugar at Odessa and Nikolaev. May also have carried 123 passengers to the Soviet Union.
SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE, 7176GT]	Baltic 25 Dec	Unknown	Unknown Havana Cebanas Havana	(14 Jan) 26 Jan 2 Feb	(25 Jan) 2 Feb 12 Feb 23 Feb	9498	This ship is probably one of the two ships reported unloading military equipment, including armored tanks, at Mariel 12-15 Jan. May have unloaded 4 MTB's at Havana on 26 or 27 Jan. Departed for Leningrad with sugar.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
ALAP'IAF'ISK [URIL, 5419GT]	Riga (18 Dec)	1200 tons super phosphates; 1325 tons general cargo, including 3200 cases vodka, 620 cases champagne, 225 cases wine	Hayama/ Jucaro	15 Jan 4 Feb	16 Jan 13 Feb	8000	Unloaded sugar at Kaliningrad.
FIZIK IBSHEV [UVIV, 12215GT]	Odesa (31 Dec)	2 E-34 tanks, 1 portable radio van and 5-ton truck, 2 tracked artillery vehi- cles, 1 large truck (approximately 17 tons), undetermined number of crates (possibly ammuni- tion)	Maribel/ Nuevitas Pasajillio	15 Jan 17 Jan 25 Jan	16 Jan 25 Jan 31 Jan	14701	Declared empty when departing Black Sea. Unloaded military cargo at Maribel. Departed Cuba for Odesa with sugar.
ISIBSI [UOUL, 75123GT]	Arhangelsk 15 Nov Murmansk 18 Dec	1392 standard of lumber (5000 tons), 3339 tons woodpulp, 4 motor torpedo boats. Also boarded 1 KROMSHTADT- class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Hayama/ Antilla Moa/ Nuevitas	17 Jan 7 Feb (15 Feb) 19 Feb	5 Feb 15 Feb 19 Feb 1 Mar	8863	To unload sugar and nickel concentrate at Murmansk. Approximately 1000 tons nickel con- centrate was loaded at Moa.
RETAIUNG SAJKOV [URQU, 12216GT]	Odesa 5 Jan	2919 tons unspecified cargo	Hicaro/ Jucaro Cienfuegos	21 Jan 24 Jan 3 Feb	23 Jan 3 Feb 15 Feb	10900	Declared for Consuey with 4000 tons general cargo when transiting Bosphorus. To unload sugar at Black Sea port.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
USTYZENIA [ULCK, 5628GT]	Nikolaev 30 Dec Odessa 3 Jan	6144 tons wheat	Havana Havilla	22 Jan 26 Jan	25 Jan 8 Feb	6571	Bunkered at Odessa en route Cuba. To unload sugar at Black Sea port.
LENINGRADSK [ULVI, 9935GT]	Constantia (1 Jan) Odessa 8 Jan	6582 tons corn and 2243 tons wheat	Havana Santiago Cienfuegos	24 Jan 2 Feb 17 Feb	31 Jan 9 Feb 17 Feb	10333	Departed for Odessa with sugar.
DEPUTAT LITSKIY [ULYQ, 9935GT]	Nikolaev (31 Dec) Odessa 8 Jan	9106 tons general cargo including 3 tons geodesy radio equipment	Santiago	28 Jan	23 Feb	9998	To unload sugar at Odessa and Nikolaev.
MICHURINSK [UOSB, 5518GT]	Baltiysk 12 Jan	3880 tons including 855 tons ammonium sulphate; remaining space was loaded with motor vehicles.	Havana Manzanillo	29 Jan 13 Feb	11 Feb 27 Feb	8330	To unload sugar at Nikolaev.
MARSHAL GOVOROV [URAZ, 5058GT]	Leningrad 13 Jan	6349 tons consisting of 3277 tons general cargo for Havana, including 525 tons chemicals, 4 diesels with spare parts and 3072 tons ammonium nitrate for Cienfuegos	Havana Santiago Guantanamo Santiago	31 Jan 19 Feb 28 Feb 3 Mar	8 Feb 19 Feb 28 Feb 3 Mar	7426	Returned to Leningrad with sugar.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOJ	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
TRIST / [RUZS, 950121]	Leningrad / 16 Jan	3503 tons cargo for Havana, including airplane oil, electrical equipment, tools, domestic appliances. Also 1117 tons ammonium nitrate for Cienfuegos.	Havana / Cienfuegos / Tomas de Zaza / Santiago	31 Jan 12 Feb 17 Feb 5 Mar 5 Mar	15 Feb 16 Feb 4 Mar 5 Mar	10901	To unload sugar at Vladivostok. Took on bunker at Santiago before departing for Far East.
KASHKORAD / [URUK, 950021]	Leningrad 12 Jan	2123 tons general cargo for Havana, including 1009 tons oats, 26 buses, 12 automatic cranes, 11 bulldozers (416 tons), 4 excavators, 6 motor vehicles. Also 956 tons potassium nitrate for Cienfuegos.	Havana Cienfuegos / Matanzas / Santa Cruz del Sur	17 Feb 24 Feb 24 Feb 5 Mar 12 Mar	24 Feb 24 Feb 5 Mar 12 Mar	10311	Embarked 13 passengers at Cuba for the USSR. Returned to Baltic with sugar.
CHEKRAKOVSK / [URUK, 540021]	Odessa / 23 Jan	7200 tons wheat	Havana Santiago	9 Feb 24 Feb	21 Feb 7 Mar	8000	Departed for Leningrad with sugar.
KASHKORAD / [URUK, 717621]	Dairen, China 31 Dec	6976 tons lumber (1354 standards)	Santiago Manzanillo	9 Feb 25 Feb	24 Feb 11 Mar	9423	Passed through Panama Canal at 282015Z Feb en route Cuba. To unload sugar at Baltic port.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
IVAN POLZUMOV [UUMR, 7176GT]	Leningrad 13 Jan	3262 tons various cargo, including 7 buses, 35 cars, 10 tons dinitrobenzene, 85 tons trinitrobenzene, 74 tons dynamite, 50,000 meters fire fuzer and 500,000 com- position books	Havana	11 Feb	11 Mar	9498	To return to Leningrad with sugar.
L'GOV [UQMW, 5382GT]	Leningrad 24 Dec Murmansk 7 Jan	2468 tons ammonium sulphate, 30 vehicles, 240 tons, 1 trailer-6 tons. Also towed 1 KROMSHADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Havana Castilla	9 Feb 23 Feb	21 Feb 3 Mar	8008	Departed for Kalingrad with sugar.
FRIDRIKH ZHOLO KURI [UQDP, 12285GT]	Odessa 24 Jan	13070 tons consisting of 1170 tons cotton, 3484 tons maize, 1614 tons barley, 250 tons industrial oil, 849 tons steel, 20 tons coal, 266 tons cast iron ingots, 34 tons wire, 11 tons chain	Havana Jucaro Cienfuegos	11 Feb 8 Mar 21 Mar	6 Mar 20 Mar 25 Mar	14994	This is a new ship on her maiden voyage. Returned to Odessa with sugar.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
BRATSK [UTAC, 5518GT]	Leningrad 20 Dec Murmansk (22 Jan)	3816 tons general cargo including 1820 tons in holds and deck cargo of 2 cases of 18 tons each, 1 case 20 tons, 1 case 14 tons, and 2 cases 12.5 tons each for Havana. Additionally 1862 tons ammonium nitrate for Santiago. Also towed 1 KRONSTADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Havana Santiago Guantanamo Santiago	12 Feb 22 Feb 28 Feb 7 Mar	20 Feb 27 Feb 7 Mar 15 Mar	7806	Departed for Baltic with sugar.
MIKULKO MATAJ [UOVE, 7212GT]	Vakhodra 5 Jan	5066 tons woodpulp	Havana Manzanillo Santiago	13 Feb 4 Mar 19 Mar	1 Mar 18 Mar 20 Mar	9497	Passed Panama Canal 9 Feb. To unload sugar at Far East ports.
ARKANGEL'SK [UVCO, 5660GT]	Leningrad 25 Jan	2835 tons cargo, including unknown amount of ammonium nitrate for Santiago; 50 titanium tubes with a length of 5400 millimeters for the Koa Nickel Mine, 10 tons caustic potash, and 12 AV-50 propellers	Havana Santiago Cienfuegos	15 Feb 3 Mar 10 Mar	1 Mar 9 Mar 17 Mar	6342	To unload at Baltic port(s).

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
BERDYANSK [UTWP, 5436GT]	Leningrad 31 Jan	7476 tons cargo for Havana including 1399 tons white cement, 657 packages of steel-1176 tons, 10296 cases tin plate-914 tons, and 3423 tons ammonium nitrate.	Mantanzas Havana Cardenas Varadero	21 Feb 10 Mar 23 Mar 28 Mar 31 Mar	10 Mar 28 Mar	7999	This ship had a collision with the Italian ship S.S. Polara at position 33-46N 01-45W at 0804Z23 Feb. It then continued voyage to Cuba and was scheduled to transfer a patient to the tanker LIRPAVA [UTFI], probably in vicinity of Santa Maria Island, Acrores. To return to Balboa with sugar.
VOLKHOVERS [UPXC, 5494GR]	Arhangelsk 24 Jan Murmansk 1 Feb	2819 tons wood pulp, 28 MAZ 205 dump trucks (165 tons), 2 PAZ 652 buses, 29 cases of spares for PAZ 652, 6 MTZATSM tractors	Havana Puerto Padre Monatti	23 Feb 11 Mar 16 Mar 18 Mar	16 Mar	6493	Vehicles loaded at Murmansk. No unloaded sugar at Balboa ports.
SPANISLAVSKIJ [UUNQ, 3179GT]	Odessa 1 Feb	1462 tons technical equipment.	Havana Anquilla	23 Feb 25 Feb	(25 Feb) 28 Feb	5146	No unloaded sugar at Tallin. This ship declared for Africa and subsequently went to Cuba.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	OCEAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
DIMITRIJ DOMSKOJ [UKDF], 5064GT]	Kaliningrad 27 Jan	1100 tons ammonium sulfate	Havana Isabella de Sagua Matanzas	24 Feb (18 Mar) 24 Mar	17 Mar 23 Mar 29 Mar	8452	Departed for Murmansk with sugar.
DITNIGORSK [UCHI, 7200GFT]	Nikolaev (7 Feb)	8219 tons cargo consisting of 3225 tons grain and 4994 tons general cargo	Martel Santiago	25 Feb 13 Mar	8 Mar 24 Mar	9412	Departed for Odessa with sugar.
BALTUSK [UWH, 5585GFT]	Leningrad 29 Dec Murmansk 2 Feb	4085 tons cargo, including 10 molding machines (60 tons). Also towed a KRONSHLADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Havana Isabella de Sagua Caldarlen	26 Feb 9 Mar 17 Mar	9 Mar 17 Mar 26 Mar	7858	After departing Baltic for Cuba, this ship turned north and made a stop at Murmansk where it took this subchaser in tow for Cuba. To unload at Baltic port.
STEPAN RAZIN [UWH, 7176GFT]	Vladivostok 24 Dec Dairen, China	6007 tons lumber (1963 standards)	Casida Cienfuegos	28 Feb (11 Apr)	14 Apr	3564	Departed for the Baltic with sugar.
ALEXSANDROVSK [UVZU, 5419GFT]	Leningrad (9 Feb)	2204 tons ammonium nitrate for Cienfuegos and 2028 tons general cargo, including 986 tons white cement for Havana	Havana Cienfuegos	28 Feb 23 Mar	22 Mar 6 Apr	5119	Departed for Baltic with sugar.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	OCEAN PORTS	DOA	DOB	NETTIC PORTS CUMMENSUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
KOLKOZNIK [UPLE, 7148GT]	Leningrad (29 Dec) Murmansk (1 Feb)	Towed one KROMSHADT-class patrol vessel and carried 4 MEM's on deck. 800 tons unspecified cargo.	Havana Santiago	1 Mar 20 Mar	17 Mar 1 Apr	9500	After departing Baltic for Cuba, this ship made a stop at Murmansk where it loaded the MEM's and took the subpasser in tow. On 25 February, while approaching Cuba, 15 transferred 74 tons of bunker to the patrol vessel. To return to Leningrad with sugar.
ALBERT'EVSK [URKA, 5419GT]	Riga Ventspils 13 Feb	3500 tons general cargo	Havana Santiago	3 Mar 14 Mar 20 Mar 24 Mar	14 Mar 20 Mar	8527	To unload sugar at Murmansk.
SRETEMSK [URQA, 5419GT]	Leningrad 10 Feb	3998 tons cargo including 8 tons pharmaceutical products, 5 molting machines-30 tons, 123 tons construction metal	Havana Tunas de Zaza Santiago	3 Mar 15 Mar 20 Mar 31 Mar	14 Mar 20 Mar	8223	To unload sugar at Leningrad. After 5 days' delay at Tunas de Zaza, this ship loaded in Santiago.
IZHEVSK [UICP, 5513GT]	Leningrad 16 Feb	4659 tons cargo consisting of 804 tons white cement, 6 bulldozers-95 tons, 2 graders-29 tons, 173 tons urea, 78 tons trinitrotoluene,	Havana Santa Cruz del Sur	8 Mar 19 Mar 23 Mar	15 Mar 23 Mar	7900	To return to Leningrad with sugar.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
IZHEVSK (Cont'd)		171 tons gum resin, 323 tons oats, 42 MAZ 280 trucks with trailers (294 tons) 22 ZIL/154 trucks-92 tons, 47 GAZ 63 trucks-147 tons, 26 GAZ 59 vehicles-61 tons					
URZHUM (UJFI, 5623GT)	Nikolaev (17 Feb)	6030 tons cargo including 516 tons wheat, 835 tons maize, 1136 tons metal, and 2447 tons construction metal.	Hayana Antilla	13 Mar 16 Mar	14 Mar 25 Mar	7019	To return to Black Sea with sugar.
ATKARSK (UVAD, 5513GT)	Leningrad 21 Feb	5624 tons cargo including 812 tons steel, 541 tons tinplate, unknown cargo of 676 packages-718 tons, 188 tons brick, 3 cars-5 tons, 4 tons drilling equipment, 4 tons blue dye, 2200 tons ammonium sulfate, 11 tons potassium bichromate, 4 tons medical equipment, 5 tons citric acid, 20 tons borex, 31 tons methanol,	Hayana Meranzas	11 Mar 24 Mar	23 Mar 7 Apr	8139	Departed for Kaliningrad with sugar.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
ATKARSK (Cont'd)		3 tons isopropyl, 23 tons hexametaphosphate, 6 tons resagents, 700 tons asbestos					
SOLNECHNOGORSK [UJTR, 99350T]	Nikolaev (12 Feb) Odessa 24 Feb	9044 tons wheat	Havana Tzabellia de Sagua Muevitas	14 Mar 28 Mar 1 Apr	27 Mar 31 Mar 4 Apr	15175	Departed for Odessa with sugar.
KEDNOGORSK [UJTR, 5500ECT]	Ventspils 7 Feb Riga 23 Feb	6234 tons consisting of 5226 tons sulfur, 24 KARAZ 221 trucks, 202 tons, 9 KARAZ 219 trucks, 100 tons, 16 MAZ 230B trucks, 48 tons, 49 MAZ 205 trucks, 323 tons, 29 MAZ 210 trucks-180 tons, 50 tanks for grease-4 tons, 151 cases spare parts-11 tons, 41 tons molds, 99 tons newsprint paper.	Havana Moa Manzanillo	15 Mar 19 Mar 28 Mar	17 Mar 27 Mar 10 Apr	7982	This ship made voyages to Cuba as a replacement for the DMITRIJ POZHARSKIJ. Sulfur was loaded at Ventspils and vehicles at Riga. To return to Black Sea with sugar and 1238 tons nickel concentrate-2500 barrels.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
KISLOVODSK / [UIMR, 541SGT]	Liepaya / Leningrad 27 Feb	5573 tons cargo including 1448 tons sunflower seed, 30 tons condensed milk, 206 tons lead ingots, 65 tons power cables, 811 tons cast 259 tons kraft sack paper, 1162 tons white cement, 4 tons caffeine, 5 tons sodium chloride, 2 GAZ 69 cars, 5 tons equipment 9 tons, 10 model 703M molding machines - 34 tons	Havana / Cubanas / Mariel /	18 Mar 27 Mar 31 Mar	27 Mar 31 Mar 9 Apr	8985	Sunflower seed was loaded at Liepaya, other cargo at Leningrad. To return to Baltic with sugar.
IVAN MOSKVIN / [UKPF, 338SGT]	Novorossiysk / 26 Feb	61,918 railway ties valued at \$356,443.10-(3870 tons)	Santiago / Antillo /	18 Mar 14 Apr	13 Apr 29 Apr	5125	Departed for Baltic with sugar. Loading of sugar aboard this vessel was delayed due to creosote odors.
KOBAN / [UOVR, 718SGT]	Nikolaev / Odessa /	7530 tons corn and wheat	Havana / Preston / Migero /	18 Mar 24 Mar 31 Mar	23 Mar 31 Mar 7 Apr	9613	Made a stop at Conakry / 23 Feb where she unloaded two heavy weights weighing 72 tons each. Departed for Havana on or about 3 March. To carry load of sugar to Vladivostok.

