                         # NUMBERS & ODDITIES #
       //////////////////////////// \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
       - Editor: Ary Boender      *****      e-mail: ary@luna.nl -
       - Nickname on IRC channels #wun #monitor #numbers:  Ary-B -
       ------------------------ Co-editors -----------------------
       - Voice stations: Chris Smolinski <cps@access.digex.net>  -
       - Morse stations: Guy Denman <gdenman@mcmail.com>         -
       - Loggings: Jascha Ruesseler -                            -
       -           <ruessele@pc0401.Psychologie.Uni-Marburg.de>  -
       \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ ////////////////////////////// 
                             [- N&O #03 -]

Hello again! This month the first part of a series of crypto articles.
Further the promised article about jamming and more station profiles.

PLEASE READ: Guy Denman told me that he is very disappointed because he
gets no input from you at all. Unless more interest is shown, this might
be his last contribution. I have the same experience; is it so hard to
share your info and experience with your fellow dxers? Why don't YOU
send us your logs, info, schedules, and questions? Especially info and
logs regarding the Morse numbers stations are most welcome. The Morse
scene is very much alive, but only few dxers seem to report them. Most
of the logs so far, are voice station logs, which are of course also
very welcome!

We like to extend our gratitude to those people who DID send their
contributions. Thanks gang!

Oh, before I forget, please, mention your location (city, state and/or
country) if you send us your logs.

Thanks for your co-operation and take care!   -Ary-


CIPHERS AND SECURITY CHECKS
---------------------------
During the early days of WW2, routine and random security checks were
inserted into all allied messages to verify that the sender was who he
said he was, and to check whether or not he was transmitting under
duress. Routine checks often comprised 'errors', such as the 3rd and
17th letter of a message misplaced by four places in the alphabet.
Because the enemy quickly learned that these checks were inserted, the
agents carried two codes, one to mislead the foe and one for messages
to friends.

Because these checks weren't very safe, random checks were inserted
into the messages. A three-letter code like 'wun', would be inserted
at the begin and end of each message in normal situations. If the
sender was transmitting under duress, he would not insert the codes
so that the receiver would know that he was in trouble. The code word
at the beginning of the message would be disguised by advancing its
letters by an agreed number of letters in the alphabet, while the
same code placed at the end of the message, would be substituted by
letters four places ahead in the alphabet. Example: code word = WUN,
substituted by letters three places ahead in the alphabet. Result:
'ZXQ' (W=Z, U=X, N=Q) and substituted by letters four places ahead
'AYR'(W=A, U=Y, N=R). Two extra letters were added to camouflage the
words as normal five-letter code words, e.g. ZXQ becomes AZXQW and
AYR becomes BAYRP.

Only too often the security codes were forgotten by the field agent,
or the home office thought that the agent had forgotten to add it,
while in fact the agent did not add the code because he transmitted
under duress. In short, this was not very safe and the allies phased
this check out in 1942.

Other security checks included the use of phrases. These phrases were
also used for short information exchanges. They often look funny, like
'the car needs a new engine', meaning that something was wrong, while
'there is no need for more coffee' could mean that everything was ok.
Another one, noted on a British Army net: 'Zeppelins in the night sky'
Reply: 'Pop them with a drawing pin'

The subject was discussed on Spooks a while ago. One of the comments
came from Simon who says ''I read in one particular publication on the
history of modern espionage that Radio Swan, the mysterious anti-Castro
station sent "strange" messages on the day of the Bay of Pigs invasion
in the form of coded sentences that made little sense, similar to the 
ones discussed in other postings.''

The other postings that Simon mentions include phrases like "Les
sanglots longs des violons de l'automne percent mon coeur d'une
langueur monotone" and  "The water in the Seine is dirty". You can
often hear sentences like these in WWII movies or TV-series. Some may
be real, others a phantasy of the writer.

PLAYFAIR CODE: the Playfair code system had its origin in the UK. It
was based on a phrase from a poem or song. The agent had to learn this
line which was then transposed into blocks of five letters. The rest
of the alphabet was used to fill the 5x5 letter square in an agreed
order, the letters 'i' and 'j' counted as one. Double letters were
omitted. Example: the phrase 'the numbers and oddities newsletter'
would appear as:

   T H E N U                  The actual message was sent in bigrams
   M B R S A                  (= groups of two letters). The bigrams
   D O I W L                  were encoded by taking the two opposite 
   P F K G C                  corners of the rectangle it formed in
   X Y Q V Z                  the square, eg DA becomes ML.

If both letters of the bigram are in the same line, then the next
letters below are used; if both are in the same column, the next
letters to the right are used, eg IW becomes KG and RI becomes SW.

The message 'spooks newsletter' in bigrams: SP OO KS NE WS LE TT ER
and encoded: MG FF GR SR AL IU MM NS. After that the bigrams are
grouped in five letter groups: MGFFG RSRAL IUMMN SZUQX. If the final
group is too short, which is the case here, it is filled with dummy
letters to complete it.

Because the system was too easy to break, it was replaced by other,
more sophisticated systems in the early years of WWII.

ONE-TIME PADS: Many other systems, a.o. Delastelle -based on Fairplay- 
were used until the one-time pad was introduced. The one-time pad is
one of the most successfull inventions of the spy-world. The system is
unbreakable. It is easy to use and is in fact a very simple way of
encryption, and very effective at the same time.

A one-time pad is a list of code groups, mostly five figure groups
-but also other codes are used- printed on paper, silk handkerchiefs,
or supplied on microfilm. Each group represents a certain phrase.

Example: 
Guns and backup required - GB; Out of toiletpaper - OP. The two-letter
codes should be repeated to avoid errors, eg GBGB and OPOP. 

A more common way is the use of code groups, being a vocabulary of
several hundreds words. The first five-digit group gives the index
code; eg an incoming message starting with group 81114 would tell the
agent that the decoding begins at page 81 line 114 of the code list.
The next five-digit blocks are made up of three-letter codes, repre-
senting the various phrases.

When an agent wants to send a message, he must use the codes for the
relevant phrases. Example: the message 'I will cross the border tonight'
has three relevant words, each with its own three-digit code.

   cross   = 321              The encrypted text would now read:
   border  = 551              321 551 873, or using five-digit groups:
   tonight = 873              32155 18730 (the '0' is a filler here).