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SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUEAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	NETTIC TONS CUEAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
LENINSKIJ / KOMOMOL [UJIM, 12016GT]	Kaerson / 27 Feb (Odessa) / 6 Mar	13021 tons superphosphate	Maribel / Cienfuegos / Higuero / Manzanillo	23 Mar 8 Apr 12 Apr 23 Apr	6 Apr (9 Apr)	(7250)	Departed for Black Sea with sugar.
UGIURAL'SK / [UTFG, 5628GT]	Nicolaev / 1 Mar	4150 tons wheat, 1912 tons flour.	Santiago	26 Mar	20 Apr	6520	Departed for Black Sea with sugar.

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CUBAN AIR FORCE VHF COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE

The object of this report is to provide a preliminary analysis of Cuban aircraft and ground control procedures and terminology as they are reflected in tactical and civil air communications. Primary emphasis is placed on Cuban tactical air communication procedure where possible, but tactical and civil air terminology appear to overlap. Military pilots and civilian pilots use approximately the same terminology to describe or refer to operations or equipment common to both. Cuban weather terminology follows general Spanish language usage.

A tentative resemblance has been discovered between a known Russian system of aircraft plotting and one being used by the Cubans. This plus the fact that the Cuban Air Force is largely equipped with Russian-built tactical airplanes manned by bloc-trained pilots suggests that as Cuba's Air Force communications develop they will probably do so along bloc lines. Tactical training is definitely underway and preliminary linguistic analysis of intercept from it establishes the participation of non-Cuban control personnel. While the pronunciation and accent of these controllers seems to be Slavic or Middle European and several samples of Russian voice have been processed ██████████ no firm generalizations regarding the predominant nationality of these advisors can be made at this time.

COMINT reflections of Cuba's present tactical air capability are somewhat contradictory. Several mentions of formation flying have occurred, but no information could be derived regarding the purpose or size of the formations. There has been at least one instance of a readiness run-through procedure associated with what appeared to be a scramble takeoff or simultaneous airplane launching exercise. This involved at least 7 airplanes. During the exercise the control officer suddenly interrupted to admonish "all pilots" to gently lift their crafts' noses on takeoff. While it seems unlikely that pilots engaged in scramble exercises would require such a warning, this probably reflects the fact that the Cuban Air Force is developing under forced draft conditions. This may

also explain the lack of uniformity apparent in certain basic procedures. Altitudes are reported in either feet or meters and ground control personnel have been heard asking pilots which was being used.

Voice transmissions are acknowledged by both air and ground personnel in a variety of ways. While a disregard for straight book procedure is not uncommon among veteran pilots and communications personnel, it is felt that the inconsistency of terminology among Cuban personnel might be attributed to their newness at this type of operation.

Other tactical items observed have been limited references to practice bombing and at least one conversation mentioning the launching of anchored target balloons for aerial gunnery practice.

There is little or no information available regarding the location of these activities. Communications security has been very well maintained through a system of cover words and/or callsigns.

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NEW SOVIET CARGO SHIP EN ROUTE CUBA WITH POSSIBLE MILITARY CARGO

1. The new Soviet cargo ship BELORETSK [USMZ], built in Copenhagen and subsequently noted in underway trials off Norway in the latter part of April 1962, is now en route Cuba from Arkhangel'sk via the Great Circle route.
2. The BELORETSK bunkered at Murmansk before departing for Arkhangel'sk, where it arrived on or about 10 May, and is estimated to have departed as late as 28 May. It was scheduled to load 2500 standards of sawn timber; however, only 1670 standards (approximately 5240 metric tons) were loaded. Its announced cargo-carrying capacity is 14,150 metric tons and its estimated gross tonnage is 10,300 tons. The 1670 standards of lumber is the only known cargo on board and appears to be a relatively light load for a ship of this size when compared with the DEKABRIST [UOML, 7176GT] which delivered 5583 metric tons of lumber to Cuba in April and the ORENBURG [UYXII, 11050EGT] with 10,013 metric tons (3189 standards) of sawn timber on board now en route Cuba. It is therefore believed that the BELORETSK may be carrying a partial load of military cargo following a pattern similar to the cargo ships BALTIJSK, BRATSK, L'GOV, KOLMOZNIK, and TBILISI, all of which carried MTB's and/or towed patrol vessels to Cuba from the Murmansk area (see O/6856-62 and O/9480-62). It is not felt, however, that this ship is towing a patrol vessel as the SOA has been as high as 19 to 20 knots.
3. The last-reported position on the BELORETSK was 49-48N 37-36W at 031500Z June.

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCRINATED RECIPIENTS))

(DIST: ~~SECRET~~)

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] 058
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

6 June 1962

DIST: [REDACTED]

FIRST ELINT EVIDENCE OF SCAN ODD RADAR IN
CUBAN AREA

ON 1 MAY 1962 A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE CUBAN
AREA INTERCEPTED SIGNALS FROM THE SOVIET AIRBORNE IN-
TERCEPT RADAR, SCAN ODD. THIS CONSTITUTES THE FIRST
ELINT EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF ANY SOVIET AIRBORNE
INTERCEPT RADAR IN THE CUBAN AREA. THE SIGNAL
DISPLAYED NORMAL PARAMETERS OF 2125 PPS AND AN 8-BAR
RASTER SCAN. AT THE TIME OF THE INTERCEPT THE MISSION
AIRCRAFT WAS ON AN EASTWARD COURSE ABOUT 40 NM SOUTH
OF THE WESTERNMOST TIP OF CUBA. THE BEARING OF THE
INTERCEPT IS UNKNOWN DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE SIGNAL
WAS IN THE BACKGROUND OF ANOTHER SIGNAL ON WHICH BEARINGS
WERE BEING TAKEN. THE RADAR WAS IN THE SEARCH MODE AND
IT DID NOT APPEAR TO FOLLOW THE MISSION AIRCRAFT. THE
INTERCEPT OF SCAN ODD SIGNALS HAS BEEN ANTICIPATED FOR
SOME TIME BECAUSE OF THE REPORTED PRESENCE OF BOTH
MIG 17 AND MIG 19 AIRCRAFT IN THE CUBAN AREA. SCP-3

DIST: [REDACTED]

Page one of one page

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NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

19 JUNE 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

0/13991-62

CUBAN AIR FORCE LONG-RANGE FLIGHTS

The following item dated 182030Z Jun 62 is released by NSA as received from the field:

1. Pilot chatter referring to wing tanks on 16 June 1962 may provide evidence Cuban Air Force jet fighters have long-range capabilities ((A)), and that pilots are becoming more adept in aircraft handling. This suggestion is based on the following:

During a training flight on 16 June, one pilot (suffix 31) experienced difficulty switching from one wing tank to the other, causing his right wing to dip. An unknown station asked 31 if his aircraft was controllable, and if not, to drop his tank. The pilot replied that he was in full control of his aircraft, and subsequently requested and was granted permission to enter the traffic pattern. The pilot was definitely Cuban, and may be considered experienced in that at no time did he appear to lose control of his situation.

2. In context with above it was also noted that a "Buddy system" seems to be in effect in the Cuban Air Force, in that while pilot 31 was having difficulties, he was in constant communications with only one other pilot (suffix 41). Shortly before being cleared for landing, he established communications with suffix 61.

((A)) [REDACTED] COMMENT: The ranges of MIG planes are:

MIG - 15 NATO Code Name: "Fagot"

Normal range: 896 km (560 miles)

Range with external tanks: 1,340 km (840 miles)

MIG - 17 NATO Code Name: "Fresco"

Normal range: 820 km (510 miles)

Range with external tanks: 1,860 km (1,160 miles)

MIG - 19 NATO Code Name: "Farmer"

Normal range: 965 km (600 miles)

Range with external tanks: 1,370 km (850 miles)

Page 1 of 1 Page

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[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
22 JUNE 1962
DIST: [REDACTED]

ELECTRONIC INTERCEPTS IN CUBAN AREA

ANALYSIS OF RECENT ELINT MISSIONS IN CUBAN AREA REVEALS THAT THERE MAY BE AS MANY AS 13 TOKEN/TOKEN VARIANTS, 13 KNIFE REST A/RUS 2, 6 FIRE CANS, POSSIBLY ONE LANDBASED SO-1 AND SEVERAL SOVIET SHIPBORNE RADARS INCLUDING SO/SF/SKIN HEAD, NEPTUNE, AND BALL GUN OPERATING IN THIS AREA. INTERCEPTS OF AIRBORNE RADARS CONSIST OF THE AI TYPE SCAN ODD. SCAN ODD IS INSTALLED IN CERTAIN MODELS OF THE MIG 17 AND MIG 19. DEFENSE OF HAVANA APPEARS TO BE THE PRIME CONCERN JUDGING FROM THE HEAVY RADAR DEPLOYMENT IN THAT VICINITY. THE SECONDARY AREA OF CONCENTRATION IS SANTA CLARA IN THE CENTRAL PORTION OF THE ISLAND. A POSSIBLE ROCK CAKE/STONE CAKE HEIGHT-FINDER WAS REPORTED EARLIER, BUT NO ADDITIONAL ELINT EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE. THE V-BEAM CAPABILITY OF THE TOKEN IS PROBABLY THE ONLY SOURCE OF HEIGHT DETERMINATION POSSESSED BY CUBA AT PRESENT. THE BAR LOCK/BIG MESH WHICH WAS SUSPECTED HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY ELINT. ON ONE MISSION AN INTERCEPT WAS MADE OF A SIGNAL WHICH HAD PARAMETERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN DEVELOPED RADAR, WOOD GAGE. THE RADAR IS TENTATIVELY CARRIED ON THE CUBAN COAST NEAR CAJIO (22° 43' N - 82° 26' W). DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE ONE OF ONE PAGE.

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[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
28 JUNE 1962
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

NIGHT FLIGHTS OF CUBAN JET AIRCRAFT

On 19 June 1962, intercept of the Cuban Military Air tactical communications reveals that the Cuban Air Force is flying Jet aircraft during the hours of darkness. Between 0115 and 0406Z (2015 and 2306 Cuban Local Time), a ground controller, probably located at San Antonio de los Banos, was active in contact with seven aircraft pilot suffixes.

COMMENTS: This is the first firm evidence that night flights of jet aircraft are being conducted by the Cuban Air Force. On 23 May 1962, a pre-flight message was passed scheduling jet practice flights as late as 0400Z (2300 local). However, no fulfillment of this schedule was noted. See [REDACTED]

~~SECRET EIMBO~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

512
FILE

ZCZ:KHH 187KA 184

PP

DE

67

P 191653Z

JUL

1962

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

FM DIRNSA

TO CNO

DIRNAVSECGRU

INFO CINCLANT

CINCLANTFLT

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

JCS

SSO DIA

/NSA REP CINCLANT

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS ADP/10A~~

1. NSA HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY SEC DEF TO ESTABLISH A SIGINT COLLECTION CAPABILITY IN THE VICINITY OF HAVANA CUBA AS A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY AND TO INITIALLY DIVERT THE USS OXFORD FOR THIS PURPOSE.

DIRNSA HAS INITIATED ACTION TO OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF AN MSTC SHIP FOR THIS PURPOSE TO BE OPERATIONAL NOT LATER THAN 1 DEC 1962.

2. SINCE FULL CAPABILITY OF OXFORD CANNOT BE UTILIZED EFFECTIVELY IN HAVANA AREA, REQUEST CNO ASSIGN SHIP TO RELIEVE OXFORD AS AN INTERIM MEASURE UNTIL MSTC CONTRACT SHIP IS AVAILABLE. NSA WILL INSTALL SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT SIMILAR TO THAT USED ON

SHIPBOARD SPACE REQUIRE-

MENTS ARE SIMILAR.

3. FOR DIRNAVSECGRU. IF INTERIM SHIP REQUESTED CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE, AND ON STATION BY 15 AUG, REQUEST OXFORD BE DIRECTED RETURN OPAREA OFF HAVANA ON COMPLETION SAN JUAN VISIT 8-14 AUG. SHOULD THIS DIVERSION BE EXPECTED TO EXTEND FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME REQUEST THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS BE MADE IN THE REMAINDER OF THE CURRENT ITINERARY FOR OXFORD

1440 1440

19/1713Z JUL

~~REMARKS~~

ACT G-51.....

INFO G-50.....G-20.....FOLDERS.....

514 110

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

5 JULIAN 08-14 AUG

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

RETURN TO G52

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 1.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CSS, CIB
Date 20 Oct 98

19 JULY 1962

G-GL-630-G50 Op-91/1650B

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

Op-922Y/dnh
Ser 500/000194

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Navy Participation in Increased SIGINT Program for Cuba (S)

Ref: (a) SECDEF memo of 16 July 1962, subj: Increased SIGINT Program for Cuba (S)

1. Reference (a) directs that the Naval Security Group (Op-94G) realign its resources to provide greater coverage of Cuba "in response to highest priority intelligence requirements." NSG has been aware of this development for several days and is determining how best to carry out the directive.
2. The degree of impact which the directed actions will have on naval intelligence collection is not yet known. Inevitably some loss will occur, but every effort is being made to keep it to a minimum. NSG is exploring with the Director, National Security Agency such things as having the other services assist with the increased manning against Cuba wherever possible.
3. The increased effort against Cuba directed by the Secretary of Defense will require approximately 20 officers and men at _____ and _____. It is not anticipated that any military construction will be required, since it is planned to rehabilitate existing facilities at _____ and to utilize vans at _____.
4. It is understood that DIRNSA will arrange directly with COM NSIS for the NSIS ship and that the SIGINT effort will be manned by Army personnel.
5. The interim arrangements for shipborne intercept will extend until about 1 December 1962 and will probably require use of a Navy ship. CINC-LANFLT is being requested to comment on the feasibility of utilizing an auxiliary type operating out of _____.
6. The Deputy Director of Naval Communications for NAVSECGRU (Op-94G) will continue to coordinate all arrangements for implementation with the Director NSA.

CHQA CONTROL # 2635

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Page 1 of 1 page
Copy 2 of 6 copies

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~
1218
DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
date 20 Apr 98

~~SECRET~~ 173
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
24 Jul 62
DIST: ~~SECRET~~

UNUSUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET PASSENGER SHIPS EN ROUTE CUBA

1. At the present time there are at least four, and possibly five (the ADMIRAL MAKHIMOV), Soviet passenger ships en route Cuba with a possible 3335 passengers on board. Three of these ships departed Baltic ports and two departed Black Sea ports. Following is a summary of the passenger ships en route or possibly en route Cuba (all information on the three ships departing the Baltic is estimated):

	<u>Departed</u>	<u>Last Known Position</u>	<u>Passengers on Board</u>	<u>ETA Cuba</u>
MARIYA ULYANOVA [ULGH, 4871GT, PAS]	Kaliningrad 10 Jul	Within 40 n.m. of 23-48N 63-06W at 231612Z	340	26 Jul
KHABAROVSK [UUYW, 4871GT, CG]	Leningrad 10 Jul	32-55N 45-35W at 221500Z	740	26 Jul
MIKHAIL URITSKIJ [UIGF, 4871GT, PAS]	Riga 12 Jul	Within 60 n.m. of 30-06N 53-30W at 231700Z	340	28 Jul
LATVIYA [UUYB, 4871GT, PAS]	Black Sea 13 Jul	Within 60 n.m. of 32-00N 49-00W at 240500Z	365	28 Jul
ADMIRAL MAKHIMOV [UKDD, 15286GT, PAS]	Odessa 16 Jul	37-26N 06-11E at 211500Z	1540	1 Aug

2. Available information indicates that the KHABAROVSK and the MIKHAIL URITSKIJ were to make voyages to Vladivostok; however, it is not known at this time whether these ships will proceed to the Far East via the Panama Canal after departing Cuba or whether the Vladivostok voyage announcements are deceptive measures to conceal Cuban voyages. The ADMIRAL MAKHIMOV and the LATVIYA both declared for Conakry when departing the Black Sea. However, the LATVIYA is tracking toward Cuba and it is considered likely that the ADMIRAL MAKHIMOV will follow suit.