Next is the transposition cycle. The agent would pick a page and line
of the code list to encrypt the message itself, eg page 23 line 4. The
code line could look like this: 67554 23075 33687 18873 33109 99841

He now has to transpose the numbers of his message as follows. Subtract
the lower number from the higher number without carrying across.

   67554 23075                The first group of the message would
   32155 18730                indicate the page and line: 23004
   ----- -----                followed by the encrypted message
   35499 15345                35499 15345

---------                   
That's it for now. Next time we'll focus on other encryption techniques.


CW NUMBERS STATIONS by Guy Denman
---------------------------------
Hi All,
For this month I will carry on with descriptions of some more of the
families and what has been happening just lately.

* M8 
----
Mode ICW.  Uses Cut Numbers
T 0, A 1,  N 2,  D 3,  U 4,  W 5,  R 6,  I 7,  G 8,  M 9,
UAAMD MDUUA UAIAU R3   UAAMDx5 = = =  150f Cut
After first message sends AR AR AR MDUUAx5 = = = 150f Cut same after
second message
Ends AR AR AR SK SK SK

This is now the usual format, at least 2 others exist.
 
The station is usually active in the mornings up to 1100. I have heard
it at 0600, but as I do not get up early nowadays, not sure how much 
earlier it is on. I have seen reports from the USA of it being on from
0000 onwards. I am still not sure if the ones we can hear in the UK are
being transmitted from Cuba. They are quite often S9 signals, which
sound too strong for that distance. Logged an unusual one recently with
the last figure of the ID being 4. They are normally 1, 2 or 3.

Some frequencies in use are: 6287  6787  6797  6825  6933  7580

                      -o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

* M10
-----
Always uses ICW. This station uses a slightly different format of
2 figure decode key. The call up usually starts with 555 but they have
been known to use other triplets, 111 222 333 444 777 and 888. These
are used on special broadcasts. They have also be known to use up to
a 4/5 figure random ID, but only very rarely. Transmission times and
frequencies are changed quite often, although they use a set of fre-
quencies to choose from. Sometimes they use 2 frequencies but not 
always. Regular schedules all use 2 parallel frequencies.

The speed the message is sent is variable, usually the later message 
is sent at a faster speed. Call and first message 17 WPM later messages
up to 25 WPM.

     Call                 Preamble            Message       Ending
555x3 571x3 46 (R5)   571x3 75 75 46 46 = =   46x5F  = = 75 75 46 46 000

They can have up to 4 IDs in the call, in this case the call would be

555x3  571x3 46 275x3 25 049x3 16 435x3 41 (R5)

Then the preamble would be the same, message the same but the ending
misses off the 000 and carries on to the next call which would be 275.

There is a regular sked with these 4 IDs on Saturday, Sunday, Monday 
and Wednesday at 1645. frequency 4485//5028. Same messages repeated 
for 4 days.

The message can also sometimes be split into 2 parts with a different 
decode key for each part, but in this case the call gives the total
amount of groups in the message.

Frequencies that have been used are:
 3385    3834    4029    4305    4485    4541    4573    4775  
 4834    4882    5007    5025    5040    5060    5085    5155
 5276    5290    5301    5295    4525    5471    5503    5521
 5554    5702    5737    5760    5860    6204    6758    6780
 6801    6835    6943    7380    7404    7475    7845    8111
 8175    8190    9164    9369    9386    9455    9971   10582
10922   11415   121??   125??   13405   14977   14650   14562

Some skeds active at present as of 9 January 1998
Sunday     1645 3385//       1810 4029//   1920 5471//
Monday     0820 8190//9164   1645 3385//   1920 5471//
Wednesday  1645 3385//4485
Thursday   1810 4029//
Saturday   1645 3385//

Schedules are Monthly, twice Monthly, or weekly. always repeated 
within the same week. Special schedules (irregular) may be daily.
Another slightly different format has been logged recently, the
station comes on at 2000 on 3824. It is not regular so may be heard
any day of the week.

Format is:
Call 111x3  55013x3 30x3 for 5 minutes
55013x3 02 02 30 30 = = 30x5F {Always 30 groups} = = 02 02 30 30
does not end with 3 zeros as the normal M10

It is sometimes hand sent, when all the rest of M10 are always auto
sent. Was on Friday 12 June to ID 12127

                      -o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

* M12
-----
Mode Usually ICW but has been known to use MCW. The call is sent
fairly slowly at about 15 WPM but the preamble and messages are
usually sent at 30 WPM, single 5 figure groups, although slower and
faster speeds have been used. They are constantly changing frequencies
and transmission times so it is not worth listing them.This is another
station that has been noted using the same frequencies and IDs as in
1997. The message is sometimes repeated on a further two frequencies. 
If the message is sent on the hour then there will be the same message
sent at Hour+20 Hour+40, Hour+25 Hour+45, or Hour+30 Hour+50, this 
depends on length of message and speed sent. Can be found on at any
time.

        Call             Preamble          Message     Ending
   749 749 749 000 R5                   No Message
   749 749 749 1 R5    1573 143 1573 143   143x5f   Pause 000 000

The figure 1 after 749 indicates number of messages,2 messages are very
rare. There is one message that keeps on being sent, that has been sent
for some considerable time. I first logged it in October 1996 but I 
know it has been logged before this, usually sent to an ID starting with
the figure 3. At present being sent to 314.

The preamble is 792 66 792 66 and the message is always the same. They
are still coming on the same frequency as used last year with some
variations. Last year on a Friday there was one on at 1600 on 12132
which repeated at 1700 on the same frequency. It is on again this year 
at 1600 on 12132 but now is the usual format, coming on at 1620 on 13544
and 1640 on 14728. ID was the same 963.

                      -o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

Activity is still high this last month. M29 had a particularly busy day
on Thursday 11 June. I heard it six times sending messages, also G4 was
on at the same time.

M3 is still coming on the same frequencies as last year, and in some
cases sending the same messages. It was on Friday 12 June at
    0800 on 5365 041/00
    0830 on 5624 017/00
    0900 on 5050 012/00
and 0930 on 6430 552/00 an exact repeat of 1997.

M53 came on friday 5 June at 2000 with one of its very rare double
messages, call was 747.750.016  Message to 750 was 30 groups, followed
by a message of 33 groups to 016.

Thats all for this Month, if anyone finds the morse station information
useful I would appreciate an e-mail. If anyone requires further infor-
mation the same applies.

73, Guy 


WORLDWIDE JAM SESSION
---------------------
Here is the promised jamming article. The article gives some info about
jamming in general and the various types of jammers. In next month's
column I will publish the frequencies and findings of the few readers
who were so kind to send me their jammer-logs and comments.

                       -o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

Everyone must have heard them, those odd sounding signals. Pulse jammers,
and bubble jammers with their typical 'woo woo woo' sound, are the most
common types of jammers on SW. The amount of jammers is amazing in the
4, 5 and 6 MHz bands, especially in the evening between 1900-2100 UTC
and at night between 0200-0400 UTC, equalling the late evening and early
morning in the Middle and Far East, where most of the jamming nowadays
originates.
Top of the list of suspects are Iran, Iraq and Cuba. The USA may be 
responsible for the jamming of Iraqi and Iran based stations. Possibly
using jammers in EW-aircraft or vessels. Cuba jams Radio Miami, Radio
Marti, WRMI, and stations which relay La Voz de la Fundacion (WHRI,
maybe some others). Radio Free Asia reported jamming of its Vietnamese
and Chinese services by possibly China, North Korea or Vietnam.

Aeronautical, maritime and SAR stations suffer from these activities.
Tony Orr, WUN's aeronautical editor wrote in his column: ''Many of you
have by now either heard or heard about the troubles with jammers in the
5 MHz range of frequencies lately. These jammers, targeting a certain
clandestine station broadcasting from the Middle East, are literally all
over the band, causing the aeronautical ground stations operating there
to scramble for new frequencies to use in lieu of their regular 5 MHz
homes. Especially hard hit was Gander Radio on 5649 kHz, which has seen
fit to move down to 4675 kHz for it's operations on NAT-C.''

Tony is right, I heard it myself. Recently Dutch Coast Guard aircraft
had to change frequency because of this problem. SAR frequency 5680 kHz
is also a victim. SAR monitor Alan Gale from the UK sent me the following
comments: 
''The interefrence on 5680 kHz first appeared around the 2 August 1997.
It fades in here in the UK around 1600 UTC every evening. The AM station
comes on air, and quickly gets jumped on by a 'Bubble Jammer'. After a
while the station stops broadcasting and the jammer also stops, but then
seconds after the broadcast restarts again the jammer also returns.

The clandestine station which was heard on 5680 kHz in the clear before 
the jammer caught up with it had a YL presenter. Shortly afterwards what 
sounded to be the same presenter was heard on 5670, 5660 and 5630 kHz.
The pattern seemed to be transmit on one channel until the jammer com-
menced, and then QSY to another channel on steps a multiple of 10 kHz 
away. As soon as the jammer caught up with them they stopped transmitting,
though in many cases a blank carrier remained on channel and the jamming
continued. The jammer only ceased when the carrier appeared to be
switched off.  

No Station IDs were heard, but the words 'Iran' and 'Rafsanjani' were 
heard on the station on 5680 with the YL presenter. On another occasion
the name 'Khomeni' was heard several times, and if as seems likely, this
is 'The Voice of the Mohajed' operating from the Iraqi border into Iran
this would make sense. There may well be a set pattern as to which channel
the station changes to when the jamming commences, it would be difficult 
for listeners if there wasn't. A regular pattern would make life easier 
for the jammers though, so a further study of this might well prove
interesting.''

* How it all started

Jamming was first used by the Germans during World War 1. In the early
1920s, competing broadcasters in the United States jammed rival radio
programs. During the 1930s, jamming became a political weapon. World
War II demonstrated that a jamming network operating against military
circuits, was a potent wartime weapon.

"Knickebein" was an early guided weapon system. The Germans invented
this system and used it in WWII. It used two beams; one transmitted
from Kleve for guidance, and a second cross-beam from Bredstedt. The
bombers followed the first beam until it intersected the second,
directly over the target, and dropped their bombs.

Documents retrieved from downed German bombers showed that the beams
operated on a frequency of 30 MHz. In those days the only receiver that
was capable of detecting the beams was the Hallicrafters S-27. Fitted
to a search aircraft, the beam was detected. The Germans made this work
easier by testing their system over England instead of Germany.

Knickebein was called "headache" by the British, and jammers dubbed
"aspirins" were developed. Soon German bombing accuracy diminished due
to the interference of the British jammers.

The War's end saw jamming continued but on an even larger scale,
especially with the advent of the Cold War. Stalin decided in 1948 to
launch massive jamming campaigns against the West. At first, the commit-
ment was made using a dozen jammers operating against Russian-language 
broadcasts of the Voice of America. By 1956 about 3,000 Soviet block
jammers were operating against Western broadcasts in all languages. Their
jamming system was administered by a secret department in the Ministry of
Communications, privately known as the Krestyaninova Section. It was 
named after Natalia Krestyanoniva who ran the department for more than 
twenty-five years.

* Introduction to Jamming

The purpose of all jamming is to interfere with the enemy's effective 
use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Use of the spectrum involves the
transmission of information from one point to another. This information
can take the form of voice or non-voice (e.g., video or digital format)
communications, command signals to control remotely located assets, data
returned from remotely located equipment or the location and motion of
friendly or enemy assets (land, sea or air).

Type of Jamming           Purpose
-----------------------   ------------------------------------------------
Communications Jamming    Interferes with enemy ability to pass
                          information over a communications link.

Radar Jamming             Causes radar to fail to acquire target, to stop
                          tracking target or to output false information.

Cover Jamming             Reduces the quality of the desired signal so it
                          cannot be properly processed or so that the
                          information it carries cannot be recovered.

Deceptive Jamming         Causes a radar to improperly process its
                          return signal to indicate an incorrect range
                          or angle to the target.

Decoy                     Looks more like a target than the target does.
                          Causes a guided weapon to attack the decoy
                          rather than its intended target.

For many years, jamming has been called electromagnetic countermeasures
(ECM), but it is now referred to in most literature as electronic attack
(EA). EA also includes the use of high levels of radiated power or 
directed energy to physically damage enemy assets. Jamming is sometimes
called "soft kill" because it temporarily makes an enemy asset ineffective
but does not destroy it.