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ELECTRICAL RELEASE

3. Since 16 July the KHABAROVSK and the MIKHAIL URITSKIJ have been recipients of high precedence [REDACTED] messages which may indicate these two ships are engaged in other than routine activities.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
31 Jul 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

POSSIBLE REFLECTIONS OF SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE ADJUSTMENTS
NOTED IN MERCHANT SHIPPING

1. An analysis of current Soviet shipping to Cuba reveals that: (a) a considerable number of Soviet merchant ships en route from the Black Sea to Cuba have been declaring for South African ports with very low cargo tonnages; (b) a number of ships from the Baltic (also estimated to be travelling light) were proceeding toward Cuba; and (c) there has been a recent absence of [REDACTED] traffic which normally reflects the departure dates and cargo/tonnage data of Soviet ships scheduled for Cuban voyages.

2. The following details are available on these ships probably en route Cuba. Read in 6 columns: Ship [C/S]/Tons Declared/Cargo Capacity/Port Declared/Probable Destination/Area of Departure.

- DUBOSSARY [UBFN]/965/8718/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea
- DIVNOGORSK [UQHJ]/760/12000/Gibraltar/Cuba/Black Sea
- F.Z. KYRUI [UQDP]/1400/14500/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea
- K. ZELENSKI [UYOL]/1654/14600/Gibraltar/Cuba/Black Sea
- N. PIROGOV [UVPT]/1295/7000/Takoradi/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
- OMSK [UQVZ]/1600/14000/Ghana/Cuba/Black Sea
- POLTAVA [UUDQ]/1270/11000/Ghana/Cuba/Black Sea
- M. KURAKO [UERM]/2350/14500/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea
- F. KURCHATOV [UYOM]/1131/-----/Ghana/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
- LEHINOGORSK [UIWY]/915/11800/Conakry/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
- MEDNOGORSK [UQHJ]/1325/11800/Accra/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
- ALAPAEVSK [URLL]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic
- ALEKSANDROVSK [UVZU]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic
- L'GOV [UQMW]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic
- SREFENSK [UIWQ]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
7 Aug 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER UNUSUAL SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE
RELATIONS RECENTLY NOTED

1. In addition to the Soviet cargo ships reported earlier as en route or possibly en route Cuba [REDACTED] at least two more, the F. VAVILOV [VYU, 12090GT] and the UMAN [UIM, 5628GT], have departed the Black Sea declaring for Conakry with low cargo tonnages reported and are presently en route Cuba. Also, there is an indication that three more Soviet merchant ships are following the same general pattern. These are: (a) KHURUG VISHNEVSKI [UYOK, 12016GT], which declared for Accra with 1300 tons of "General" cargo; (b) METALLURG BARDIN [URDP, 12285GT], which declared for Conakry with 1438 tons of "General" cargo; and (c) METALLURG BAJKOV [UWQU, 12017GT], which declared for Casablanca with 140 [sic] tons "General" cargo. It is estimated that these ships may be en route Cuba. Additionally, the cargo ships AL'MET'EVSK [UKKB, 5419GT], BALTISK [UVHY, 5585GT], and the IZHEVSK [UICP, 5513GT], which departed the Baltic with unknown cargoes, and the KURA [UYSM, 4048GT], which departed the Black Sea with 2427 tons of grain, are also presently en route Cuba. No unusual circumstances surround these last four ships.

2. Four of the cargo ships reported earlier, as possibly, are now definitely determined to be en route Cuba, i.e., the H. PIROGOV, F. KURCHATOV, LENINOGORSK, and the MEDNOGORSK.

3. Thus far in the 3rd quarter of 1962, 21 Soviet merchant vessels representing 134,107 gross tons (plus 3 possible candidates totaling 36,888 gross tons) are either en route or have arrived in Cuba from the Soviet Union. The following chart provides figures for comparison purposes of tonnages arriving from the USSR (NOTE: Figures represent gross tonnage of vessels involved, not of cargoes actually delivered):

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ELECTRICAL RELEASE

<u>3rd Qtr 61</u>		<u>4th Qtr 61</u>		<u>1st Qtr 62</u>		<u>2nd Qtr 62</u>	
July	54,183	Oct	82,596	Jan	103,134	Apr	105,836
Aug	44,576	Nov	36,389	Feb	109,862	May	133,953
Sep	52,798	Dec	64,938	Mar	83,708	Jun	100,362
Total:	151,557		183,923		296,704		340,151
Average	50,519		61,307		98,901		113,383


4. The criteria for originally reporting this activity were: (a) the relatively large number of ships departing the Black Sea and declaring for various ports on the African continent (port and cargo declarations from ships departing the Baltic are not normally noted; therefore, any assumptions attributing anything out of the ordinary to their activity is purely conjectural); (b) the fact that they all declared very low cargo tonnages in comparison with their known cargo capacities; and (c) a distinct lack of [redacted] regarding cargoes and ports of departure/arrival. It must be cautioned, however, that diversionary port declarations by individual ships are not considered extraordinary. In this instance, the fact that so many ships within such a short period of time seemed to be employing this gambit was felt to be noteworthy. Indeed, it might have been considered even more extraordinary if all the ships had plainly declared for Cuba.

5. Therefore, when evidence became available which tended to explain the facts in other than military terms [redacted] some of the apparently extraordinary aspects of this merchant activity could reasonably be explained: (a) the light loading of the vessels might be a reflection of a Soviet inability to furnish industrial/agricultural materials to the Cubans; (b) the military equipment already in Cuba was in excess of what was needed or could be paid for; therefore, the ships were needed to export the material from Cuba (an unprecedented occurrence); and (c) little [redacted] traffic would be expected if the ships were not carrying anything but the stated cargo tonnages.


ELECTRICAL RELEASE

6. There is some evidence to substantiate an assumption that at least some of these ships may be carrying military cargo. It has been past experience that the Soviets generally attempt to conceal military shipments by such means as declaring it "Varied" or "General" cargo. At least nine (not including the three possibilities noted in paragraph 1) of these vessels did, in fact, make such declarations which permits the assessing of a certain amount of the cargo to be possibly military.

7. However, it is considered that any assumptions concerning a general increase or a rapid acceleration of transport of military equipment from the USSR to Cuba is to be treated with extreme reserve.



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[REDACTED]
DEPLOYED QUITE EXTENSIVELY IN THE HAVANA, CUBA AREA. DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Page two of two pages.

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ELECTRICAL RELEASE
23 Aug 62
DIST: ~~TOP SECRET~~

STATUS OF SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPPING TO CUBA

1. A continued increase in the number of Soviet merchant vessels en route Cuba, lightly loaded, and declaring for various ports other than Cuba, has been noted. Since mid-July a total of 57 Soviet merchant ships have made voyages to Cuba or are currently estimated to be en route Cuba. This figure includes three ships (and possibly a fourth) which are making their second trip to Cuba since mid-July. These are the passenger ships M. URITSKIJ, KHABAROVSK, M. ULYANOVA, and possibly the LATVIYA.

2. The following details are known concerning Soviet merchant vessels which have completed cargo deliveries to Cuba and have not heretofore been reported. ~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ Read in six columns: Ship [Callsign]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Area of Departure/Cargo Aboard.


1. SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE]/7176/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/2 patrol vessels, 4-6 trucks, and concealed equipment
2. LESOZAVODSK [UQIS]/9820/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/1 helicopter, boats
3. KIROVSK [URIM]/9254/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
4. KRASNOGRAD [UQOX]/9500/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
5. SOVETSKAYA GAVAN' [UUMP]/7176/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
6. DVINOLES [UYSA]/4638/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
7. ATKARSK [UVAD]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/Army trucks and boats on deck
8. SEVEROLES [UERL]/4638/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/16 vans, crane trucks, one large crate
9. BOL'SHEVIK SUKHANOV [UJYP]/6660/8803 wheat/Cuba/Black Sea/5 Army vans
10. KIROVSK [UICO]/5518/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/6311 tons general cargo including 39 GAZ-63 trucks
11. KISLOVODSK [UIWR]/5419/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/26 trucks on deck, 10 large covered crates

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ELECTRICAL RELEASE

3. The following details are known concerning ships which are presently en route or believed to be en route Cuba. Read in seven columns: Ship [Callsign]/ Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Probable Destination/Area of Departure/ Cargo Aboard.

1. M. URITSKIJ [ULGF]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 2. KHABAROVSK [UUYW]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 3. M. ULYANOVA [ULGH]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 4. NIKOLAEVSK [URSF]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 5. LATVIYA [UUYB]/4871/310 passengers/Conakry/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
 6. GRUZIYA [UPOV]/11030/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 7. M. BAJKOV [UWQU]/12017/1400 general/Casablanca/Cuba/Black/trucks and cranes
 8. DOIMATOVA [UYSE]/7265/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Black/15 trucks and fuel tanks
 9. BELORETSK [USMZ]/10300/1700 general/Accra/Cuba/Black/Army vehicles and cranes
 10. I. MECHNIKOV [UPVW]/5865/1260 general/Le Havre/Cuba/Black/xxxx
 11. STAVROPOL' [UQQT]/2780/2000 general/Conakry/Cuba/Black/xxxx
 12. M. GAVOROV [UKAZ]/5058/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 13. B. KHMEL'NITSKIJ [UPKP]/7351/1469 Technical Mach./Mediterranean for orders/xxxx/Black/xxxx
 14. N. BURDENKO [UPVY]/5042/1423 general/Ghana/Cuba/Black/xxxx
 15. ORENBURG [UYXH]/11058/1450 rubber/Ghana/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
 16. P. BONIVUR [UVZV]/1078/1000 general/Le Havre/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
 17. MICHURINSK [UOSB]/5518/xxxx/xxxx/possibly Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 18. USOL'E [UIFK]/5628/xxxx/Cuba/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
 19. IABINSK [UQIR]/6660/1375 general/Casablanca/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
- 

24 AUGUST 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

REFLECTION OF SOVIET BLOC PILOTS/TECHNICIANS IN CUBAN AIR FORCE TRAINING

(1 MAY - 4 MAY 62)

COMINT sources reveal Russian and non-Cuban voice activity on Cuban Revolutionary Air Force tactical frequencies since 1 May.

Concentrated efforts have been made by Bloc pilots and controllers to converse entirely in Spanish but, on occasion, they have reverted to their native tongue to convey a difficult command or request to other Bloc pilots or controllers. In only one recorded instance has a Bloc pilot requested a Cuban controller to speak more slowly because he was unable to understand.

In practically all noted GRAF major operations or new training techniques a Bloc pilot, most probably Russian, has been observed as the flight instructor or as an observer on hand to assist and advise as necessary. See [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

The following gives a breakdown of all non-Cuban voice activity noted on the Cuban Air Force Tactical nets:

Dinomes indicate pilot suffixes.

SAB stands for San Antonio de los Baños, SC for Santa Clara, CAM for Camaguey.

(T) denotes tower, (GCI) denotes ground control intercept, (DF) denotes direction finder, and (GCA) denotes ground control approach.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1 May	--	24	[REDACTED] (Field comment: Sounds non-Cuban and appears to be (T) (dr)
1 May	SAB (T)	02	S A (slavic-accent)
1 May	SAB (T)	10	S A
6 May	SAB (T)	10	S A
6 May	10	SAB (T)	S A
6 May	S C (T)	02	S A
6 May	S C (T)	10	S A

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
6 May	SAB (T)	10	SPOKE RUSSIAN
6 May	10	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
6 May	02	10	SPOKE RUSSIAN
6 May	10	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
7 May	SC (T)	02	S A
7 May	SC (DF)	02	S A
10 May	--	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
10 May	CAM (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
10 May	02	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
10 May	CAM (T)	82	S A
10 May	CAM (T)	81	S A
11 May	SAB (T)	03	S A
11 May	47/36	CAM (T)	S A
11 May	SC (T)	32	S A
11 May	21	CAM (T)	S A
11 May	SC (GCI)	23	SPOKE RUSSIAN
11 May	23	SC (GCI)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
11 May	80	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
11 May	CAM (T)	80	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	82	83	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	83	82	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	SAB (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	02	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	10	SC (T)	S A
12 May	SC (T)	10	S A
12 May	SAB (T)	03	S A
19 May	SC (T)	02	S A
19 May	02	82	SPOKE RUSSIAN
19 May	82	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
19 May	--	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN



<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
23 May	PLAYA BARACOA (T)	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	SAB (T)	PLAYA BARACOA (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	02/80	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	CAM (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	CAM (T)	80	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (T)	01	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	01	SC (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SAB (T)	03	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	03	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	CAM (GCI)	01	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (GCI)	01	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	01	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	01	SC (GCI)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	02	SC (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (T)	30	S A
24 May	SC (T)	50	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	28	33	S A
24 May	33	28	S A
24 May	SC (GCI)	SC (DP)	S A
24 May	01	SAB (GCI)	S A
24 May	02	03	S A
24 May	03	02	S A
24 May	SAB (GCI)	01	S A
24 May	--	30	S A
25 May	03	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
25 May	SAB (T)	03	SPOKE RUSSIAN
25 May	02	03	S A
25 May	03	02	S A
28 May	--	--	HSS ON 123.0MCS
29 May	--	--	2 MINS. HSS 129.9 MCS



<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
16 Jun	--	33	SLAVIC ACCENT
19 Jun	--	21	S.A.
20 Jun	SC (T)	31	S A
20 Jun	SC (T)	30	S A
20 Jun	21	SC (T)	S A
20 Jun	--	SAB (GCI)	S A
22 Jun	50	32	S A
28 Jun	14	56	S A
12 Jul	CAM (T)	88	S A
12 Jul	CAM (T)	84	S A
12 Jul	--	CAM (T)	S A
12 Jul	SC (GCI)	SC (T)	S A
12 Jul	86	CAM (T)	S A
12 Jul	SC (T)	SC (C% GCA)	S A
21 Jul	86	CAM (T)	S A
21 Jul	--	89	S A
25 Jul	SAB (T)	20	S A
25 Jul	CAM (T)	04	S A
25 Jul	CAM (T)	25	S A
25 Jul	CAM (T)	21	S A
25 Jul	66	SC (DF)	S A
25 Jul	87	CAM (T)	S A
26 Jul	89	CAM (T)	S A
31 Jul	73	SC (T)	S A
31 Jul	SAB (T)	50	S A
04 Aug	83	CAM (T)	S A
04 Aug	27	SAB (T)	S A

~~SECRET~~
28 AUGUST 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: ~~SECRET~~

NIGHT AERIAL GUNNERY EXERCISES BY CUBAN JET AIRCRAFT

Four MIG aircraft were engaged in night aerial gunnery exercises in Pinar del Rio Province on 23 August between 0100Z and 0253Z (2000-2153 EST). At 0204Z one aircraft reported being on course to La Francia (22-31N 83-14W) and at 0220Z he reported his position to be over the first shooting point. At 0253Z he reported landing.

Three other MIG's were active in air/air air/ground communications during this time and are believed to have participated in the exercise.

COMMENTS:

All aircraft were probably from San Antonio de los Baños airbase.

NSA release of report received from ~~SECRET~~

FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE

1. An additional 11 Soviet dry cargo vessels [REDACTED] have been noted in COMINT en route or believed to be en route Cuba. This brings the number of Soviet vessels (excluding tankers) going to Cuba to 69 thus far in the third (calendar) quarter, 1962.

2. The following details concerning the additional ships are available. Read in seven columns: Ship [C/S]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Probably Destination/ Area of Departure/ Known Cargo and Remarks.

SRETFENSK [UNZE]/2352/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/Second trip this quarter.

DIVNOGORSK [UQHI]/8843/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic second trip.

ALEKSANDROVSK [UVZU]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/Second trip.

ALAPAEVSK [URIL]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/Second trip.

OMSK [UQVZ]/11067/10,900 Gas-Oil/Ghana/Cuba/Black/"Barrelel" Gas-oil.
Second trip.

IVAN SECHENOV [UPVU]/5842/1222 Wheat/Casablanca/Cuba/Black/xxxx

KHIMIK ZELINSKIJ [UYOL]/12295/1531 General/Conakry/Cuba/Black/Second trip.

USTYUZHNA [ULGK]/5628/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Black/Towing floating crane.

VOLGOLES [UQIT]/4638/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx

DOBRUSH [UYR]/7625/400 General/xxxx/Cuba/Black/xxxx

FROLOVO [UKRR]/1870/587 General/Casablanca/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx.