The basic technique of jamming is to place an interfering signal into an
enemy receiver along with the desired signal. Jamming becomes effective
when the interfering signal in the receiver is strong enough to prevent
the enemy from recovering the required information from the desired signal,
either because the information content in the desired signal is overwhelmed
by the power of the jamming signal or because the combined signals (desired
and jamming) have characteristics that prevent a processor from properly
extracting or using the desired information.

Communications jamming (COMJAM) is the jamming of communications signals.
This is normally considered the jamming of tactical HF, VHF and UHF
signals using noise-modulated cover jamming, but it can also mean the
jamming of point-to-point microwave communications links or command and
data links to and from remote assets.

The effectiveness of a jammer is calculable only in the context of the
enemy receiver that it jams. The most common way to describe that effec-
tiveness is in terms of the ratio of the effective jammer power (i.e.
the jamming signal power that gets into the heart and soul of the recei-
ver) to the signal power (that the receiver really wants to receive).
This is called the "jamming to signal ratio," or the "J-to-S ratio," or 
simply the "J/S."

Jamming signals are, by their nature, one-way transmissions. In general,
the performance of the jamming signal is the same whether its target
is a communications receiver or a radar receiver. Its acceptance by the 
receiver differs from that of the desired signal in two ways.

- First, unless the receiver has an omnidirectional antenna, the antenna
gain will vary as a function of the azimuth or elevation from which the
antenna receives signals. Thus, the jamming and the desired signal will
experience different receiving antenna gains unless they arrive from the
same direction.
- Second, jamming signals must often be much wider in frequency than the
signals they are jamming because the desired signal's exact frequency
cannot be measured or predicted. In predicting the J/S, it is important
to count only the part of the jamming signal power that falls within the
receiver's operating bandwidth.

Every type of receiver must have an adequate signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
in order to properly process the signals it is designed to receive. The
SNR is the power ratio of the desired signal to the noise power in the
receiver's bandwidth. The received desired-signal power is a function of
the transmitter power, the length of the transmission path, the operating
frequency and (for radars) the radar cross section (RCS) of the target.
Cover jamming injects additional noise into the receiver, which has the 
same effect as increasing the transmission-path length or decreasing the
RCS of a radar's target.

When the jamming noise is significantly higher than the receiver's thermal
noise, we speak of the jamming-to-signal (J/S) ratio rather than the SNR,
but the effect on signal reception and processing is the same. If cover
jamming is increased gradually, the operator or the automatic processing
circuitry following the receiver may never become aware that jamming is
present - only that the "SNR" is becoming extremely low.

The required RCS depends on the nature of the received signal and the way
it is processed to extract its information. For voice communications, the 
SNR will depend on the skill of the speaker and the listener and the 
nature of the messages being passed. Effective communication ceases when
the SNR rises to the point at which no information can be received. For
digital signals, inadequate SNR causes bit errors and communication ceases 
when the bit error rate is too high to pass messages.

If frequency hopping is employed in either radar or communications appli-
cations, the frequency band accepted by the receiver is a "moving target"
When other types of spread-spectrum techniques are used, the signal is
spread over a wide frequency range that the receiver can reverse to 
achieve the sensitivity appropriate to the signal before it was spread.
The problem for the jammer is that to be effective, it must spread its
available power over the entire frequency that the receiver might be
receiving - over all the angular space that might contain the receiving
antenna - during all of the time that the receiver might be accepting 
signal energy. Still, it is only the amount of power that gets through
all of the receiver's defenses, that contributes to J/S. Since a jammer's
transmitter power is directly related to its size, weight, prime power
availability and cost, the answer is seldom just to increase the jammer
output power until there is enough effective jammer power.
The more the jammer knows about the operation of the receiver, the more
narrowly it can focus its jamming power to what the receiver will notice.
Jammer energy-focusing is called "power management," and it can only be
as good as the information available about the jammed receiver. The
bottom line is that the jammer can concentrate its power where it will
do the most good.

* The great carriers hunt

Many dxers -especially the 'spook hunters-, often report carriers
on many frequencies between 4 and 6 MHz. Sometimes a station pops
up after a while, but most of the times nothing happens. At least 
that's what you think. Although I have no solid proof, I am pretty
sure that these carriers have a purpose, namely to attract jammers.
When the jammers are busy jamming the carriers, the station itself
can broadcast without being jammed.

A few examples:
The 'chase': 5721 17.03 jammer, stopped at 17.03; jumped to 5680 at
17.05 because there was an carrier. Both carrier and jammer stopped
at 17.06. The jammer jumped from 5680 to 5729 and stopped after one 
minute. Then to 5768 at 17.07 and stayed there also for one minute. 
Back again to 5729 where it was active for quite a while.

Another one: 5660 17.45 UTC a Clandestine? stn with a marching song and
a male voice in unid language came on. Its signal was good. About 30-40
seconds later, the jammer on 5658 jumped to 5660 kHz. 10 seconds later
two other jammers joined in, all power houses. Very loud. The station
often changed frequency, hopping up and down the dial with no obvious
"strategy" in 10, 20 or 30 kHz steps. It was chased by 3 jammers. It
took the jammers not much time to catch up with the station.

''Is someone listening to all these frequencies so that he can switch on
the jamming device at the right moment?'', you may ask. No, not really.
But it's close....... This is how it works:

o HF JAMMING SYSTEMS
often have automatic frequency control tracking capabilities for signal
analysis, so that you can select a mode that has to be jammed (eg CW or
voice). A look-through feature suspends jamming when a target's trans-
mission has stopped, immediately directing the system to other freqs 
selected for jamming. This automatically means that the jamming of SAR
frequency 5680 kHz is either intentionally or they just don't care, as
virtually all modern systems work with databases filled with target 
frequencies. You can include or exclude frequencies very easily, so 
they probably just don't care who they are jamming.

o VHF JAMMING
works in slightly different way: a computer allows the Jam-System to
constantly monitor the frequency range and to respond instantly to 
changes in the electro-magnetic environment. Then it starts its jamming
activities.

* Field Manual 24-33

The various types of jamming signals are described in the US Army
Field Manual 24-33 chapter 3. This is an exact quote of the relevant
parts of the text, hence the  'we', 'us' and 'our' expressions :-)

o Types of Jamming Signals
Jamming is an effective way for the enemy to disrupt our command,
control, and communications on the battlefield. All the enemy needs
to jam us is a transmitter tuned to our frequency with enough power
to override friendly signals at our receivers. Jammers operate against
receivers--not transmitters. There are two modes of jamming: spot and
barrage. Spot jamming is concentrated power directed toward one channel
or frequency.
Barrage jamming is power spread over several frequencies or channels 
at the same time. Jamming can be difficult, if not impossible to detect.
For this reason, we must always be aware of the possibility of jamming 
and be able to recognize it. The two types of jamming most commonly 
encountered are obvious and subtle jamming. 

A) Obvious jamming
This is normally very simple to detect. The more commonly used jamming
signals of this type are described below. Do not try to memorize them;
just be aware that these and others exist. When experiencing a jamming
incident, it is more important to recognize and overcome the incident
than to identify it formally. 

* Random noise
This is synthetic radio noise. It is random in amplitude and frequency. 
It is similar to normal background noise and can be used to degrade all
types of signals. Operators often mistake it for receiver or atmospheric
noise and fail to take appropriate ECCM actions. 

(note: this one sounds like a sudden increase in athmospheric noise.
A variation of this type transmits noise bursts.  -Ary-)

* Stepped tones
These are tones transmitted in increasing and decreasing pitch. They 
resemble the sound of bagpipes. Stepped tones are normally used against
single-channel AM or FM voice circuits. 

* Spark
The spark signal is easily produced and is one of the most effective
for jamming. Bursts are of short duration and high intensity. They are
repeated at a rapid rate. This signal is effective in disrupting all
types of radio communications.

* Gulls
The gull signal is generated by a quick rise and slow fall of a 
variable radio frequency and is similar to the cry of a sea gull. It
produces a nuisance effect and is very effective against voice radio
communications. 

* Random pulse
In this type of interference, pulses of varying amplitude, duration, 
and rate are generated and transmitted. They are used to disrupt tele-
typewriter, radar, and all types of data transmission systems. 

(note: this pulse-keyed CW signal sounds like a power drill.  -Ary-)

* Wobbler
The wobbler signal is a single frequency which is modulated by a low
and slowly varying tone. The result is a howling sound that causes a
nuisance effect on voice radio communications. 

(note: this type is also known as 'warble' or 'bubble' jammer. It
sounds like 'woo woo woo woo'  -Ary-)

* Recorded sounds
Any audible sound, especially of a variable nature, can be used to 
distract radio operators and disrupt communications. Music, screams,
applause, whistles, machinery noise, and laughter are examples.

(note: the 'backwards music station' (XM) and 'the workshop' (XW) are
good examples, also the one that Simon calls the "Reverberator" which,
as the name suggests, sounds like endless reverberation - similar to
the sound of a crowded room.  -Ary-)

* Preamble jamming
This type of jamming occurs when a tone resembling the synchronization 
preamble of the speech security equipment is broadcast over the 
operating frequency of secure radio sets. Preamble jamming results in
all radios being locked in the receive mode. It is especially effective
when employed against radio nets using speech security devices. 

(Additional jamming signals, not mentioned in FM24-33 are:
* Carrier-sweep
This one sounds like an automobile engine at high-speed.

* Grunting
Produced by modulating an AM transmitter with a very low audio frequency 
varying at a random rate. Sounds exactly like it is named)

B) Subtle jamming
Subtle jamming is not obvious; no sound is heard from our receivers.
They cannot receive an incoming friendly signal, even though everything
appears normal to the radio operator. Subtle jamming takes advantage of
design features of the AN/PRC-77 and AN/VRC-12 series radios. In order
to activate the receiver of an AN/PRC-77 in the SQUELCH mode or an
AN/VRC-12 series radio in the NEW SQUELCH ON mode, a 150-hertz tone must
be transmitted to them along with the carrier signal. In addition to this
squelch feature, the AN/PRC-77 and AN/VRC-12 series radio receivers lock
onto the strongest carrier signal received and eliminate the reception of
all other signals. For example, if we have an AN/PRC-77 in the SQUELCH
mode and an AN/VRC-12 series radio in the NEW SQUELCH ON mode and they 
receive a jamming signal without the 150-hertz tone, the receivers of 
these radios will not be activated by any signal as long as the jamming
signal is stronger than any other signal being received. In effect, the 
threat jammers block out these radios' ability to receive a friendly 
transmission without the operator being aware it is happening. This is
called squelch capture and is a subtle jamming technique. The radio 
operator can readily detect jamming in all other function control modes 
and the other modes must be checked. Often, we assume that our radios 
are malfunctioning instead of recognizing subtle jamming for what it is. 

o Recognizing Jamming
Radio operators must be able to recognize jamming. Again, this is not
always an easy task. Threat jammers may employ obvious or subtle jamming
techniques. Also, interference may be caused by sources having nothing
to do with enemy jamming. Interference may be caused by the following: 

      Unintentionally by other radios (friendly and enemy). 
      Other electronic or electric/electromechanical equipment. 
      Atmospheric conditions. 
      Malfunction of the radio. 
      A combination of any of the above. 

Internal or external interference.
The two sources of interference are internal and external. If the inter-
ference or suspected jamming can be eliminated or substantially reduced
by grounding the radio equipment or disconnecting the receiver antenna,
the source of the disturbance is most likely external to the radio. If
the interference or suspected jamming remains after grounding or discon-
necting the antenna, the disturbance is most likely internal and is 
caused by a malfunction of the radio. Maintenance personnel should be
 contacted to repair it. External interference must be checked further
for enemy jamming or unintentional interference. 

Jamming or unintentional interference.
Unintentional interference may be caused by other radios, some other 
type of electronic or electric/electromechanical equipment, or atmos-
pheric conditions. The battlefield is so crowded with radios and other 
electronic equipment that some unintentional interference is virtually 
unavoidable. Also, the static electricity produced by atmospheric 
conditions can negatively affect radio communications. Unintentional
interference normally travels only a short distance, and a search of
the immediate area may reveal the source of this type of interference.
Moving the receiving antenna for short distances may cause noticeable 
variations in the strength of the interfering signal. These variations 
normally indicate unintentional interference. Conversely, little or no 
variation normally indicates enemy jamming. 