3. The following figures are given for comparison purposes (NOTE: The figures represent gross tonnages of vessels involved, not of cargoes actually delivered):

3rd quarter 61	151,923 GT
4th quarter 61	183,923 GT
1st quarter 62	296,704 GT
2nd quarter 62	340,151 GT
3rd quarter 62 (to date)	518,196 GT

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET DINKAR~~

7 SEPTEMBER 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

INCREASED FLIGHT ACTIVITY OF CUBAN TACTICAL AIR FORCE

Since 31 August 1962, when Cuban Air Force communications personnel were placed on a state of alert, an increase in MIG flight activity has been evidenced on air-to-ground communications. Between 1 and 4 September 1962, 76 pilot suffixes were recorded. On 4 September, a total of 43 pilot suffixes were noted active between 1022 and 1659Z (0522-1159 local). Of these, 36 were active in contact with the ground controller at San Antonio de los Banos. Activity consisted of bombing practice and possibly patrol flights. During the same period, seven additional MIG pilot suffixes were noted active with the Camaguey ground controller. No flight activity was noted at Santa Clara, although the ground controllers were active in ground to ground contacts.

COMMENTS: This is the highest number of MIG pilot suffixes recorded since the first intercept of air-to-ground communications on 1 May 1962. The highest number previously recorded was on 20 June 1962, when 31 pilot suffixes were noted active

Source: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
7 Sep 62
DIST: ~~SECRET~~

FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE

1. An additional 8 ships have been noted in COMINT as currently en route or possibly en route Cuba. The following details concerning the additional ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Probable Destination/Area of Departure, and Remarks.

BRATSK' [ULAC]/5518/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic

FRIDRIKH ZHOLIO KYURI' [UQDP]/12285/2400 general/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea, 2nd trip

CHERNYAKHOVSK' [UQNH]/5400/1911 general/Conakry/possibly Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

L'GOV' [UQMW]/5382/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

KISLOVODSK' [UIWR]/5419/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

AL'MET'EVSK' [UKICB]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

BERDYANSK' [UIWP]/5436/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic

METALLURG KURAKO' [UERM]/12016/2005 general/Accra/possibly Cuba/Black Sea, 2nd trip

2. Current COMINT has also indicated several Soviet merchant ships which are completing or have completed voyages to Cuba. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in eight columns: Ship [C/S]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Date Arrival Cuba/Date Departure Cuba/Area of Departure/Known Cargo.

KHIRUS VISHNEVSKIJ' [UYOK]/12285/1300 general/Accra/16 Aug/xxxx/Black Sea/
personnel carrier on deck

BOI'SHEVIK SUKHANOV' [UJYP]/6660/xxxx/xxxx/26 July/xxxx/Black Sea/xxxx

USSURLJSK' [UYIE]/5628/xxxx/xxxx/17 July/approx. 19 Aug/Vladivostok/general cargo

CHERNYAKOVSK' [UQNH]/5400/xxxx/xxxx/15 July/approx 30 July/Baltic/general cargo

SOLNECHNOGORSK' [UJVR]/9935/xxxx/xxxx/14 July/12 August/Black Sea/general cargo

3. Three ships previously reported as being possibly en route Cuba have now been definitely established as en route Cuba. ~~SECRET~~ These are the POLTAVA' [URDQ], the FIZIK LEBEDEV' [UYV], and the LENINSKIJ KOMSOMOL' [UQIM].

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~SECRET~~ KIMBO

[REDACTED]
11 SEPTEMBER 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

CUBAN MIGS SCRAMBLE ON TWO U.S. NAVY PATROL PLANES

At approximately 1812Z (1212 EDT) 8 September, two Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) MIG's scrambled on and intercepted 2 U.S. Navy patrol planes over international waters.

[REDACTED] at 1535Z two Navy S2F patrol planes, S2F-13 and S2F-16, departed in company from the Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida. At 1812Z while both planes were at position [REDACTED], NSA [REDACTED] Ground Control Intercept (GCI) informed S2F-16 of the presence of an unidentified moving radar target 23 miles from S2F-16. The unknown target was reported on a true course of 275 degrees with a speed of 300 knots at 9,000 feet. S2F-16 was flying at an altitude of 5,000 feet. At 1814Z the radar target, tentatively identified by the S2F pilots as a MIG-17, made an overtaking approach on the S2F-16 passing underneath and pulling up in front. When visually sighted the range was estimated at approximately 1,000 yards and opening at high speed. Key West radar further tracked the MIG through a 180-degree turn and observed it making another pass behind the patrol plane. At this time both objects ceased on the radar.

At 1834Z while at position 23-16N 82-45W, S2F-16 observed the MIG making gunnery-type runs on the second Navy patrol plane. The MIG passed alongside S2F-13 at an approximate range of 1000 feet on the initial run. On the third similar run the MIG, after pulling out, settled in front of the Navy patrol plane at an altitude of 5000 feet. The MIG then executed a climbing right-hand turn and disappeared. The Navy pilots reported the MIG as being dark in color without obvious markings to reveal nationality [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Intercept of the CRAF tactical VHF frequency parallels this activity and reveals that pilots using suffixes 12 and 89 were involved in the GCI alert. Both planes were scrambled and controlled by San Antonio de los Banos GCI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

[REDACTED]

At 1820Z suffix 12 broke off intercept and returned to base because his fuel was running low. While in flight both 12 and 89 passed a series of numbers, possibly grid coordinates pertinent to the target activity, to the GCI controller.

While in contact with GCI, suffix 89 reported that the target was "presenting combat" and requested authorization to "knock it down." Evidence suggests that his request was denied since no hostile action was initiated.

Suffix 89 was instructed to maintain his position and continue surveillance.

COMMENTS: In direct contrast to previously observed GCI operations, most of the information passed was from the interceptors to GCI. Only a minimum of tracking was required by the intercepting planes, indicating increased proficiency.

The term "presenting combat" used by 89 is not understood but most probably reflects the evasive action taken by the Navy planes.

Source: [REDACTED]

~~TSC~~

11
* Sep 62

From: DIRNSA

To:

~~TOP SECRET DINAR/NOFORN/Limited Distribution~~

ABP/151-62.

Any/all SIGINT evidence of Cuban acquisition of potentially offensive weapons systems (e.g., surface to surface missiles, bombers, submarines) will be forwarded electrically to DIRNSA only at OI precedence or higher. Message will contain preamble "This is a funnel message" and indicated DDH HDH. No repeat. No further dissemination is authorized without specific instructions.

TSC DIRNSA msg, 11 Sep 1962, AGO #

[Lilly].

FUNNEL Handling = Indication of possible Cuban acquisition of potentially offensive weapons. By 26 Oct 62 - (TSC) New Instruction

"Offensive-weapon messages (Formerly called "Funnel" and controlled):
1. Use regular Series (TS DINAR) and also use this legend."

2. Be sure that the OSCAR used does not have an it.

3. Printed in black -

(Both electrical and hard copy must have legend).

FUNNEL

Sia line

Project involving the forwarding of special Cuban Traffic

See Dated 17 Oct. 62 in Compartmented folder.

See telecon of 7 Nov 62, project no longer active.

El ext 3596

12 Sep 62

From T543s
(old cover terms index card file)

"Compartmented folder" cannot be located

10/92

"Funnel" was apparently ~~as~~ a handling channel for offensive weapons - Related reporting. Its Dates, above, were 17 Oct - 7 Nov 1962 - Probably in response to Pres. Kennedy's Restriction on INF. until he made a decision.

However, our "card" Notes "Funnel" in effect by at least 9 October -

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

HW 20/9/92

~~SECRET~~

19 SEPTEMBER 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: ~~SECRET~~

NEW RADAR DEPLOYMENT IN CUBA

Signals emanating from western Cuban since 11 September 1962 display characteristics of radars not previously reported in Cuba.

One intercept on 15 September (1623-1635Z) is the first reported signal identified as SPOON REST. Initial D/F bearings cross the Cuban coast about three NM west of Mariel (2259N/8245W). Parameters reported for the SPOON REST are approximately as follows:

RF: 155 MCS

PRF: 350 PPS

PW: 4.5 USEC

SCAN: Irregular (average scan time of 15 SPR)

Also intercepted were BUBB signals from the Havana Harbor area. These emitters are normally located solely along Soviet coastal areas, suggesting a coastal watch or harbor surveillance function. D/F bearings reported 11 through 16 September locate the emitter in the vicinity of 2309N/8221W. The specific function and exact deployment of BUBB has not yet been determined from evidence at hand. Parameters are reported approximately as follows:

RF: 9400 MCS

PRF: 1200 or 600 PPS



PW: .35 USEC

SCAN: 8.0 SPR

COMMENT: SPOON REST radars have been used by the Soviets as target acquisition radars serving SA-2 missile sites. SCP-3

~~SECRET~~


SECRET


ELECTRICAL RELEASE
21 SEPTEMBER 1962
DISTRIBUTION: 

IFF SIGNAL IN CUBAN AREA

A signal identified as Soviet airborne transponder, SRO, was intercepted on 18 September 1962, indicating operation of an IFF system in Cuba. The presence of pulse coding in the signal indicates that the transponder was interrogated.

COMMENT: The interrogation equipment is possibly either land-based IFF equipment such as the first net IFF interrogator or the shipborne yard rake IFF interrogator.



SECRET

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
25 Sep 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CARGO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS

1. An additional 13 Soviet merchant ships have been noted in COMINT en route or possibly en route Cuba. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S, Gross Tons]/Area of Departure/Port Declared/Cargo Declared/known Cargo/Remarks.

BERDYANSK [UIWP, 5436]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/possibly en route Cuba;
second trip

DVINOLES [UYSA, 4638]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip

KASIMOV [Unknown, 9254]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

GRUZIYA [UPOV, 11030]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/passenger ship; possibly en route Cuba; second trip

BELORETSK [USMZ, 10300]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/2527 metric tons steel/second trip

DEPUTAT LUTSKIJ [UJYQ, 9935]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/1462 metric tons pig iron and steel/xxxx

NIKOLAEVSK [URST, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/100 passengers sighted on deck/passenger ship; second trip

DUBOSSARY [UBFN, 7265]/Black Sea/Cuba/3400 tons general/xxxx/second trip

METALLURG BARDIN [URDP, 12285]/Black Sea/Conakry/1707 tons general/xxxx/second trip; possibly Cuba

SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE, 7176]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip; possibly Cuba

INDIGIRKA [UWEP, 7661]/Arctic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/icebreaker/cargo ship

ORENBURG [UYXH, 11058]/Black Sea/Conakry/1900 tons general/xxxx/second trip; possibly Cuba

SIMFEROPOL' [UVTG, 6750]/Black Sea/Cuba/2200 tons general/2295 metric tons flour/xxxx

2. International commercial messages indicate that the BELORETSK, DEPUTAT LUTSKIJ, and SIMFEROPOL' loaded the above-mentioned tonnages of cargo for shipment to Cuba. This type of information has been largely absent from such communications

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~SECRET~~
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

during the past three months. During that time, Soviet ships en route Cuba have, in general, attempted to conceal factual cargo information. Previously, however, the loading of specific cargoes for Cuba was often seen in international commercial messages.

3. The icebreaker/cargo ship INDIGIRKA is believed to have made a call at Murmansk on 17 September prior to beginning its present voyage to Cuba. In the past, the majority of ships which have followed this pattern have been carrying and/or towing naval units. ~~SECRET~~ In light of this fact, the possibility that the INDIGIRKA may deliver naval and/or military cargo to Cuba should not be discounted.

4. Two ships, previously reported as possibly en route Cuba, are now known to be definitely en route Cuba. These are the passenger ship AIMIRAL NAKHIMOV [UKDD] and the cargo ship KIVASNOGRAD [UQOK].

5. The following cargo information, obtained from COMINT and collateral sources concerning ships already reported en route Cuba, is available: (a) IZHEVSK [UICP], 8-10 oil tanks, 6 large wooden crates, 1 truck crane, one 1.5- or 2.5-ton truck, and various types of small deck cargo; (b) LENINGORSK [UIWY], eight 1.5- or 2.5-ton trucks; and (c) ANJANGEL'SK [UVCO], spare parts for tractors (COMINT).

6. There have been 121 Soviet voyages (excluding tankers) to Cuba thus far in the third (calendar) quarter of 1962. This number represents a total of 872,195 gross tons.

(DIST: ~~SECRET~~)

~~SECRET~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
2 Oct 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CARGO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS

1. An additional eight Soviet merchant ships have been noted in COMINT en route Cuba since the publication of [REDACTED]. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S, Gross Tons]/ Area of Departure/Port Declared/Cargo Declared/known Cargo/Remarks.

KOMILES [UQTW, 4638]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

MIKHAIL URETSKIY [ULGF, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; passenger ship

MARIYA ULYANOVA [ULGH, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; passenger ship

USSURIJSK [UYLE, 9501]/Black Sea/Accra/1850 tons "technical material"/xxxx/ possibly en route Cuba; second trip

ESTONIYA [UYYA, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/passenger ship

IL'YA MECHNIKOV [UPW, 5865]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/trucks sighted on deck/ second trip

NIKOLAJ BURDENKO [UPVY, 5842]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/trucks sighted on deck/ second trip

SOBOLEVO [USLZ, 3455]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

2. Four ships, previously reported as possibly en route Cuba, are now definitely known to be en route Cuba. [REDACTED]

These are the cargo ships METALLURG BARDIN [URDP], SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE], ORENBURG [UYXH], and METALLURG BAJKOV [UWQU].

3. The following cargo and passenger information, obtained from collateral sources, is available on ships previously reported en route Cuba: (a) ATKARSK [UVAD], five liquid storage tanks, six 2.5-ton trucks, an undetermined number of road graders, one cherry picker crane, two large wooden crates; (b) NIKOLAJ PIROGOV [UPVT], four trucks, two cranes, one bulldozer, and other miscellaneous deck cargo; (c) LESOZAVODSK [UQIS], various types of army vehicles, including trucks, on deck; (d) KIMOVSK [URIM], five tank trucks, two busses, four light trucks, nineteen large army trucks, three crane trucks, two truck tractors, two large wooden crates,

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

CRISIS SITUATION

Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

NSA Intelligence
Watch Office

T/COM Effort

R/D

Plain language Effort

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12065
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

PLW date 20 Apr 98

T/A Effort

C/A Effort

[Faint, illegible text]

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR.

2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM: DIEMSA

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 62

DISTRIBUTION

TO: USAPSS
CUBASA
DIRNAVSECGRU
INFO: NSA REP LANT

DIR 1
D/DIR 1
ADN 3
ADP 3
B 2
EL 2
C 4
C1 5
D302 3
D32 4
D31 4
DRF 2
D3 RF 2
FO2 2
FO4/05 6

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~
DIR 205

KURTZ, CRAIG AND KLOCK FROM BLAKE.

PART I FOR KURTZ.

1. REF IS MADE TO YOUR QUERIES DURING MY VISIT TO YOUR HQRS ON
14 SEPTEMBER 62.

2. INTERCEPT TASKING OF YOUR FACs INVOLVED IN CUBAN PROBLEM HAVE
BEEN EXAMINED AND THE FOLLOWING CAN BE STATED:

(A) ACHIEVE THE REQUIRED REPORTING
CAPABILITY, LOCAL INTERCEPT CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES WILL BE
INCREASED, ALTHOUGH THE DEGREE OF CONTROL MUST BE REGULATED TO
PRECLUDE DUPLICATION OF COVERAGE AMONG YOUR FACILITIES, ASA, AFSS
FACILITIES ALSO TASKED WITH CUBAN TARGETS. ALSO, THE
OPNS OFFICERS CAN
EMPLOY NSA-CONTROLLED POSITS ON TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY UP TO
24 HOURS WITHOUT NOTIFYING THIS AGENCY CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

(B) CUBAN IS CONTINUING
ON A PRIORITY BASIS. THE PRESENT EQUIPMENT, WHEN AUGMENTED BY

RELEASING OFFICER

Gordon A. Blake
USN/D, Chf, D31 GORDON A. BLAKE, LTJG, USN, USAP, DIR

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

052025Z

PAGE 1 OF 3

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.6 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
AW date 20 Apr 95

AGI NR.
AGD NR. 10207/05
DTG 052101Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGC
AGI
DTG
SUSPENSE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM:

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 62

TO:

DISTRIBUTION

ADDL EQUIP ALREADY ON ORDER, WILL DOUBLE OUR PROCESSING CAPABILITY
AND WILL ALLOW FOR THE TIMELY CUBAN

INTERCEPT. TO ALLOW FOR THE CURRENT PROCESSING EFFORT, EQUIP AND
PERS WERE DIVERTED FROM OTHER HIGH PRIORITY TASKS TO ENABLE THE
PROCESSING OF THE CUBAN TAKE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AND
PROVIDE YOU WITH TIMELY TECH SUPPORT. ACTION TO FORWARD APPROPRIATE
COLLATERAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN EXPEDITED. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS
ON HOW THIS PROCESSING CAPABILITY CAN BE ENHANCED OR TECH SUPP
IMPROVED WOULD BE MOST WELCOME.