The enemy can use two types of jamming signals: powerful unmodulated or
noise-modulated signals. Unmodulated jamming signals are characterized
by a lack of noise. Noise-modulated jamming signals are characterized by 
obvious interference noises.

o Overcome jamming
Adjust the receiver. When jamming is experienced, we should always
check to ensure the receiver is tuned as precisely as possible to the
desired incoming signal. A slight readjustment of the receiver may
provide an improved signal-to-jamming ratio. Depending on the radio 
being used, some of these methods are:
    
      Adjust the beat frequency oscillator (BFO). 
      Adjust the bandwidth. 
      Adjust the gain or volume control. 
      Fine tune the frequency. 

Adjust or change the antenna. Antenna adjustments can appreciably 
improve the signal-to-jamming ratio. When jamming is experienced, the
radio operator should ensure the antenna is optimally adjusted to 
receive the desired incoming signal. Depending on the antenna being 
used, some of these methods are:

      Reorient the antenna. 
      Change the antenna polarization. (Must be done by all stations) 
      Install an antenna with a longer range. 

Relocate the antenna. Frequently, the signal-to-jamming ratio may be
improved by relocating the antenna and associated radio set affected 
by the jamming or unidentified interference. This may mean moving a few
meters or several hundred meters. It is best to relocate the antenna and
associated radio set so that there is a terrain feature between them and
any suspected enemy jamming location. 

                       -o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-o-

Sources:
Anthony Uminn, Paige Chia, William Kangas ('Jamming Radio Signals', 1997)
'Codebreaking and Secret Weapons in World War II' by Bill Momsen
JED - Journal of Electric Defense
US Army Field Manual 24-33 chapter 3
US Army Field Manual 34

Special thanks to the following dxers for their logs and comments:
Tony Orr, Alan Gale, Iron Eagle, Markus Buttinger, Day Watson, Alec
Muffett, Clarence Thompson, John Maky, Roger Preston, Simon Denneen,
and various anonymous dxers.

****************************************************
Numbers + Oddities Logs column 
Jascha Ruesseler
Ruessele@pc0401.psychologie.uni-marburg.de
****************************************************
Hi, folks, her we go again..
Our log format is as follows:

FREQ c/s Station (Enigma Code) Time (date) Mode (baud) Remarks
(Initials)

Example:
10426 Lincolnshire Poacher (E3) 1540 (April 13) USB ongoing msg (JR)

The logs in this column are taken from the spooks mailing list. I also
include some logs from the wun-list which are not cross-posted to
spooks. If you want to remain anonymous, you can sent your logs to me
or Ary.