(C) THE HIGH PRIORITY GIVEN TO THE CUBAN PROBLEM WITHOUT
INCREASED AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PERS HAS STRAINED THE SIGINT COMMUNITY
IN TERMS OF RESOURCES AVAIL FOR DIVERSION AGAINST THIS TARGET. THE
NSG HAS RESPONDED ADMIRABLY TO THIS HIGH PRIORITY TASK. WE LOOK
TO YOU TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A STRONG ELEMENT OF LEADERSHIP IN
SECURING MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THIS
REQUIREMENT. THE CLOSE LIAISON WITH CINCLANT MAINTAINED BY
DIRNAVSECGRULANT AND NSA REPRESENTATIVES WILL ENABLE US, THROUGH
THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS, TO PROVIDE A BETTER RESPONSE TO CINCLANT

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE PAGES

2 OF 3

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

207/05

DTG

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM:

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 62

DISTRIBUTION

TO:

INTELL REQUIREMENTS.

3. I WILL CONTINUE TO DIVERT TO THE CUBAN PROBLEM AS MANY RESOURCES
AS IS CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING OUR WORLD WIDE SIGINT POSTURE.
YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS REGARD ARE MOST
WELCOME.

PART II FOR CRAIG AND KLOCK.

1. YOUR ACTIONS TO DATE HIGHLY COMMENDABLE IN SUPPORT OF DIVERSIONS
TO ACCOMMODATE CUBAN PROBLEM. I KNOW YOU WILL CONTINUE THIS SUPPORT
FOR ESG IN CARRYING OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION

I HAVE ASKED ADM KURTZ TO PROVIDE IN PART I ABOVE. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS
ALSO SOLICITED.

M/R: Part I of this message discussed with D32;
PO4/05; and concurred in by Mr. Buffam,
for ADP; and RADM L. R. Schulz, ADN. Part II added by the Director.

SN/D312/3391/5 Oct 62/mw

*# what special
attn
Jones*

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE PAGES

3 OF 3

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

207/05

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

PP

DE

ZKZK PP NOA RLR NNN NRL DE

P 092215Z

FM

OO DIST VICTOR ROMEO/ELINT ONE

ZEM

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE KOMET III IN KBA

A RADAR IDENTIFIED AS A POSSIBLE KOMET III WAS INTERCEPTED

FGO1 091745-1748Z AND 1804-1805Z. DF INFORMATION INDICATED AIRBORNE

PLATFORM. NO VISUAL CORRELATION WAS OBTAINED; MEASURED

PARAMETERS WERE AS FOLLO:

FREQ:

PRF:

PW:

SVP-3

0700 0700

09/0214Z OCT

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CDS

AW date 20/04/98

*This is the Report that
How's card notes a
Response to his 5x8"*

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C.

Cuban Crisis:

10 Oct 1962

NSA Produced Series X-RAY, FUNNEL
SIGINT End-Product Release.

From: DIRNSA

To:

Ref: ADP/51-62, DTG 141432Z.

Cont: DTG 092215Z

indicates possible Cuban acquisition of
potentially offensive weapons and should
have been given "FUNNEL" handling

Garbled:

-OR SLINT REPORT FROM

Still Searching for ADP

Cuban Crisis:

10 Oct 1962

NSA Produced Series X-RAY, FUNNEL
SLINT End-Product Reference.

From: DIRNSA

To:

Ref. NSA ADP/ISI-62, DTG 141432Z.

1000

, DTG 092215Z

indicates possible Cuban acquisition of
potentially offensive weapon and should
have been given "FUNNEL" handling

10 October 1962

(TSC) Memo from DIR NSA, Blake → Klocko -
COMUSAFSS.

" I feel that our first priority report is reporting reaction in connection with high and low level reconnaissance flights. Our problem is that limitations in physical facilities enabled us to do only very limited processing these. The processing capability presently on board enabled us to do ~~only very limited~~ processing these to meet in a barely limited fashion the report for reaction reporting. In order to perform the analysis necessary to meet the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT, we would have to double our present analytic effort

" Based on our preliminary information it would appear that in addition to the personnel required to perform the mission outlined above there may be space to intercept and process some portion of the Cuban military problem. If so, I might further propose a co-located army-air force facility at

Lt. Gen. Black asked Klock for
his comments re: the interim solution
and the longer term solution *

DTG = 30 2241 Z, AGO 7 10 234/30, 7

30 Oct 62

[REDACTED]

10 Oct 62 1649Z

DIST: [REDACTED]

INTERCEPT OF PROBABLE CUBAN AIR DEFENSE GRID TRACKING

On 9 October 1962, a probable Cuban [REDACTED] facility was intercepted passing air defense grid tracking reports. The system being used is similar to the [REDACTED] grid system used by the Soviet/[REDACTED] prior to 25 March 1962.

COMMENTS: Although the tracking data passed is possibly practice, it is the first intercept of what appears to be instantaneous air defense tracking. A grid system was previously intercepted on 14 May 1962; however, that information was a transmission of a post-flight report.

Source: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
11 Oct 62
DIST: ~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CARGO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS

1. An additional 13 Soviet merchant ships have been noted in COMINT en route or possibly en route Cuba since the publication of ~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S, Gross Tonnage]/Area of Departure/Port Declared/Cargo Declared/Known Cargo/Remarks.

LABINSK' [UQIR, 6660]/Black Sea/Conakry/1370 tons general/xxxx/xxxx

IVAN POLZUNOV' [UVMB, 7176]/Baltic/Accra/1676 tons general/six 2.5-ton trucks, five 2.5-ton open-body trucks, miscellaneous motor vehicles, tinned goods, geological prospecting equipment/xxxx

PARTIZAN BONIVUR' [UVZV, 10078]/Black Sea/Accra/1776 tons general/xxxx/
second trip

AMATA' [UFHM, 3359]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

SIMFEROPOL' [UVTG, 9344]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/not to be confused with the refrigerator ship SIMFEROPOL', also currently en route Cuba

BRATSK' [ULAC, 5518]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip

GRETENSK' [UNZE, 2352]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/one large wooden structure,
five trucks or cranes/third trip

OMSK' [UQVZ, 11067]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip

AL'MET'EVSK' [UKKB, 5411]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; possibly en route Cuba

ALEKSANDROVSK' [UVZW, 5411]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; possibly en route Cuba

DUBNO' [UBFM, 7265]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/possibly en route Cuba

LENINSKIJ KOMSOMOL' [UQIM, 12016]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip;
possibly en route Cuba

VOLGOLES' [UQIT, 4638]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 2 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

2. The cargo ship USSURIJSK [UYIE], which was reported [REDACTED] as possibly en route Cuba, is now considered to be definitely en route Cuba.
3. ~~Three~~ ships, previously reported en route or possibly en route Cuba, are now known to be en route ports other than Cuba. These are the cargo ships SOBOLEVO [USLZ], DVINOLES [UYSA], and the passenger ship GRUZIYA [UPOV].
4. The following cargo and passenger information, obtained from collateral sources, is available on ships previously reported en route Cuba: (a) METALLURG BAJKOV [UWQU], 14 trucks, four mobile cranes, two buses (all painted olive drab), 40 men and women sighted on deck; (b) KOMILES [UQIW], wooden boxes on deck; (c) SIMFEROPOL' [UBMY], five 2.5-ton trucks, four or five panel trucks; (d) USSURIJSK [UYIE], 13 military vehicles; (e) IL'YA MECHNIKOV [UPVW], approximately 20 trucks (probably 2.5-ton); (f) NIKOLAJ BURDENKO [UPVY], six very large crates, one large canvas-covered object, two gravel shovels, two 2.5-ton trucks, one 2.5-ton open-body truck (all trucks loaded); (g) ARKHMANGEL'SK [UVCO], 14 loaded trucks on deck; (h) FIZIK VAVILOV [UYU], trucks sighted on deck; LENINOGORSK [UIWY], one tank truck (in addition to known cargo already reported); ANGARSKLES [UYST], six very large crates on deck.
5. Although Soviet cargo shipments to Cuba thus far in October continue at a rate considerably above what had been considered normal prior to the third (calendar) quarter 1962, there has been a slight decrease since the end of the first week of September. Lately, there have been occasions when Soviet ships have actually declared for Cuba and international commercial traffic has periodically provided information of cargoes for Cuba being loaded in the Soviet Union. However, the vast majority of ships involved in Soviet/Cuban trade continue to screen their activities by either utilizing false cargo and port declarations or by simply not issuing declarations of any kind. Those cargoes, known to have been delivered to Cuban ports in late September and early October, have been primarily of a technical/military nature.
6. There have been 140 Soviet dry cargo voyages to Cuba since 1 July 1962. These voyages represent a total of 998,411 gross tons.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

From : DIRNSA

To : CUSASA
DIR NSA
USAFSS -

16 October 1962

~~TS COMINT Channels~~

1. NSA is establishing an ad hoc planning group to prepare a plan to improve the collection and processing posture against Cuba. The major areas to be ~~studied~~ investigated by the group are:

A. Scope of effort required by recent developments, both tech and political.

B. The feasibility of a greater degree of centralization of effort, including the consolidation of intercept and processing at as few locations as technically practicable.

C. The establishment of jointly manned facs (intercept and processing) to take advantage of available manpower and physical facs.

D. Pers Rpt's, Construction Rpt's, and other costing data necessary to support the effort.

2. The Study Group will submit their plan by 1 Nov 62.

(ADP, Maj. Gen. John J. Davis, USA asked for the SCAs' cooperation) *

* TS DIRNSA Mesg, AGO # 10054/17, DTG 171533Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR. *1*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
COURIER

SPECIAL HANDLING
~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 16 OCT 62

TO: CUSASA
DIRNSG
USAFSS

INFO: CUSASA (FM)
DIRNSG
USAFSS (FM)

DISTRIBUTION

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DET	2
D32	4
D31	3
ASALNGP	2
AFSS/FM	3
ADNSG	3

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

AIDP/161-62

1. NSA IS ESTABLISHING AN AD ECC PLANNING GROUP TO PREPARE A PLAN TO IMPROVE THE COLL AND PROCESSING POSTURE AGAINST CUBA. THE MAJOR AREAS TO BE INVESTIGATED BY THE GROUP ARE:

- A. THE SCOPE OF EFFORT BORD BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, BOTH TECH AND POLITICAL.
- B. THE FEASIBILITY OF A GREATER DEGREE OF GENERALIZATION OF EFFORT, INCLUDING THE CONSOLIDATION OF INTERCEPT AND PROCESSING AT AS FEW LOCATIONS AS TECHNICALLY PRACTICABLE.
- C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINTLY MANNED FACS (INTERCEPT AND PROCESSING) TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AVAIL MANPOWER AND PHYSICAL FACS.
- D. PERS EQMTS, CONSTRUCTION EQMTS, AND OTHER COSTING DATA NEC TO SUPP THE EFFORT.

2. THE STUDY GROUP WILL SUBMIT THEIR PLAN BY 1 NOV 62.

3. YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAN (THIS SECTION TO REMOVED)

IF, PO4/3538-B

USA, AIDP

RELEASED AT (SUDD)

I	
PAGE	PAGES
1	2

ARI NR.

AGC NR.

1005417

DTG

171533Z

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSB

RAW date 20 Apr 98

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGC N
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SUSPENSE E

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE: 16 OCT 62

TO:

ESSENTIAL. APPREC YOUR APPOINTING A REP, AND ADVISING NSA (ATTN: P04) SOONEST. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE GROUP WILL TAKE PLACE IN ROOM 3W100 AT 0900, 22 OCT 62.

Shown to : ASALNGP {
ADNSG {
USAFSS (FM)

P04/3538-8/16 Oct 62/rh

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 2 OF PAGES 2

AGI NR.

ASO NR.

054/17

REFERS TO MESSAGE

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TOP SECRET

COPY NR

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ACTION PRECEDENCE
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PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING
~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 22 OCT 62

TO: JCS

INFO: CUSASA

~~TOP SECRET/COMINT CHANNELS~~

ADP 176

NEC ACTION BE TAKEN
REQUEST SYSTEM BE DIRECTED TO MOVE 326 ASA CO TEMPORARILY FROM
FORT BRAGG N.C. TO , IMMEDIATELY, TO PROVIDE

VITAL AUGMENTATION OF SIGINT EFFORT ON CUBA. ALL RESOURCES OF
313 USASA BN, INCLUDING 326 USASA CO, WILL BE PLACED IN DIRECT
SUPPORT OF APPROPRIATE COMMAND UPON JCS IMPLEMENTATION OF CURRENT
CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANS UNDER DISCUSSION.

M/R: CUSASA IACG 3764, requested NSA request JCS to direct the
movement of the 326th USASA Co. to Above msg requests
JCS action on the above and informs JCS that all resources of 313th
USASA Bn including 326th USASA Co. would be placed in direct support
of appropriate command upon implementation of JCS Cuban Contingency
Plans.

CONCUR: ADN
SHOWN TO: ASALNGP
CO 313th USASA BN

P04, 3356, a/jg, 22 Oct 62

DRAFT

RELEASING OFFICER
B. K. Buff
J. J. DAVIS, MAJ GEN, USA, ADP

P04, 3538

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

PAGE 1 OF 1

AGO NR 10094/22

221812Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

ADD
AOI
OTG
SUSPENSE

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TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date 20/01/98

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C	4
P02	2
P04	5
ADP	1
ADN	5
DRF	2
ASALNGP	2
B1	2
B11	2

NNNNTZCZCKHA053 [REDACTED]

00 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

D *USN 72*
ZKZK 00 NNN DIS NRL DE

CONFIDENTIAL
ZHO

0 230516Z

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

~~SECRET SABRE~~

[REDACTED] SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT, *0144 attached*

REPORT NR 2

1. AT 230412Z WHILE AT POSITION 3036N 6530W C70 AS DETERMINED BY

DF SIGINT TRAWLER SHKVAL/OUXN ORIGINATED AND PASSED A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MESSAGE OF FLASH PRECEDENCE TO CARGO VESSEL

ALANTIKA/UPGJ. THIS TYPE OF PRECEDENCE RARELY OBSERVED. *230516*

SIGNIFICANCE UNKNOWN.

2. ON THE SAME SCHEDULE THE SHKVAL ORIGINATED AND PASSED A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MESSAGE OF UNDETERMINED PRECEDENCE TO

THE ALANTIKA FOR MURMANSK TRAFLOT HOROZOV.

3. LATEST POSITION ON THE ALANTIKA IS 4036N 6618W C90

222134Z AS DETERMINED BY DF.

0950 0950

23/0516Z OCT

NNNN

This work uses sensitive information regarding the operations of the United States Navy and the Department of Defense. It is intended for the use of personnel assigned to the operations of the United States Navy and the Department of Defense. It is not to be distributed outside the Department of Defense. Section 1.4 of the Department of Defense Information Security Manual (DODISMAN) applies to this information. CONFIDENTIAL WORK SHEET

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Z CZ CKHA08
OO
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

EXTERNAL	
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DEFENSE	
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INITIALS	
REMARKS	

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ZKZK OO NNN DIS NRL DE
O 230750Z
FM USN 22
TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA
ZFM

~~SECRET SABRI~~

See [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OUEH, SPOTREPORT, *Faircopy.*
REPORT NR 4

1. IN A WEA MSG SOVIET TANKER ADLER/UDR. GAVE POSITION OF 2600N 5242W AS OF 230600Z
 2. IN A DPR SOVIET CARGO VESSEL FARAR/UDR GAVE POSITION OF 3829N 2459. AS OF 230500Z. IDENTIFIED VESSEL BY CAPTAIN NAME.
 3. IN A DPR SOVIET PASSENGER VESSEL LIYVA/UYUC GAVE POSITION 3911N 2542E AS OF 230500Z.
 4. IN A WEA MSG THE SOVIET TANKER GROBYI/UDR GAVE POSITION OF 2724N 3842W AS OF 230600Z.
 5. AT 230657Z ODESSA RADIO/UEB RELAYED A [REDACTED] MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT PRECEDENCE FROM MOSCOW TO AN UNKNOWN VESSEL.
 6. AT 230715Z ODESSA RADIO RELAYED A [REDACTED] MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT PRECEDENCE FROM MOSCOW TO SOVIET CARGO VESSEL MEDNOGORSK/UDR.
- 230750
- 1300 1300
23/0749Z OCT

CLASSIFIED

NNNN

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THIS FORM
CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

REQUESTED A VERY URGENT OSOSKE

WITH SOVIET CARGO VESSEL DUBHO/UBFH AND SOVIET CARGO VESSEL

DIVNOGRSK/UOHI 0108708 OR 1699Z KCS. SIGNIFICANCE UNKNOWN.

2. IN A WEA MSG SOVIET CARGO VESSEL DVIHOLES/UUSA GAVE POSITION

230910Z

OF 2548W 1336E AS OF 230600Z

3. AT 222019Z DUBHO WAS LOCATED AT 2206H 772W C70 AS DETERMINED

BY DF.

4. AT 221626Z DIVNOGORSK WAS LOCATED AT 2300H 7912W C100 AS

DETERMINED BY DF

5. AT 230724Z UFB PASSED AN INCOMPLETE

MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT PRECEDENCE TO METALLURG KURADO.

6. AT 230750Z SOVIET CARGO VESSEL SRETENSK/UUWO RELAYED A

MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT

PRECEDE FROM MOSCOW TO SOVIET CARGO VESSEL AMMET'EVSK/UKKB.

7. 221200Z THE SRETENSK WAS LOCATED AT 3230N 4454E AS DETERMINED

BY WEATHER. TRAFFIC.

8. AT 201508Z THE AMMET'EVSK WAS LOCATED AT 2700N 6312W B50

AS DETERMINED BY DF.

0900 0900

23/0907Z OCT

NNNN

00

ZKZK OO NNN DIS NRL DE

O 231432Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

~~SECRET SABRE~~

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT,

REPORT NR 8

AT 231340Z THE SOVIET PASSENGER VESSEL NIKOLAEVSK(URST) GAVE HER POSITION AS 2119N 7356W AND STATED THAT U.S. WAR SHIP NR 889 IS CONTINUING TO ACCOMPANY HER.


0400 0400

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2319322



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ZKZK OO HHH DIS HRL DE

O 231730Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZELI

~~SECRET~~

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT

REPORT NR 9

1. AT 231500Z THE SOVIET CARGO VESSEL USTYOZHNA (ULGK) WAS CARRYING ON CARGO OPERATIONS IN CUBAN PORT OF HOA.

2. AT 231500Z THE SOVIET PASSENGER CARGO VESSEL ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV (UKDD) REPORTED HER POSITION AS 2139N 4815W.

0500 0500

23/1729Z OCT

FINAL

2110

Handwritten initials/signature

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961-O-579222

SEE CIVIL

231730Z

[REDACTED]
23 Oct 62 2115Z

DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON: UNUSUALLY HIGH LEVEL OF CRAF PILOTS
ACTIVE ON 18 OCTOBER

Further analysis of Cuban MIG activity [REDACTED] on 18 October 1962 reveals that of the 63 MIG pilot suffixes active on that date, twelve were Russian, one was Czechoslovakian, and an additional twenty-two were non-Cuban, probably Russian.

COMMENTS: Only those pilots noted speaking in the Russian language are identified as Russian. The identification as non-Cuban, probable Russian, is made on the basis of distinctly heavy slavic accents.

[REDACTED]

Oct 23, 1962: US announced USSR had started building aggressive missile bases in Cuba.

Pres. Kennedy ordered US naval + air forces to establish immediate "quarantine" (partial blockade) of Cuba to prevent further delivery of aggressive weapons aboard Soviet-bloc or any other ships.

USSR said US action could end in thermonuclear war; warned that Soviet ships would not submit to search.

UN Security Council convened; Acting Secy. Gen. A. Thant pleads for negotiation.

Kennedy charged Soviet-Cuban action had upset precarious status quo which had long existed between East + West in regard to nuclear weapons.

①

CRITICOMM Requirement

24 Oct 1962

Msg. from DIRNSA → JCS, J-6

"This Agency had an urgent CRITICOMM requirement for a duplex circuit between NSA and [redacted] This circuit should be engineered for 61.1 band modulation rate, polar signalling at the NSA terminal and neutral at Terminal. Target date is ASAP and upon customer advice." *

* (C) DIRNSA msg. A60 * 10 139/24, DTG 241810Z

CLASSIFIED

NNNN [REDACTED]

00 00 [REDACTED]

DE [REDACTED]

ZKZK 00 NRL NNN DIS DE

O 24 19 18

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

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~~SECRET SABRE~~

[REDACTED] IGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT,

REPORT NR 23

CLASSIFIED

1. HFDF FIX INDICATES THAT SOVIET CARGO VESSEL BOL'SHEVIK
SUKHANOV (UJYP) HAS ALTERED COURSE AND IS PROBABLY ENROUTE
BACK TO PORT. POSITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

230035Z 3648N 2530W D110

231500Z 3417N 2524W TRUE POSIT FM USN 0012

241523Z 3700N 1930W C60

0688 0688

24/1917Z OCT

CLASSIFIED

CLASS DATE AD

EXTENSION		
RCI/STATE		ZHU
CIA OCT 24 20 23		
AFSSOP		
DFI/ACSO		
ONL		
AFSSO BRAF		
JOC		
ZICON		
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241918

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 26 OCTOBER 1962

TO: CUSASA
DIRNAVSECCHU

INFO: DIRNAVSECORULAKT

DISTRIBUTION

C	5
CI	5
CI1	2
CI11	2
CI2	7
CI4	5
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FM	5
FO4	5
D302	2
ADP	1
DRY	2
ASALNRP	5
AFSS/PM	5
NSG/PM	5

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATP 188

IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSIONS HELD BY CUBAN AUGMENTATION COMMITTEE 22-23 OCTOBER REQUEST ASA PERSONNEL BEING TRAINED FOR DUTY ON BOARD USNS MULLER BE MADE AVAILABLE TEMPORARILY TO DIRNAVSECCHU TO MAN VACANCIES CREATED AT BY TRANSFER OF CONFIDENTIAL PERSONNEL.

DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED. REQUEST YOU KEEP ME ADVISED.

DO NOT DESIRE PERSONNEL TO LOSE IDENTIFY AS PROSPECTIVE CREW FOR USNS MULLER.

M/R: Further action on recommendations of Cuban Augmentation Committee. (coordinated with:)

, D/C G, 3911, 26 OCT 62, Lh

RELEASING OFFICER <i>B. K. Buffan</i> D/C G B. K. BUFFAN, RADM	RELEASED AT (ZULU) Z
PAGE 1 of 1	PAGES

ASINR
ASO NR
10247/26
DYE
262049Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO
AGI
DTG
SUSPENSE

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSACHief, CSS
PAW
date *20 Mar 98*

I. Summary

7. Floating Platforms

During the month of September, the USNS VAI DEZ
USNS ROBINSON were operational from
ports. The USS OXFORD continued operations in the
Havana vicinity. Activation work on the USNS MULL
to be used in support of the Cuban intercept effort
began on 1 October.

pg. 6

I. Summary

6. Improvement of Collection + Reporting on Cuba

a. ELINT:

With increased SIGINT collection facilities and establishment of an ELINT processing effort within PROD, the exploitation of Cuban ELINT

b. COMINT:

- (1) In a further effort to reduce the backlog,
a new element has been established within Project
- (2) Mechanization of the radio printer intercept has produced a significant decrease in the time necessary to process Cuban radio printer traffic.

pg. 6

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY/NOFORN

FROM: DIRNSA

DATE: 26 OCTOBER 1962

DISTRIBUTION

F05	1
B	1
EL	1
C	1
ADP	1
ADM	1
DIR	1
PTWO	1
NSACP	1
FBI	1

TO: CIA/CHAIRMAN USIB VIA SPINT
 CIA/GENERAL CARTER VIA SPINT
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RCI
 SSO, ACSI, D/A (MAJOR GENERAL FITCH)
 AFSSO, USAF (MAJOR GENERAL BREITWEISER)
 CNO, ONI (OP922Y) (ADM LOWRANCE)
 SSO DIA (LT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL)
 JCS (MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS)
 AEC
 FBI (..... COURIER)

~~SECRET / COMINT CHANNELS/NOFORN~~

F05/ 334

REF F05/310-62, 222334Z LINE THREE ABOVE MESSAGE SHOULD BE AMENDED
 TO READ QUOTE WILL BE REPORTED AS TOP SECRET CAT THREE NOFORN EXCEPT

M/R Self-explanatory

1/P05/3538-S/26 Oct 62/mb

DRAFTER

1/P05/3538-S

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2

PAGE OF PAGES

1 OF 1

AGI NR

AGO NR

10085/26

DTG

26/1601Z

REFERENCES TO MESSAGE

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 SUSPENSE E

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
 by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
 date 20/04/98

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DISTRIBUTION IV

DATE: 26 October 1962

FROM : M6

SUBJECT: Courier Service

Armed Forces Courier Service is making daily courier flights to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. Material destined for this area should be hand-carried to M6 for entry into the Courier Service.

Chief, /

M6

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

RAW date 20 APR 98

CLASS

*Check against copy in file
for DUPE*

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Security in that it relates to the transmission of information of a confidential nature the disclosure of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

O 270643Z 1962

TO 11 DIST ROMEO VICTOR/ELINTMNE

VE

CLASSIFIED

ZEM

~~SECRET~~

CUBAN SPOON REST ACTIVITY

CLASSIFIED

AT 270438Z INTERCEPT WAS MADE ON THREE RADARS IDENTIFIED AS SPOON REST (EW/ACQ; DF LINE BEARINGS INDICATE EMITTERS LOCATED AT MARIEL, HAVANA EAST, AND POSS MATANZAS SITES. EMITTERS REMAIN ACTIVE W 06 10Z.

SCP-3

SIFIED

0800 0800

27/0645Z OCT

*Serial
Reused*

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

270643

RAW date 20 Apr 98

of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR

3

NSA FORM 12858 REV JUN 61
(Superseded by NSAS 287 APR 62
to be used until exhausted)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

FROM: DIENSA

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1962

TO: SSO DIA

INFO: AFSSO USAF

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

A/390-62

REF: DIAAQ2 3043-62

1. MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE USE OF PRESENT RESOURCES AT OUR DISPOSAL NOW BEING MADE. CRITICAL COLLECTION DEFICIENCIES HOWEVER, EXIST IN FOLLOWING AREAS: CUBA.

2. IN ORDER TO INCREASE COLLECTION AND REPORTING IN THESE CRITICAL AREAS, AS SPECIFIED, I.E. LOGISTICS BUILDUPS AND TROOP MOVEMENTS, WE WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING:

A. REDPLOYMENT OF USS OXFORD OR ANOTHER SIMILARLY CONFIGURED SEABORNE PLATFORM, WITHIN RANGE OF CUBAN SIGNALS (MINIMUM 20 MILES OFFSHORE).

B. EQUIPPING FOR OPERATIONAL UTILIZATION ALL C130 ACRP TRAINER AIRCRAFT.

C. SCHEDULING OF FREIGHT FLIGHTS TO CONFORM WITH ACRP FLIGHTS.

3. OPTIMIZING OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE AIRBORNE COLLECTION WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, PROPERLY CONFIGURED. SUCH AIRCRAFT

DISTRIBUTION

AIP	2
EADP	1
A	5
B	2
C	5
PO4	2
PO5	2
A1	2
A2	2
A3	2
A4	2
A6	2
C1	4
C11	4
C15	4
B2	4
B3	2
NSACP	1
ERF	1
D302	1

B 1101-1

B 1401-1

CH OFFICE

PERATIONS OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ASG NR

ASG NR

10067/37

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/CSS, GSS
Date 20 Apr 95

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR

REV JUN 61
REV APR 60
(Excluded)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1962

NOT NOW AVAILABLE TO THIS AGENCY FOR TASKING.

MORE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS MUST AWAIT MORE PRECISE GUIDANCE.

NSA HAS OPTIMIZED ALL SIGINT RESOURCES DURING CURRENT EMERGENCY TO

PRIMARY TASK OF RECOGNIZING PREPAREDNESS FOR

HOSTILITIES. MOVEMENT OR BUILDUP OF LOGISTICS AND/OR TROOPS ALREADY

ESTABLISHED AS A PRIMARY INDICATOR.

M/R: This message is in response to DIA request for NSA recommendations for optimizing aerial reconnaissance detection of CUBAN troop and logistic buildups and/or movements. A meeting held at 1000 hrs on 27 Oct 62 chaired by A Watch Office with appropriate A, B, and C personnel and DIA representatives resulted in: (1) Clarification of requirement (2) extension of deadline from 1700 hrs 27 Oct to 0800 hrs 28 Oct 62. (3) arrangement for knowledgeable NSA representative to visit DIA on 29 Oct 62 for on-the-spot assistance or clarification.

Contents of this msg prepared and concurred in by A Group

Watch/3627

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

AGI NR

ABO NR

067/27

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

BYC

Processing - Cuban Crisis '62

AGO 10234

30224Z Oct 62

Blake to Klocker

States that NSA's first priority requirement - is reaction reporting in connection w. high and low level reconnaissance flights.

Physical facilities at enables only very limited processing there.

Includes proposal to establish at a facility capable of intercept processing and reporting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban air defense communications.

(green notebook)

30 Oct 1962

SIGINT Intercept units:

COMINT-derived advisory warnings. will originate

* TS Navy Department Msg - AB1 54337
From CNO → CINCLANFLT, 30 2324Z
Oct 62.

In-Flight ADVISORY Warning Plan

30 October 1962

In a DIRNSA message to COMUSAFSS (Klocko), Lt. General Blake, USAF, advised the following course :

1.

2. Colonel [redacted] of your staff has just completed a briefing for members of my staff in which he outlined the requirements of CINCONAD and CINCAFLANT for COMINT support to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities. Although we have received no formal statement of requirement as outlined by Colonel

[redacted] there is no question about the validity of the requirement to keep CONAD and CINCAFLANT currently advised of the Cuban Air situation. I feel, however, that our first priority requirement is reaction reporting in connection with high and low level reconnaissance flights. Our problem is that limitations in physical facilities at [redacted] enables us to do only ^{very} limited processing there. The processing capability presently on board enables us to meet in a barely adequate fashion the requirement for reaction reporting, in order to perform the analysis necessary to meet the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT, we would have to double our present analytic effort at

3. We can however, provide a very limited response to these requirements by adding a small number of Air Force personnel familiar with these requirements to the complement at [redacted] operating under the control of OIC, [redacted] and permitting these individuals to pick off as a by-product of our limited processing in support of the reaction reporting that information which would also satisfy CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible. When the processing is not engaged in supporting reaction reporting, we will direct the OIC, [redacted] to satisfy the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible.

4. It is our understanding that the information produced as a result of the arrangements outlined above would be passed over a communications circuit to MacDill AFB where it would be relayed to the other Air Force

consumers. Pertinent information could also be passed by appropriate secure means to CONAD Control Center

5. I have been advised that we have received the authority to move in to
Therefore,
as a longer term solution to our problem, I would propose to task the [Army with
establishing ?] a facility capable of intercept processing and re-
porting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban Air Defense Communications. Based on our
preliminary information it would appear that, in addition to the personnel required
to perform the mission outlined above, there may be space to intercept and process
some portion of the Cuban Military Problem. If so, I might further propose a co-
located Army-Air Force facility

Note: General Kloc's comments on the interim and longer term solution
we solicited by Gen. Blake in this message.*

*
(TSC) DIRNSM Msg to COMUSAFSS, DTG 302241Z, 10234/30.

27. Cuban Crisis

- a. During the Cuban crisis, D3 personnel were assigned to JCS J-3 Battle Staff at the Pentagon to ~~keep~~ keep NSA, Ft. Meade, apprised and up to date on all significant collateral data relating to the Cuban crisis. Present planning is for D3 personnel to return to Battle Staff for duty if the group is reconstituted.
- b. Arrangement was made with JCS J-3 to provide for automatic inclusion of NSA representation when future crises dictate revising the Joint Battle Staff. Project Officers names were exchanged (for JCS) and the individuals have been in contact. for NSA,
- c. D3 maintained a constant watch over all SIGINT support plans and implementing actions during the Cuban crisis, as well as the up-dating of CINCLANT and corresponding Component plans.

(2)

FORM 8-63 REV JUN 61
FORM 8-63 REV APR 58
until 10/1/60

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

REQUEST FOR BE FURNISHED INTELLIGENCE ON ANY
CHANGES TO LOCATIONS OF CUBAN RADARS AND AIR UNITS DERIVED FROM
ANALYSIS OF RECONNAISSANCE RESULTS.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

3

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

2

OF

PAGES

2

AGI NR

55036

AGO NR

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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SUSPENSE

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

062030Z

~~SECRET~~

7 November 1962

From DIRNSA → DIRNAVSECGR

After the Air Force facility

is unable to assume satisfactorily the responsibility for intercept/processing and reporting of the Cuban Air Defense Problem propose further to improve our Cuban effort. Their consideration of the intercept/processing and reporting of the Cuban naval and shipping problem at

A. The processing and reporting responsibilities of will be:

- (1) Complete field processing and reporting for the Cuban Naval problem.
- (2) Spot reporting of significant developments on the Cuban Naval ~~problem~~ and shipping problem.

(3) Trappie analysis on assigned targets to support mission and complete trappie analysis on Cuban Naval problem.