---------------------------------------------------
 2626  Mossad (E10) 1731 (June 7) USB unable to make out id but passed
       2 msgs (SD)
 3927  atencion stn (V2) 0100 (May 31) (BR)
 4016  cut no's CW (M8) 0300 (June 1) (BR)
 4028  ?? cut no's (M8) 0300 (June 9)  CW ANRMA MMGNA NNGTA (BR)
 4029  Spanish Lady  0530 (June 5) AM YL/SS 5F groups.  Off at 0545 UTC
       with "FINAL"x3.(JM)
 4120  //4450 Reverberator 1004 (May 27) AM in progress (SD)
 4165  ?: Mossad, ISR 22.18 (May 21) USB MIW2 transmission (AB)
 4174  Spanish Lady (V2) 1002 (May 27) USB in progress (SD)
 4479  Atencion stn (V2) 0300 (May 26) (BR)
 4479  atencion stn (V2)  0300 (June 2) (BR)
 4479  atencion stn (V2) 0300 (June 10) AM (BR)
 4506  cut no's CW (M8) 0100 (May 28) (BR)
 4506  cut no's CW (M8) 0300 (June 2)  (BR)
 4625  The Buzzer (S28) 1453 (June 11) USB idle mode (SD)
 4665  ?: Mossad, ISR 22.20 (May 21) USB KPA2 transmission (AB)
 4506  cut no's stn (M8) 0300 (June 10)  CW (BR)
 4506  cut no's stn (M8) 0100 (June 11)  CW very weak & noisy condx
          (BR)
 4973  RR/F (S21) 1742 (May 28) AM  973R4 798 798 41 41 (GD2)
 5116  cut no's stn (M8) 0200 (June 12)  CW (BR) 
 5180  Cherta (S12) 2100 (June 3) 671/00 Not sure of first figure of
          ID (GD2)
 5230  Mossad (E10) 1815 (June 7) USB id MIW2 (SD)
 5340  English     (G2)  0757 (May 28) AM  58955 01331 71226 (GD2)
 5419  cut no's CW (M8) 0200 (June 1) (BR) 5416  cut no's CW (M8) 0300
       (June 2)  (BR) 
 5416  cut no's stn (M8) 0300 (June 10) CW (BR) 
 5435  Mossad (E10) 1802 (June 7) USB id ART with 2 msg grps 14 & 93 (SD) 
 5435  Mossad (E10) 1502 (June 14) USB id ART2 (SD) 
 5629  Mossad (E10) 1816 (June 7) USB id KPA2 (SD)
 5630  Three Note Oddity (sorry, i deleted  the time-ed.) (June 7)
       USB msg. (HFD)
 5688  Babbler 1325 (May 24) USB SP W test counts. (ANUS)
 5637  Babbler 2242 (May 23) USB idle (ANUS)
 5730  Three Note Oddity 2005 (June 7) USB 
       Msg.: 32147 65458 21002 95458 32125 45214 05658 78547 66655
       22147 32125 45214 84547 05458 32125 44520 33321 85457 33258
       65452 45214 55547 32125 00087 32125 Note the "32147" on 1 and
       "32125" 5, 11, 15, and 25 (HFD)
 5758  cut no's CW (M8) 0300 (June 4)  (BR)
 5758  cut no's stn (M8) 0200 (June 10)  CW with MTWTN GDGAN ATUGN (BR)
 5800  atencion stn (V2) 0300 (June 1) (BR)
 6797  atencion stn (V2) 0200 (June 1) (BR)
 6825  cut no's CW (M8) 1200 (May 28) (BR) 
 6825  ?? cut no's (M8) 0200 (June 9) CW  (BR)
 6825  cut no's stn (M8) 1200 (June 11)  CW (BR)
 6826  atencion stn (V2) 0300 (June 1) (BR) 
 6826  atencion stn (V2) 0300 (June 2)  (BR) 
 6826  atencion stn (V2) 0300 (June 10) AM (BR) 6855  atencion stn (V2)
       0300 (June 1) (BR) 
 6867  Russian man (?) 0200 (June 10)  msg 538 then 5fig x 2 (BR) 
 6868  Bored Man 1406 (May 24) USB "R290" msg // 4106.  (ANUS)
 6982  ?? cut no's (M8) 1200 (June 8) CW  (BR) 6982  cut no's stn (M8)
       1200 (June 15)  CW (BR)
 6983  atencion stn (V2) 0200 (May 29) strong carrier, weak audio (BR)
 6983  atencion stn (V2) 0200 (June 12) AM (BR)
 6985  Spanish Lady  0204 (June 11) AM SS/YL/5FG Ended with three
       "hello?"s (JL)
 7250  English     (G2)  0957 (May 28) AM  Repeat of above /GD2) 
 7337  ?: Lincolnshire Poacher, CYP 22.00 (May 21) USB Id 28065.
       //9251 //12603 kHz (AB)
 7540  Mossad (E10) 1532 (June 14) USB id JSR2
 7583  atencion stn (V2) 0200 (June 10)  AM (BR)
 7726  Spanish Lady (V2) 0538 (June 3) AM in progress (SD)
 7888  ?? cut no's (M8) 0100 (June 9) CW RIRTA RWMWD GDGAA (BR)
 8188  English     (G2)  0957 (May 28) AM  Repeat of above (GD2)
 8320  // 12056 // 13866  E4  1200  USB 78640 (7) beeps 42200 5ngs.
       All frqs were good today.(CT)
 8320  //  12056 (E4) 1200 (June 3)   usb   03191  5ngs.(CT) 
       noticed parkhall voice scrambling on 8320 usb today (June 3) (CT)
 8320  s7dB // 12056 s1dB  // 13866 s1dB   Cherry Ripe (E4) 1200 (June
       8)  usb  94275 5ngs 86273 86273.(CT)
 8320  // 12056 // 13866  e4 Cherry Ripe  1200 (June 12) usb  33437 5ngs
       good signals this am local.(CT)
 8320  s7dB // 13866 s2dB // 12056 s3dB  cherry ripe (E4) 1200 (June
       17)  usb  58820 5ngs 05104.(CT)
 8983  Backwards Music Station (XM) 1738 (June 7) USB in progress (SD)
 9130  Mossad (E10) 0525 (June 3) USB id EZI2 (SD) 
 9218  X6 Polytone Station (tent) 0606 (May 27) (SD) 
 9218  High Pitched Polytone (XPH) 0605 (May 27) AM in progress (SD) 
 9238  Spanish Lady (V2) 0604 (May 27) AM in progress (SD)
 9238  Spanish Lady (V2) 0600 (June 3) AM unable to make out id (SD)
 9260  atencion stn (V2) 0200 (June 10)  AM (BR) 
 9263  Cherry Ripe (E4)  1115 (June 3)  usb  5 ngs  missed callup.(CT)
 9263  // 13688 // 14469   Cherry Ripe (E4) 1100 (June 15)  usb 
       94349 5ngs(CT)
 9326  Russian Man (S6) 0528 (June 4) USB in progress (SD)
 9394  XPH - High Pitch Polytone Station 0602 (June 5) AM SINPO55545 
       Off at 0604z (ABe)
10223  count stn (E5) 1200 (June 10)  USB msg 869 count 215 (BR)
10223  count stn (E5) 1200 (May 26) with msg 829 count 215 (BR)
10223  count stn (E5) 1200 (June 2) with msg 869 count 215 (BR)
10328  BPA FAPSI (M42) 1530 (June 6) rpt of above  (BR)
10529  count stn (E5) 1300 (June 5) with msg 117 count 215 (BR)
10529  TCS 1300 (May 16) AM "CIA" station (JL)
10566  cut no's CW (M8) 1300 (June 5) (BR)
10597  Count stn (E5)  1500 (June 5) USB msg 194 count 126  (BR)
10711  Spanish Man (V7)  0600 (May 28) AM  725x3 000 Null message 
       Repeats same message as sent by M45 at 1702 on 5474 (GD2)
10858  cut no's CW (M8) 1200 (May26) with RGRND UWMID DDWGD (BR)
10858  cut no's CW (M8) 1200 (May 28) (BR)
10858  ?? cut no's (M8) 1200 (June 9)  CW (BR)
10858  cut no's stn (M8) 1200 (June 11) CW (BR)
11149  V7 - Spanish Man 0600 (June 9) AM ss/om/frequency
       id-118/message-1/id
       key-1723/gc-50/5fg SINPO 55545 off at 0610z with 000 000. Tx
       moved imediately to 12149 kHz. (ABe)
11149  Spanish Man (V7) 0600 (June 11) ss/om/frequency id-118/
       call-'000'/no traffic SINPO 55555 off at 0605z. 
       Tx moved after one minute to 12149. (ABe)
11149  Spanish Man (V7) 0600 (June 16) AM
       ss/om/frequency id-118/message-1/id key-810/gc-37/5fg
       SINPO 55444 off at 0609z with 000 000. Tx moved to 12149 kHz
       within 1 minute. Tx went off momentarily during first few 5fg.
       (ABe)
11149  Spanish Man 0600 (June 18) AM
       ss/om/frequency id-118/message-1/id key-810/gc-37/5fg
       SINPO 55555 off at 0609z with 000 000. Tx moved to 12149 kHz at
       0611z. Heavy Buzz on Tx. (ABe)
11461  cut no's CW (M8) 0200 (June 1) (BR)
11494  XPH - High Pitch Polytone Station 0621 (June 5) AM SINPO55545
       Off at 0624z (ABe)
11570  // 13866 // 7484(qrn digi) Cherry Ripe (E4) 1300 (June 12) 63696
       5ngs.(CT)
11637  GMN FAPSI (M42) 0045 (June 11)  RTTY (75/425) with
       46's - no tfc (BR) 12056   ?: Cherry Ripe, ? 22.00 (May 21) USB
       Id 35624. //9263  //15624 kHz (AB)
12149  V7 - Spanish Man 0620 (June 9) ss/om/frequency id-118/
       message-1/id key-1723/gc-50/5fg SINPO 55444 off at 0630z with
       000 000. Tx moved imediately to 13849 kHz. (ABe)
12149  Spanish Man (V7) 0610 (June 11) ss/om/frequency id-118/
       call-'000'/no traffic SINPO 55545
       off at 0616z. Tx off imediately. (ABe) 
12149  Spanish Man (V7) 0620 (June 16) AM
       ss/om/frequency id-118/message-1/id key-810/gc-37/5fg
       SINPO 55555 off at 0629z with 000 000. Tx moved to 13849 kHz at
       0630z. (ABe)
12200  Spanish Lady 0208 (June 8) AM SS/YL/5FG (JL)
12215  ?? cut no's (M8) 0100 (June 9) CW TWRTA TATDA TGNMA (BR)
13452  JMS FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2245 (May 25) with 4/671 msgs (BR)
13452  JMS FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2230 (June 2) with 2/180 msgs (BR)
13452  JMS FAPSI (M42) 2239Z (June 12)  RTTY (75/425) rpt of above (BR)
13380  UMK:FAPSI 0010z (June 2) RTTY 75/1000 w/UMK QTC 46s w/one msg :
       11144  00155  24018  01064  01659  w/5LGs, unusual shift
       for this net (ML)
13849  Spanish Man (V7)  0640 (June 16)
       ss/om/frequency id-118/message-1/id key-810/gc-37/5fg
       SINPO 55545 off at 0649z with 000 000. (ABe)
13906  count stn (E5) 1200 (June 10)  USB msg 222 count 215 (BR)
13394  XPH - High Pitch Polytone Station 0640 (June 5) AM SINPO55555
       Off at 0644 (ABe)
13556  HZW FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2012 (May 30) with 2/492 msgs (BR)
13849  V7 - Spanish Man 0640 (June 9) ss/om/frequency id-118/
       message-1/id key-1723/gc-50/5fg
       SINPO 55444 off at 0650z with 000 000. (ABe)
13906  count stn (E5)1200 (June 2) with msg 222 count 215 (BR)
14000  ?: Numbers station E15, ? 17.00 (May 20) USB id Frank Young
       Peter (AB)
14434  KRN FAPSI (M42) 1744 (June 5) rpt of above  (BR)
14487  ?: Lincolnshire Poacher, CYP 17.00 (May 20) USB id 18647 (AB)
14731  BPA FAPSI (M42) 1515 (June 6) RTTY/75 msgs 2/747 (BR)
14843  JMS FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2230 (May 25) with 4/671 msgs (BR)
14843  JMS FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2230 (June 2) with 2/180 msgs (BR)
14843  JMS FAPSI (M42) 2230 (June 8) RTTY/75 msgs 4/1039 (BR)
14843  JMS FAPSI (M42) 2230 (June 9)  RTTY/75 msgs 5/989 (BR)
14843  JMS FAPSI (M42) 2230 (June 12)   RTTY (75/425) with 1/207 msg (BR)
14843  JMS FAPSI (M42) 2230 (June 15)   RTTY (75/425) with 2/210
       msgs (BR)
14930  Spanish Lady 0109 (June 6) AM SS/YL/5FG  (JL) 
15478  // 16050 count stn (V5) 0100 (May 29) with msg 902 (BR)
15478  //16050 count stn (V5) 0100 (June 10) USB msg 902 (BR) 
15624  //19884//21866 Cherry Ripe (E4) 0103Z (June 11) USB id 94275 (SD)
15682  Linconshire Poacher E4 1408 (June 5)  321-24 very weak here. (EB) 
16218  HZW FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2000 (May 30) with 2/492 msgs (BR) 
16218  YBU FAPSI RTTY (M42) 1400 (June 4) with 1/75 msg (BR) 
16218  YBU FAPSI RTTY (M42) 1400 (June 5) with 46's - no tfc (BR) 
16218  KRN FAPSI (M42) 1735 (June 6) RTTY/75 msgs 2/1229    (BR) 
17464  YBU FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2209 (May 25) with 1/168 msg (BR) 
17464  YBU FAPSI (M42) 2207 (June 12)   RTTY (75/425) with "TIKAS" msg:
       "QSL NR 182, NR 183, NR 184" (BR)
17499  //20474 Cherry Ripe E4  2305 (May 24) Sunday Tune barely 
       audible;  numbers not audible (PFR)
17464  YBU FAPSI (M42) 2207 (June 15)   RTTY (75/425) with "TIKAS" msg
       freq sked for 1400 xmsn. (BR)
18703  YBU FAPSI RTTY (M42) 1408 (June 4) with 1/75 msg (BR)
19889  Cherry Ripe E4  0000 (June 3) usb 03068(CT)  
20117  YBU FAPSI RTTY (M42) 2200 (May 25) with 1/168 msg (BR)
20117  YBU FAPSI (M42) 2200 (June 9) RTTY/75 msg 1/123 (BR)
23461  //  17499 //  20474 jammed   Cherry Ripe E4  2300 (June 3)  usb
       63696  5ngs.(CT).