(4) Daily and weekly Cuban Naval wrap-up reporting. *

* TSC DIRNSA Msg, ACO # 1115.8/07,
DTG 072101Z, (Msg dated 7 Nov 62)

(5) Spot and summary reporting of Cuban air activity in response to reconnaissance mission in accord-
ance with established procedure.

(6) Development and reporting of Cuban naval order-of-battle items.

B. To ~~be~~ accomplish the above recommend the following intercept be allocated.

Target	NR	POS	Manned	Trans	TYPE
	4		24		
1	3		0		
	10		24		
	3		24		
	4		24		
	1		24		

Note: This is a good source, showing proposed coordination of Cuban Naval and Shipping
msg. is filed in CUBA, I, Black [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR

3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

OP LMMD

OP LMMD

~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM DIRNAVSECGRU

DATE: 07 NOV 62

ACT
INFO

TO DIRNSA //ADV COPY TO P2//

SUSP DATE

07 NOV 62

INFO CNO

COMUSAFSS

ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU

CINCLANTFLT

DISTRIBUTION

BT	2
A	5
B	3
C	6
C1	4
DRF	2
D308	3
D31	1
ADP	5
P04	5
P05	6
S	3
ADNSG	1
SUSP	1
FA	2

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

A. USAFSS 031835Z NOTAL

B. USAFSS 061423Z NOTAL

1. COMM PROVISIONS REF A CONSIDERED MIN NECESSARY SUPPORT

2. REF B INDICATES DIFFICULTIES IN MEETING COMM REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD SECURE VOICE COMMS FROM [redacted] TO ARCC.

3. I MOST STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT TRANSFER OF MISSION REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES FROM [redacted] BE DEFERRED

UNTIL SUCH A TIME AS ALL COMM FACILITIES ARE INSTALLED AND OPERATION, AND A DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY EXISTS SATISFACTORY TO [redacted] TO PROVIDE HIM WITH TIMELY AND COMPLETE INTELLIGENCE TO THE SAME DEGREE AS IS CURRENTLY BEING DONE BY

ANSWERED
IN SEVERAL
M 565 -

4. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

B1101-1
B1401-1

M63 NOTE DTG 061423Z AGI 54974
DTG 031835Z AGI 54576

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

WRD/GPN

7-3-67

PAGE PAGES

DOCUMENT MARKING

Q ... 76 -- 112-117
112 25/57
11158/07

1 OF 1

AGI NR

55279

AGO NR

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

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DTG

SUSPENSE

WRO

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

071522Z

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSB

[Signature] Date 20 Apr 98

8 November 1962

DIRNSA To

1. Request
translations of current intelligence and
release reports and
directly to consumers intelligence value

2. primary reporting responsibility
to be intelligence items derived from
Cuban air, air defense
and air-air, air-ground communications and
in communications Service
communications

A. First priority is processing and
reporting on Cuban reactions to high
and low altitude reconnaissance
flights. Maximum support must be
made toward real time processing
and reporting. These reports should
be issued at emergency precedence
to the distribution specified in TTE
below. *

* TSC DIRNSA Msg I
11245/08, DTG 082 143 Z.

AGO*

~~SECRET~~

NSA FORM 7288B REV JUN 61
(Supersedes NS288 KEY APR 58
to be used until exhausted)

COPY NR 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
OP IMMED

INFO PRECEDENCE
OP IMMED

SPECIAL HANDLING
~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM CINCLANT
TO DIRNSA
INFO: COMKWESTFOR
DIRNAVSECGRU
COMUSAFSS

DATE 13 NOV 62
// ADV COPY
TO B11//

ACT
INFO

DISTRIBUTION	
B11	6
B	9
B1	2
C	6
C1	4
C11	5
C15	4
A3	5
D32/SPO	2
DIR	2
ADP	2
ADN	2
P04/P05	2
NSACP	2
ADNSG	3
AFSS	3

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

- A. YOUR 121852Z
 - B. COMKWESTFOR 122350Z
 - 1. CONCUR TRANSFER CUBAN AIR/AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM
- FROM

NSA M63 NOTE: COMKWESTFOR DTG 122350Z AGI 56083.
DTG 121852Z AGO 11008/12/ORIG DIR.

DRAFTER REA/RNE/13-2-32	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU) Z
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AGO NR

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AGI
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SUSPENSE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

DTG
131541Z

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
[Signature] date *[Signature]*

NSA's Contribution to the Review of the Intelligence Activities
relating to the Cuban Arms Build-Up
during the period 14 Apr - 24 Apr 1962.

dated Dec 62.

TS 04850

[now decontrolled]

In Dec's Reading File, DIR/PROD

After subject folders:

NSA/SCA Contingency Studies
to the Director 15 July 63

Misc

Item 71

USIBM 42

21. Cuban Situation

a. D3 representatives attended a joint NSA/SCA meeting concerning interim operations and long-term SIGINT planning for CUBA. A statement of eventual minimum collection requirements was presented by the 7th Organization and SCA representatives gave their views on various approaches for long range operations. The SCA's were in general agreement that collocated efforts would be preferable to joint operations, and further that two locations would be required in Florida because of logistic problems. It was proposed that NSA determine the number + size of fixed installations, the host-tenant relationships and communications requirements.

b. The USAF has directed its appropriate Commands to extend the TDY on loan for the Cuban situation until 1 July 63. They suggested that if NSA foresees the need that steps be taken through appropriate external support channels to obtain them on a more permanent basis, PO2 has been asked to investigate this matter.

(over)

c. D3 representatives attended a meeting with representatives from NSG, P2 and B1 on 11 Dec. The purpose of the meeting was to determine procedures to satisfy current requirements for communication from the USS Orford to NSG representative to arrange a RW-26 Bravo Patch. A proposal by the NSG representative was accepted as a satisfactory solution to the requirements.

d. D3 has completed a survey and has catalogued total communications circuitry for the complex between all pertinent locations and This effort is available for briefing purposes with associated background discussion on the geographical location and environmental situation in that area.

6 Dec 1962

DIRNSA → CUSASA
DIRNAVSECGRU
COMUSAFSS

1. Formulation of joint force and program-
ming of permanent facilities in Florida
for use against SOV/CUBAN problem
has been delayed pending development
of requirements of USIB for intell
from Cuba. This in turn has awaited
classification of a USIB estimate regard-
ing ultimate SOV posture in Cuba.
During interim period we have
been advised to continue our
effort against SOV/Cuban problem
generally at our present levels.

2. Guidance for interim adjustments
involving Cuban naval and shipping problem
was furnished to NSF and req D X

*TSC DIRNSA msg ACO # 12062/06, dtd
061727Z

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
COURIER

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

FROM DLNBSA

DATE: 6 DEC 62

DISTRIBUTION

TO CUSASA
DIRNAVSECCHI
COMUSAFSS

DIR	2
P04	5
P05	5
P02	2
A	5
B	2
BI	2
BI1	2
C	6
CI	5
CI1	5
D31	4
D32	3
ADN	2
ADP	1
DRF	2
ADNEG	3
ASALNGP	2
AFSS/FM	3
P2	8

INFO:AFSS/FM (COURIER)
ADNSG (COURIER)
CUSASA/FM (COURIER)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ADP/249

A. MY 171533Z OCT/ADP/161-62

B. MY 022306Z NOV/ADP-198-62

C. MY 072101Z NOV/ADP/208-62

D. MY 041713Z/ADP-245-62

E. USAFSS 282325Z NOV/OPD 28-11-105

1. FORMULATION OF RQMT FOR AND PROGRAMMING OF PERMANENT FACILITIES

IN FLORIDA FOR USE AGAINST SOV/CUBAN PROBLEM HAS BEEN DELAYED

PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF USIB RQMTS FOR INTELL FROM CUBA. THIS IN

TURN HAS AWAITED CLARIFICATION OF A USIB ESTIMATE REGARDING ULTIMATE

SOV POSTURE IN CUBA. DURING INTERIM PERIOD WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED TO

CONTINUE OUR EFFORT AGAINST SOV/CUBAN PROBLEM GENERALLY AT OUR

PRESENT LEVELS.

2. GUIDANCE FOR INTERIM ADJUSTMENTS INVOLVING

ON CUBAN NAVAL AND SHIPPING PROBLEM WAS FURNISHED TO NSG IN REF D.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

MAJ GEN JOHN J. DAVIS, USA, ADP

MAJ GEN JOHN J. DAVIS, USA, ADP

Z

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PAGE 1 OF 2

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 2.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

RAW date 20 Oct 98

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DTG

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

12062/06

061727Z

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

PRIORITY

COURIER

NONE

FROM:

DATE: 6 DEC 62

DISTRIBUTION

TO

IN REGARD TO ASA AND AFSS, WE ARE CONTINUING TO USE CONTINGENCY OR EMERGENCY REACTION UNITS PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT LONG RANGE PLAN. FURTHER GUIDANCE REVISING OR ESTABLISHING INTERIM ROOMS FOR ASA AND AFSS FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.

3. FOR THE LONG TERM PERMANENT INSTALLATIONS, WE ARE ASSUMING THAT ROOMS WILL GENERALLY APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF PRESENT EFFORT. WE ARE TENTATIVELY ^{THINKING} ALONG LINES OF CONSOLIDATION AT ONLY TWO LOCATIONS, IN

ADDITION TO PRESENT SHIPBORNE AND ACRP EFFORTS AND ONE OF THESE WOULD BE LOCATED ^{FOR INTERCP OF SIGNALS ABOVE} THE HF SPECTRUM AND ONE AT AN ACTIVE INSTALLATION IN ^{FOR}

HF INTERCEPT. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT THESE INSTALLATIONS WILL BE JOINTLY MANNED AND OPERATED ALONG THE PATTERN ALREADY ESTABLISHED

FOR DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT DOD SUPPORT FOR SEPARATE LOCATIONS FOR EACH SERVICE TO COPE WITH A COMBINATION TYPE OF APPROACH.

4. WE PROPOSE TO CONVENE AN NSA/SCA PLANNING GROUP TO WORK OUT ROOMS FOR AND DETAILS OF OPERATION OF THE PERMANENT FACILITIES WITH INITIAL MEETING AT NSA 11 DEC 62. PLEASE ADVISE NAMES OF YOUR REPS AND ANY COMMENTS YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT AT THIS TIME.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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2 OF 3

AGI NR

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062/06

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
COURIER

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE: 6 DEC 62

TO:

5. SUBSEQUENT TO COMPLETION OF JOINT NSA/SCA PLAN, PROPOSE TO
SUBMIT RQMIS TO DOD IN PCP FORMAT AS AN ADD-ON TO PRESENT OPINS LEVELS.

M/R: Prepared under guidance from DIR in order to proceed with
long term planning against Cuba at an early date.

Concurred in by:

DADN

- A
- B
- C
- FM
- P1
- P2

Shown to CUSASA/FM
AFSS/FM
ADNSG

P041, 4618-S/6 DEC 62/jm

DRAFTER

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RELEASED AT (ZULU)

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AGI NR

AGO NR

062100

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

- AGO
- AGI
- DTG
- SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

HR file
12/10/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSAL FOR SNIE ON THE
SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA

The continuation of a Soviet military presence in Cuba after removal of the MiG's and IL-28's raises important questions for intelligence and for policy.

USIB departments and agencies have been working individually to develop and report the pertinent facts. Their interpretations have varied in scope and emphasis. Meanwhile, the press has directed public attention to the continued Soviet military presence in Cuba, and the President and Secretary of State have taken note of the problem in public statements.

Secretary Rusk has suggested that a coordinated intelligence assessment be prepared for the White House.

I therefore propose that USIB undertake preparation of a SNIE on the current Soviet Military Presence in Cuba for approval by next week's meeting. The SNIE should cover such points as (a) the composition,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Baw 020 20 Apr 98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

organization, strength, and disposition of the Soviet military presence; (b) Soviet intentions as to continuing it and increasing or reducing it; (c) Soviet short-term and long-term objectives in maintaining it; (d) probable Cuban and Latin American reactions to its continuation; and (e) probable political and strategic effects of its continuation.

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AC 1 PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

INFO PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~CONTINT CHANNELS~~

BE MANNED AND TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT; HOWEVER, THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAVANA STATION SHIP DO NOT FULLY JUSTIFY SUCH A LARGE INVESTMENT.

3. THE MULLER REPRESENTS A MORE ECONOMICALLY REALISTIC PLATFORM FOR MEETING THE CUBAN REQUIREMENTS FURTHER MORE RETAINING THE MULLER AS THE HAVANA SHIP WOULD HAVE CERTAIN BENEFITS. THE EXPENSE OF THE ADDITIONAL CONFIGURATION OF THE MULLER FOR THE CRUISE CAN BE SAVED, THE SIGINT PERSONNEL FIGURES CAN BE STABILIZED AT THE LESSER FIGURE, THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR PERIODIC CHANGES OF SC PERSONNEL, AND THE PERSONNEL SAVINGS CAN BE APPLIED AGAINST THE INCREASE IN TASKING AT

4. I REALIZE THAT ONE OBJECTION TO THIS PROPOSAL MAY BE THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE OXFORD AS A "SPY SHIP". HOWEVER, THE MULLER MAY WELL INHERIT THE SAME NAME DURING HER INTERIM EMPLOYMENT AS THE OXFORD'S RELIEF. WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LEARN TO LIVE WITH PROBLEMS REGARDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF TRS'S IN FOREIGN PORTS, REMEMBERING THAT WITH THEIR STRONG FAMILY APPEARANCE, ALL TRS'S WILL LOOK ALIKE TO FRIENDS FOES, AND NEUTRALS.

M63 NOTE: ADP/245 DTG 041713Z AGO 12061/04
DTG 162320Z/NOV AGI 57057

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULU)
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SECURITY MARKING	PAGE	PAGES
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	AGI NR	6061
	AGG NR	

REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DTG
AGG AGI DTG SUSPENSE	HANDLE VIA CONTINT CHANNELS ONLY	072200Z
	SECRET	

~~TOP SECRET~~

303
9317

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : Distribution P IV

DATE: 11 December 1962

FROM : AIP

SUBJECT: Commendation

Further to my Memorandum of 26 November, same subject, I am forwarding extracts of an exchange of correspondence between the Director and Admiral Dennison concerning the value of the contributions made by the SIGINT Community during the recent Cuban crisis. Request you inform those personnel of your organization involved in the activity mentioned in the Director's Memorandum of the favorable comments made on the results of their work.

John J. Davis
JOHN J. DAVIS
Major General, USA
Assistant Director, NSA
for
Production

Incl:
a/s

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~P TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER 1-60~~
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, C&D
[Signature] Date 20 Apr 95

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~TOP SECRET~~*Memorandum*

TO : ADP

DATE: 28 November 1962

FROM : Director

SUBJECT: Appreciation

The President's visit to military units associated with the Cuban crisis symbolizes the "well done" all concerned have merited. The nature of our business prevents public recognition, but all our people who participated should feel they are a part of the President's attention to our military forces on his visit. I have also received a letter of favorable comment from Admiral Dennison who, as CINCLANT, had a major responsibility during the Cuban crisis. I am quoting from his letter, as well as my reply for the information of your personnel concerned with SIGINT support during the recent weeks.

From Admiral Dennison's letter:

"I should like to take this opportunity to mention the very significant contribution which SIGINT in general - and the National Security Agency in particular - have made toward support of the Atlantic Command. The unique and vital intelligence made available as a result of the national SIGINT effort frequently finds its end use and final justification at the level of the Unified Commander. In the present situation SIGINT has been one of the most important single factors in supporting our operations and improving our readiness. Your fine support is much appreciated."

From my reply to Admiral Dennison:

"I hasten to thank you for the favorable mention in your letter of 17 November concerning the significant contribution of SIGINT in the present situation. While you mentioned NSA in particular, I am sure you know that the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Security Service, together constituting our Service Cryptologic Agencies, deserve a lion's share of credit for their work in the fields of collection and direct processing to our customers. I have taken the liberty of passing on your kind remarks to both NSA personnel and the SCA's as kindred vital elements of our SIGINT team."

GORDON A. BLAKE
Lieutenant General, USAF

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~P TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER 1-62
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 December 1962

Restoration of Cases

" There are currently three types of communications in Cuba:

1. Those communications found to be purely Russian.

2. Those " " to be purely Cuban.

3. Those " " satirizing Soviet

procedure and probably presently controlled by the Soviets but involved in joint Soviet-Cuban activities (the Cuban Air Defense system being the primary case)." *

* Chief, B1, Memo to A, B, B1, B231/
[?], subj: Restoration of Cases,
dtd 13 Dec 62.

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM DIRNSA

DATE 8 JAN 63

TO USAFSS

DISTRIBUTION

LFOA	6
A	5
A5	6
B	3
B1	2
B11	6
C	6
C1	4
C11	5
C12	6
C14	4
DRF	2
AFSSFN	3

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

CL14/06-63

FOR OPD.