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
                      xtra
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Guy Denman remarks:

Hi All,
I have noticed particularly with Morse Stations, that they are coming
up on the same frequency as 1 year ago in 1997. It does not apply to
all families, but so far I have seen it with M1B, M3,M12, and M13. M3
is even sending the same message as it sent a year ago. It might be
worth checking your logs of voice stations to see if they are doing
the same. I have not heard anything at all of G2 this week. It is one
of those funny weeks, week 5 of May. I will have another listen next
week as that will be week 1 of June.

from Tom Sevart:

Hey gang,
The mystery station P7X is back, this time on 5879.5 with its usual
120 grp 5L msgs interspersed with data xmissions.  I logged P7X on
4439.5 a couple weeks ago.  I think it may possibly be working
parallel on both freqs, but I don't hear it on 4439.5 at the moment.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Contributors:
AB:   Ary Boender, Spijkenisse, the Netherlands
Abe:  Andrew Bell, Merseyside, UK
ANUS: Anonymous Eastern USA
BR:   Bob Roehrig, Aurora, IL
CT:   Clarence Thompson, Texas, USA
EB:   Eric KC5WCP P.O. Box 896 Biloxi, MS 
GD2   Guy Denman, England
HFD:  Hans-Friedrich Dumrese, Trier, Germany
JL:   Jason Lillie
JM:   John Mondary, Annmore, WV, USA
ML:   Murray Lehman, Perth, Australia
PFR:  Paul F. Reah, Phoenix, AZ
SD:   Simon Deneen,Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia.

tnx for all contributions !

000 000 znn de jascha