REQUEST TECHNICAL RESULTS OBTAINED HF HEARABILITY TESTS ON CUBAN
TARGETS CONDUCTED AT ANY OTHER FLORIDA AF STATIONS

CONCUR:

M/R USAFSS was to conduct a HF hearability test on Cuban targets to begin on 3 December 1962. Results of any tests were to be forwarded to NSA. In the event was considered technically unsuitable, USAFSS planned to further conduct HF hearability tests at other active AF stations in Florida. To date, this Agency has not received any results of these tests and required this information for planning overall site capabilities

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

082040 Z

PAGE PAGES

1 OF 1

AGI NR

AGO NR

01179/08

DYS

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REFERS TO MESSAGE *

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/CSS, CSS
date 20 Apr 98

FORM 8888 REV JUN 61
REPLACES FORM 8888 REV APR 58
(to read with extension)

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

DISTRIBUTION

5. THE AFOREMENTIONED ACTION BY PROD-02 WAS NECESSITATED BY THE PRIOR COMMITMENT TO FOURTEEN SEPARATE PLANS. FIVE OF THESE PLANS ARE ORIENTED. ANOTHER TWO OF THESE PLANS AFFECT ACTION IN COUNTRIES. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROGRAMMING ACTION BE INITIATED AT AN EARLY DATE TO RELIEVE OF ITS CURRENT OPERATIONS SO THAT IT MAY RETURN TO ITS READINESS STATUS OF A DIRECT SUPPORT ROLE OF US ARMY COMBAT FORCES

NSA M63 NOTE: ADP/268 DTG 182108Z DEC 62 IS AGO 12160/18

DRAFTER		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ZULC)
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			AGI NR 01454
			AGO NR
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Return to
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15 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting With Consumers On Cuban Air Defense Requirements

1. A meeting was held in the Director's Conference Room on 11 January 1963 at 1400 hours for the purpose of reviewing and up-dating consumer requirements on reporting of the Cuban Air Defense problem. The meeting was attended by representatives from DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA; NSA participants were

2. The following items were discussed:

a. The SAC proposal to decrease the precedence of reports brought when an overflight sortie is in progress, or to report hostile intent and/or action.

b. The priority order in which new reports developments/events in the Air Defense operations.

(1) Air reactions to US reconnaissance flights, with real time reporting on overflights and 3 hour reports on peripheral recon flights.

(2) Cuban aircraft exiting Cuba.

(3) Location and operational status of all tactical aircraft in Cuba.

(4) Civil/military transport, identified as Soviet or Cuban, arriving or departing Cuba.

(5) AOB, proficiency of the air defense/early warning systems, degree of Soviet influence.

(6) Six-hour reports on total air mission of , with emphasis on Soviet participation and influence.

c. The proposal from COMAD to move its portion of the Joint Reconnaissance Control Center (JRCC) at Boca Chica to Montgomery Air Defense Sector (MDAS), including the AFSSO Key West and the KI-26 circuit.

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSB

AW Date 20 Apr 98

~~SECRET~~

~~FOR EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

3. The following agreements were reached:

a. The SAC recommendation was bought by all consumers, subject to the stipulation that possible hostile intent/action toward peripheral flights be accorded the same high priority of overflights.

b. In reference to priorities, the present arrangement was agreed to, except for the following changes:

- (1) The requirement for reporting on peripheral reconnaissance flights is put on the same plane as reporting on overflights.
- (2) The requirements agreed to be in lower priority for reporting were agreed to solely on the basis of the rapidity with which they would be reported. This in no way negated or downgraded the necessity for reporting such items as USSR participation/influence, indications of Russian departure, proficiency of Cuban/Russian Air Defense systems, transport activity in or out of Cuba, and the location and status of tactical aircraft in Cuba.

c. In reference to COMAD's proposal to move to NDAB, the Navy dissented, pointing out the need to keep the KJ-26 circuit into Boca Chica for CINCLANT aircraft. The Air Force explained that, by moving to NDAB, greater intercept capability could be brought to bear on any "mad dog" Cuban pilot who decides to attack the US, or to facilitate any potential defector aircraft's safe arrival in the U.S. It was pointed out that providing the type of reporting desired by COMAD would have an adverse effect on its capability to perform its mission for other consumers. DIA will advise NSA of the decision reached on the COMAD request. No further action is required by NSA at this time.

Chief,

F05

cc: AIP
EOI
MCI

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SECRET

P. Rep MGS for Feb 63

P 1 established a study group to review
the reporting on Communist SIGINT
efforts in Cuba. Headed by ----
of R4, with reps of B1, A14, & P05.
Report due 15 March 1963

ACTION PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

INFO PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

SPECIAL HANDLING

~~COMINT CHANNELS~~

FROM: DIRNAVSECGRU

DATE: 21 FEB 63

INFO:

TO: SSO DIA

GINCLANTFLT

CUSASA
COMUSAFSS

INFO: DIRNSA

ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU
DIRNAVSECGRULANT

DISTRIBUTION

A
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B1
B11
C
C1
C11
D31
P02
P04
P05
ADP
DRF
ADNSO

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

CUBAN COMINT COLLECTION AND REPORTING

A. DIRNSA MSG ADP/20-63 (222223Z JAN) NOTAL

1. BUILDUP OF NAVSECGRUACTY

TO PERMIT ASSUMP

TION CUBAN NAVAL AND SHIPPING COLLECTION AND REPORTING

TASKS HAS COMMENCED. ANTICIPATE SHIFT OF REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES

WILL CONCUR DURING MARCH 1963. SPECIFIC DATES WILL BE PROVIDED BY

STATIONS CONCERNED IN NORMAL SIGINT PRODUCT REPORTING SERIES.

M63 NOTE: ADP/30-63 DTG 222223Z IS AGO 01208/22

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED BY (GLO)

DIRNAVSECGRU 21-2-63

PAGE 1 OF 1

SECURITY MARKING

ASINR. 09755

AGO NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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BYE 211512Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

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ADI
OTG
RESPONSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

SPECIAL HANDLING

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FROM DIRNSA

DATE: 19 MAR 63

TO: CINCLANT

INFO: NSA REP CINCLANT

DISTRIBUTION

DRP	2
P04	6
P05	6
A	5
A6	6
B	2
B1	2
B11	2
C	6
DIR	1
M61	2
M63	1

~~CONFIDENTIAL - COMINT CHANNELS~~

DIR 35

A. MY 082132Z, DIR 28 (PASEP)

1. AS INDICATED IN REF A THIS AGENCY HAS RECEIVED REQUIREMENTS FOR RAPID RECEIPT OF MATERIAL, CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL, FROM FLORIDA SCA UNITS. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SPECIAL JET AIRCRAFT, COURIER WHEN REQUIRED TO SUPPLEMENT ARFCOS.

2. PROPOS THE FOLLOWING TASK SITUATIONS AND COURSES OF ACTION ~~WILL BE~~ IN SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENT FOR FAST TRANSMITTAL OF SPECIFIED MATERIAL WITH NICKNAME RED COAT.

A. SITUATION ALPHA, MATERIAL ORIGINATES AT AND

RED COAT IS TASKED TO MAKE PICKUP AT

NAB AND DELIVER DIRECTLY TO ANDREWS AFB FOR RENDEZVOUS

RELEASING OFFICER

GORDON A. BLAKE, LT. GEN. USAF

DIRECTOR

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

DOCUMENT MARKING DC/P04, 3538

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGO 03208/08

AGI

OTO 082132Z

SUSPENSE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

030320

201550z

DECLASSIFIED FOR SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
BY SP-6 MIA/MSL/CSS
DATE 20 APR 98

NEEDS BY JUN 61
PKY APR 58
will be handled
PRECEDENCE

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM

DATE:

TO:

WITH NSA COURIER.

B. SITUATION BRAVO IS SAME AS ALPHA PLUS INTERMEDIATE
STOP AT FOR MATERIAL ORIGINATING

AT

C. SITUATION CHARLIE IS SAME AS ALPHA AND BRAVO PLUS
PICKUP AT FOR MATERIAL ORIGINATING AT

D. SITUATION DELTA IS SAME AS ALPHA WITH INTERMEDIATE
STOP ONLY AT

3. REQ DIRNSA AND SPECIFIED SCA UNITS BE NOTIFIED VIA
EMERGENCY PRECEDENCE MSG OF BUNO AND ETAS. MATERIAL WILL
BE DELIVERED TO AIRCRAFT PILOT BY SCA REP. AN OFFICIAL
NSA COURIER WILL MEET AIRCRAFT AT ANDREWS AFB AND RECEIPT
FOR MATERIAL DIRECT FROM PILOT.

4. TENTATIVE AREA ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN
INFORMALLY COORDINATED.

5. REQUEST CONCURRENCE AND/OR COMMENTS.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (SULS)

SECURITY MARKING

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

032/20

DYS

REFERS TO MESSAGE

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ELECTRICAL RELEASE

19 JUN 63

DIST: OSCAR/XRAY ECHO

0/16156-63

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

COMINT REPORT

WARNING

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DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

BAW date 20 Nov 98

~~SECRET SABRE~~

19 JUN 63

DIST. OSCAR/XRAY ECHO

~~SECRET~~ 0/16156-63
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19 JUN 63

SOVIET SHIPS IN CUBAN TRADE

1. THIS REPORT CONTAINS DETAILS ON CARGOES, POSITIONS, AND OTHER INFORMATION REGARDING SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS EN ROUTE, IN PORT, OR DEPARTING CUBA AS OF 19 JUNE 1963.

2. LATEST INFORMATION ON SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS EN ROUTE CUBA:

BUKHAREST [UQYR, 21255GT, TKR] 35-48N 38-18W AT 191200Z.

CHERNOVTSY [UJVM, 8229GT, TKR] 25-12N 56-54W AT 190600Z.

DRUZHEBA [USQF, 25718GT, TKR] 36-22N 22-38E AT 171500Z.

A COLLATERAL SOURCE INDICATES IT TRANSIRED THE BOSPHORUS ON 16 JUNE.

DUSHANBE [UJNC, 7176GT, CG] 25-06N 76-25W AT 190001Z.

DZHUZEPE GARIBAL'DI [UUZL, 20659GT, TKR] 37-17N 06-42E
AT 171500Z.

EL'SK [UWOL, 7949GT, TKR] 52-31E 00-26W AT 170500Z.

GRIGORIJ VAKULENCHUK [UVFO, 8229GT, TKR] 22-18N 60-00W
AT 190823Z (WITHIN 85 NM).

KRASNOGRAD [UQOX, 9254GT, CG] 25-49N 77-19W AT 190500Z.

KRASNYJ OKTYABR' [ULZE, 12285GT, CG] 34-42N 45-12W AT
191140Z (WITHIN 75 NM).

LIBICHANSK [UYXF, 23153GT, TKR] 34-36N 46-36W AT 190600Z.

MARIYA ULYANOVA [ULGE, 4871GT, PAS] APPROACHING THE
STRAITS OF DENMARK AT 170500Z. ESTIMATED TO HAVE DEPARTED BALTIC
PORT (POSSIBLY LENINGRAD) ON 15 JUNE. CARGO INCLUDES 54 POINT 8
TONS OF CONDENSED MILK AND 95 PIECES OF "GKES" CARGO.

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~ 0/16156-63
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

MICHURINSK [UOSB, 5518GT, CG] 27-00N 71-42W AT 190336Z
(WITHIN 75 NM).

OKHOTSK [USKY, 11106GT, CG] 37-18N 133-06W AT 181200Z.

PRAGA [UCSQ, 21255GT, TKR] 38-54N 21-06W AT 190957Z
(WITHIN 60 NM).

3. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 20 SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS IN CUBAN
PORTS AS FOLLOWS

ANTILLA

LABINSK [UQIR, 9820GT, CG].

SREBENSK [UINQ, 5419GT, CG].

SUKHONA [UPCW, 7212GT, CC].

HAVANA

ALAPAEVSK [URIL, 5411GT, CG].

ALEKSANDROVSK [UVZU, 5411GT, CG].

BOL'SHEVIK SUKHANOV [UWYP, 6660GT, CG].

DIVNOGORSK [UQHI, 8843GT, CG].

IVAN POLZUNOV [UVMR, 7176GT, CG] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED
HAVANA 18 JUNE.

KIROVSK [UICO, 5518GT, CG].

POTI [UVGI, 8229GT, TKR] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED HAVANA
19 JUNE.

SLAVSK [USKR, 9344GT, CG] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED HAVANA
19 JUNE.

ISABELA DE SAGIA

METALLURG ANOSOV [USMN, 12205GT, CG]

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~ 0/16156-63
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MARIEL

MEDNOGORSK [UQBJ, 8843GT, CG] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED
MARIEL VICE HAVANA 14 JUNE.

MOA

UGLEURAL'SK [UIFG, 5628GT, CG] DEPARTED MATANZAS
180530Z. ARRIVED MOA 191030Z.

NICARO

FRUNZE [UVFK, 8229GT, TKR] DEPARTED SANTIAGO 170800Z.
ARRIVED NICARO 18 JUNE.

VIL'NYUS [UKBB, 4956GT, CG].

NUEVITAS

ATKARSK [UVAD, 5411GT, CG].

PUERTO PADRE

L'GOV [UQMW, 5382GT, CG].

UNKNOWN

KHERSON [UQNY, 8229GT, TKR] ESTIMATED TO HAVE DEPARTED
NUEVITAS 17 JUNE, PROBABLY EN ROUTE HAVANA.

4. THE FOLLOWING SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS HAVE DEPARTED CUBA
AND ARE WEST OF 30 DEGREES WEST:

ARCHANGEL'SK [UVCO, 5660GT, CG] 26-54N 64-04W AT
190500Z. DEPARTED NUEVITAS 16 JUNE.

BUDAPEST [UJNR, 21255GT, TKR] 26-12N 58-06W AT
190600Z. DEPARTED HAVANA 160700Z.

CHEKRYAKHOVSK [UQNH, 5382GT, CG] 25-54N 79-30W AT

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DNEPROGES [UOUB, 5494GT, CG] 34-36N 36-48W AT 181800Z.

ETA KALININGRAD 29 JUNE.

KUBAN' [UOVY, 7176GT, CG] 27-54N 62-24W AT 190537Z
(WITHIN 60 NM). CARGO TO CUBA FROM USSR WAS 32,376 POINT 4 TONS
OF CRUDE OIL. ETA BLACK SEA PORT 28 JUNE.

LUGANSK [UYXE, 2226GT, TKR] 34-54N 37-00W AT 190755Z
(WITHIN 75 NM)

TSIMLYANSKOGES [UKKG, 5494GT, CG] 22-18N 74-54W AT
190801Z. STD NUEVITAS 18 JUNE.

VARSHEVA [UWOF, 21255GT, TKR] 29-42N 57-12W AT 190600Z.
DEPARTED HAVANA 152048Z.



With regard to the Cuban situation:
In a dry-need presentation of the
CCP (March 1963), The Director, NSA,
suggested to Mr. Kirby, that "especially
when presenting to serious DOD officials,
I think we should come out loud
and clear on the long-term assumption
we are making regarding Cuba when
we program fixed facilities in Florida."

* DIRNSA Memorandum, Subj: CCP Presenta-
tion, addressed to Mr. Kirby WABP, 21 March
1963.

The Director maintained that it would be more prudent to keep the program at the level NSA recommended, and, if events took a favorable turn, it would be easier to reduce at the time than to find resources elsewhere, if they did not.

FROM: DIRNSA
 TO: CIA/CHAIRMAN USIB VIA SPINT
 CIA/GENERAL CARTER VIA SPINT
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RCI (MR. ROGER HILSMAN)
 SSO, ACSI, D/A (MAJOR GENERAL FITCH)
 AFSSO, USAF (MAJOR GENERAL BREITWEISER)
 CNO, ONI (OP-922Y) (RAIM LOWRANCE)
 SSO DIA (LT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL)
 JCS (MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS)
 ASC
 FBI

DATE: 5

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- CNO, ONI (OP-922Y) (EXCLUSIVE FOR RAIM LOWRANCE)
- DEF/ACSI (EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJ. GEN. FITCH)
- DIA/CLIC (EXCLUSIVE FOR LT. GEN. CARROLL)
- AFSSO USAF (EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJ. GEN. BREITWEISER)
- STATE (RCI) (EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HILSMAN)
- JCS (EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN. COLLINS)

M/R: Above message revised distribution of FUNNEL product in accordance with USIB desires.

COORD: BI

CHIEF/PO5/3938-S COL/USAF/ JOHN J. DAVID/MAJ GEN/USA/ADF/333

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 by Director NSA/CSS/ESS

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~DIRNSA~~